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ABSTRACT 
Ashley Reed: Gender, Race, And Secular Agency In American Protestant Fiction, 1820-1870 
(Under the direction of Jane Thrailkill) 
This dissertation argues that disenfranchised authors of the antebellum and early 
postbellum periods used fiction as an imaginative space in which to explore new forms of 
collaborative agency grounded in particular Protestant beliefs. In chapters on Catharine Maria 
Sedgwick, William Wells Brown, Susan Warner and Augusta Jane Evans, and Elizabeth 
Stoddard, it asserts that authors excluded not just from voting citizenship but also from the clergy 
and from sectarian journals explored in fiction questions of atonement, free will, and 
predestination that helped them to imagine into being new forms of spiritual and temporal 
agency. This narrative of religiously based cultural innovation has been overlooked by historicist 
critics working within a secularized and individualist model of self-determination. Building on 
recent work in the field of secularism studies that replaces inaccurate sociological models of 
secularization with a more nuanced description of post-Enlightenment secular society, this 
project illuminates how modern secular conditions offered new opportunities for the circulation 
and expression of religious thought and enabled nineteenth-century authors to envision 
collaborative action across race and gender lines. By attending to the religious concerns woven 
into fictional plots, this dissertation reveals how states and behaviors that look (to a secularized 
criticism) like passivity—expressions of belief, unconscious cognition, collective immersion, or 
willful submission—often represent potent forms of theological engagement that helped writers 
at the political margins catalyze significant cultural change in a volatile period in American 
history. 
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Introduction: Reading Religious Agency in Nineteenth-Century America 
 
Believing in Belief: The Sedgwick Family and the Story of Mum Bett 
This study, focused on Protestant belief and personal agency in nineteenth-century U.S. 
culture, takes up a set of questions exemplified in the case of the African-American slave woman 
Elizabeth Freeman and in the way the story of her experiences circulated in the nineteenth-
century U.S. in the writings of the white Sedgwick family. In 1781 Theodore Sedgwick, a 
Massachusetts lawyer and well known Federalist politician who would serve during his career as 
a delegate to the Continental Congress, a Massachusetts Supreme Court justice, and Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, successfully argued for Freeman’s emancipation before the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Freeman, after her emancipation, joined the Sedgwick family 
as a hired servant and nurse to the seven Sedgwick children, many of whom would pay public 
tribute, as adults, to the influence of Freeman, or “Mum Bett,” whom they regarded as a “second 
mother” and spiritual guide. 
The Sedgwick siblings’ divergent written accounts of Freeman’s life and of her 
emancipation reveal the essential interplay of gender, race, and religious belief in the early 
antebellum public sphere and the possibilities for personal and collective agency that arose from 
the declaration and circulation of such beliefs. In an 1831 lecture at the Stockbridge, 
Massachusetts, Lyceum, Henry Sedgwick, second son of Theodore and a rising lawyer and 
antislavery activist, briefly related the circumstances and the aftermath of Freeman’s case, 
highlighting Theodore Sedgwick’s legal achievement in obtaining Freeman’s freedom: 
	   2 
The case was tried at Great Barrington. Mum Bett was declared free: it being, I 
believe, the first instance… of the practical application of the declaration in the 
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, that ‘all men are born free and equal.’ The late 
Judge Sedgwick had the principal agency in her deliverance. She attached herself 
to his family as a servant.... If there could be a practical refutation of the imagined 
natural superiority of our race to hers, the life and character of this woman would 
afford that refutation. She knew her station, and perfectly observed its decorum. 
(16) 
 
When Henry’s younger sister Catharine, a successful author of novels and short stories, 
recounted the story of Freeman’s emancipation in a short sketch for a British literary journal, her 
contrasting account emphasized Freeman’s agency rather than Theodore’s: 
It was soon after the close of the revolutionary war, that she chanced at the village 
‘meeting house,’ in Sheffield, to hear the Declaration of Independence read. She 
went the next day to the office of Mr. Theodore Sedgewick [sic]…. “Sir,” said 
she, “I heard that paper read yesterday, that says, ‘all men are born equal, and that 
every man has a right to freedom.[’] I am not a dumb critter; won’t the law give 
me my freedom?”… Such a resolve as hers is like God’s messengers—wind, 
snow, and hail—irresistible.… Mr. Sedgewick [sic] immediately instituted a suit 
on behalf of the extraordinary plaintiff; a decree was obtained in her favour.… 
Mum-Bett immediately transferred herself to the service of her champion, if 
service that could be called, which was quite as much rule as service. 
 (“Slavery in New England” 421-422)  
 
Henry’s and Catharine’s accounts of Freeman’s emancipation situate agency and the 
source of that agency in very different places. Henry’s rendition of Freeman’s tale locates agency 
in a series of legal and logical processes initiated and controlled by the white lawyer Theodore 
Sedgwick: Freeman is “declared free” by virtue of the “practical application” of the 
Declaration’s principles, with little to no contribution from Freeman herself. The rational 
workings of the democratic public sphere are displayed by way of Freeman’s passive body, and 
her subordination is emphasized in her single act of “attaching herself” to Theodore’s family. In 
Henry’s telling, Freeman’s humanity exists primarily in the negative, in her perfect suitability for 
the role of servant: Henry’s “Mum-Bett” paradoxically proves the “superiority” of the black race 
by “knowing her station” and “perfectly observing its decorum.” 
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Catharine’s version of Freeman’s story emphasizes not the impersonal agency vested in 
legal processes controlled by white men, but the personal and spiritual agency claimed by 
Freeman herself and the effect of that agency in the public sphere. In Catharine’s rendition, it is 
Freeman’s belief in her own equality that prompts her to seek out Theodore’s assistance and set 
in motion the legal case for her freedom. Freeman’s powerful belief is rooted in religious 
conviction applied to the principles of the Declaration: denying that she is a dumb “critter,” she 
speaks in the voice of “God’s messengers,” declaring that she was “born equal” and that “every 
man has a right to freedom.” Once free she actively “transfers herself” to a paid position in 
Theodore Sedgwick’s family that, according to Catharine, resembles rule more than service and 
that Freeman holds by a “divine right.” This act of “transferal” contrasts sharply with Henry’s 
description of Freeman as “attaching herself” to Theodore’s family—a formulation that 
emphasizes her dependence on the Sedgwicks’ largesse rather than her self-determined choice to 
enter into their employ.  
In Catharine’s narrative, belief in her own God-given humanity allows the enslaved black 
woman Elizabeth Freeman to approach the white, wealthy, and politically powerful Theodore 
Sedgwick and enlist his assistance: Theodore, rather than assuming the “principal agency” as in 
Henry’s telling, instead “meets” Mum Bett on her own moral ground and initiates a case “on her 
behalf.” It is Freeman’s “resolve”—her moral energy, not Theodore’s—that initiates the 
cooperative effort between them that transforms the “constitutional abstraction” of legal equality 
into personal and historical reality. Belief, in Catharine’s version of Freeman’s story, is the 
engine that makes personal agency possible, bridging the chasms of race, class, and gender that 
separate Freeman from Theodore Sedgwick. Freeman’s belief, in turn, led to wider social 
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change: the Sedgwicks credited Freeman’s case with ending all forms of slavery in 
Massachusetts.1 
The repeated narrativization of Freeman’s story by members of the Sedgwick family thus 
provided an imaginative space in which the influential New England siblings might interrogate 
the relationship between religious and political belief, personal identity, and human agency. 
Catharine, in particular, retold Elizabeth Freeman’s story throughout her 40-year career, 
proliferating fictional models of cross-race, cross-gender, and cross-class agency based on the 
religious resolve of Elizabeth Freeman. Versions of Freeman’s story appear not only in “Slavery 
in New England” but in Catharine’s 1835 novel The Linwoods, her unpublished antislavery story 
from the 1830s,2 and most famously in her 1827 novel Hope Leslie, in which Elizabeth Freeman 
is immortalized in the character of Magawisca, a Pequot woman who prevents the execution of 
an innocent man. In each of these texts Sedgwick reenvisioned Freeman as a figure who could 
wield agency and effect change despite disenfranchisement, simply by virtue of the power of 
belief.   
Once these fictional models of agentive belief entered the public sphere, they could in 
turn be emulated in the arenas of political agitation and moral reform. In March 1831, the 
African-American abolitionist Sarah Louisa Forten, writing for The Liberator, adopted the pen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1
 For a discussion of the legal history of this and other cases that led to the abolition of slavery in 
Massachusetts—a far more drawn out and complex process than either Henry or Catharine describes—see 
Emily Blanck’s “Seventeen Eighty-Three: The Turning Point in the Law of Slavery and Freedom in 
Massachusetts” and Arthur Zilversmit’s “Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of Slavery in 
Massachusetts.” Contemporary legal scholars are generally in agreement that Freeman’s case, while 
representing an important step in the eventual abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, was not immediately 
responsible for it. 
 
2
 Though the manuscript is undated, Karen Woods Weierman convincingly dates the composition of the 
story to the early 1830’s. See Weierman’s “‘A Slave Story I Began and Abandoned.’” 
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name “Magawisca” to exhort slaveholders to amend their ways and to act in accordance with 
their professed religious beliefs: 
Awake from your lethargy; exert every nerve; cast off the yoke from the 
oppressed; let the bondsman go free; and cry unto your offended God to send 
freedom... I say, cry unto Him for aid; for can you think that He, the Great Spirit, 
who created all men free and equal... will always allow you to rest tranquil on 
your downy couches? No... He will shake the tree of liberty, and its blossoms 
shall spread over the earth. 
 
Writing in a voice that invokes both the Biblical prophets of the Old Testament and Sedgwick’s 
fictional heroine, Forten, like Freeman, makes a cross-race and cross-gender appeal based on 
belief in her own equality and in God’s ultimate justice. 
This dissertation examines figurations of agentive belief in the fiction of the antebellum 
and early postbellum United States and argues that disenfranchised authors of the early- to mid-
nineteenth century—those explicitly excluded from electoral political participation, from the 
clergy, and from institutions of higher education—transformed the realm of published fiction 
into a creative laboratory in which to imagine into being new forms of collaborative agency 
grounded in shared Protestant beliefs. Each of my chapters investigates how the emplotment of 
theological concepts and controversies enabled female and African-American authors otherwise 
denied cultural power to imagine and narratively construct new models of personal and 
collective agency that were legible within the context of the nineteenth-century Protestant public 
sphere. Inhabiting and fictionalizing the terms of particular doctrinal debates, I argue, gave 
disenfranchised writers a language and a set of symbolic structures with which to envision new 
ways of being and acting in the world—ways that were simultaneously compatible with and 
transformative of contemporary theological principles and cultural norms. 
The authors included in this study demonstrate what the religious historian Mary 
Bednarowski calls “theological creativity”: the willingness and ability to adapt existing 
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doctrines, or even to invent new ones, in ways that are meaningful for individuals and often for 
the community as a whole (15). I argue that women and African-American authors of the 
antebellum period employed the language of Protestant doctrine and theology because it was 
both a natural and familiar form of discourse and an accepted means by which to enter into 
public discussion about the role of disenfranchised persons in society and the modes of action in 
which they might engage. Excluded from the clergy and from the sectarian journals and 
institutions of higher education where formalized doctrinal debate took place, disenfranchised 
authors turned to fiction as a space for religious reflection and for imagining alternative ways of 
being, believing, and acting in the world.3  
More than what individual authors believe, this project is about what texts believe—how 
novels participate in the public sphere by positing and performing historically and culturally 
contingent forms of belief and thereby cultivating those beliefs in readers. Investigating the role 
of belief in nineteenth-century texts is not simply a task of translation or explication; while the 
details of doctrine are important insofar as they represent cognitive structures through which 
individuals and communities understand the world, investigating a text’s belief system is not 
simply a matter of researching the details of Calvinist or Unitarian or Spiritualist doctrine and 
overlaying those details onto a text to produce a legible reading of its (or its author’s) theological 
commitments. Rather, to ask what a text believes is to investigate both the world from which a 
text emerges and the reformed world that it imagines into being, and to consider what conditions 
of existence and possibilities for agency that world presupposes and makes narratively viable. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3
 This dissertation is in one sense a companion story to David Reynolds’s “From Doctrine to Narrative: 
The Rise of Pulpit Storytelling in America,” which traces the evolution of the clerical sermon in 
antebellum America from a form that served primarily as a delivery mechanism for theological 
propositions to one that inspired and moved listeners through the medium of narrative. This dissertation 
demonstrates, among other things, that at the same time that the preached sermon was becoming more 
narratively driven, popular narrative was serving as a forum for doctrinal discussion. 
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This dissertation approaches nineteenth-century fiction by disenfranchised authors as a series of 
imaginative worlds in which the public agency of women and African Americans became 
imaginable precisely insofar as such agency was readable and resonant within the terms of 
nineteenth-century Protestant doctrinal discourse—insofar as it represented what William James 
called a “living option” (“Will” 3). Nineteenth-century fiction, I argue, was the arena in which 
the skeleton of Protestant doctrine put on the sinews of personal agency and walked forth into the 
world. 
 
A Social History of Belief 
In “The American Scholar,” his 1837 address to the Harvard Chapter of the Phi Beta 
Kappa Society, Ralph Waldo Emerson asserted that  
As the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of God, so it is ever to so much of 
his attributes as we bring to it.... [I]n proportion as a man has any thing in him 
divine, the firmament flows before him and takes his signet and form. Not he is 
great who can alter matter, but he who can alter my state of mind. (86) 
 
Emerson’s vision of a world that responds to the belief and behavior of individuals reflects not 
only his own intellectual experience but the cultural terms of the nineteenth-century Protestant 
public sphere, in which belief—and the ability to shape the beliefs of others—was indeed the 
most potent of cultural currencies. Emerson’s model of divinity—including human divinity—is 
discursive: both the heavens and human opinion are shaped by the expression of belief, and it is 
these expressions that distinguish great men from ordinary ones.  
This dissertation project also approaches belief as a discursive process, one that inspired 
and informed new models of agency during the antebellum and immediately post-bellum 
periods. It treats belief—and the varieties of Protestant doctrine present in the nineteenth-century 
United States in particular—as discourse rather than ideology: as “something that you do... rather 
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than something to which you are subjected” (Mills 79). And it reveals how mastering, 
internalizing, and producing Protestant religious discourse enabled not only men like Emerson 
but also women and African Americans to imagine into being new forms of agency for 
themselves and their communities.4 This project does not set out to prove that religious belief 
enables agency in all contexts and under all circumstances, but instead details how, under the 
cultural terms of the nineteenth-century public sphere, the exploration of doctrine through fiction 
enabled disenfranchised authors to imagine multiple and contingent forms of agency that were 
both brought into being and simultaneously bounded by the social conditions and sectarian 
structures from which they emerged. 
Treating nineteenth-century novels as both intellectual products and imaginary worlds 
where new forms of belief can be explored, this project approaches belief as a set of active, 
though not necessarily conscious, choices: performances of the will involving mind, body, and 
soul that take rhetorical or textual form but at the same time cannot be reduced to the merely 
rational or intellectual. William James, writing of belief as an act of will, spoke of the range of 
beliefs available to members of a community or culture as “hypotheses” with varying degrees of 
“liveness”: “The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. 
Practically, that means belief” (“Will” 3). But to speak of belief as “hypothesis” risks over-
intellectualizing an act and a state of being that involves every aspect of experience—mental, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
 In employing a discourse model of religious adherence rather than an ideological one, I am implicitly 
distinguishing between doctrinal agency and doctrinal determinism. Doctrinal determinism is the 
suggestion that religious doctrine (or any deeply held belief or group adherence including, for instance, 
political party identification) does not merely influence and inform but actually determines the behavior 
of those who hold particualr beliefs, and does so in stable and predictable ways. Doctrinal determinism is 
a surprisingly resilient ideology in its own right—one that frequently arises, for instance, during elections, 
as when commentators feared that Barack Obama would follow in lockstep the dictates of Pastor 
Jeremiah Wright, or that Mitt Romney sought the presidency in order to fulfill the “White Horse 
prophecy” of Joseph Smith. Such predictions are little different from the nineteenth-century accusation 
that Catholics were unfit for public office because their loyalties ostensibly lay with the pope rather than 
with the American people. 
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emotional, spiritual, and physical—and sometimes operates below or beyond the level of 
individual consciousness.5 As I will elaborate later in this introduction during my discussion of 
secularism theory, to approach belief as an entirely cognitive process is to misapprehend the 
variety of ways that belief can be experienced and enacted in the world. 
As a complex aspect of human experience, belief has multiple valences, intersecting with 
factual knowledge and affective positions in myriad ways. The religious philosopher J.L. 
Schellenberg, building on James and other observers of religious experience, usefully 
distinguishes between propositional belief—the condition of thinking that a certain state of 
affairs exists and has the quality of reality—and affective belief, which involves both the 
acknowledgment that a certain state of affairs exists and an accompanying “affective or 
emotional state” related to that reality.6 Schellenberg calls propositional belief “belief-that,” as in 
“I believe that Santa Claus is a myth,” and affective belief “belief-in,” as in “I believe in racial 
equality” (67-74). The different temporal registers of these formulations—“belief-that” 
something currently is so and “belief-in” the possibility that something might be so—index the 
tension between them: one may believe-in equal pay for men and women while also believing-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is not to say that James always approaches belief as a solely cognitive process; “The Will to 
Believe,” The Varieties of Religious Experience, and James’s other writings on religion are too wide-
ranging to be summarized and dismissed in one quotation. I offer a more extended discussion of James in 
the coda to this dissertation. 
 
6
 Most religious historians do not make this distinction, but define all Protestant belief as “propositional” 
(or sometimes “creedal”). It is certainly true that Protestant sects have traditionally emphasized both the 
fact of belief and the correctness of one’s belief, with correct belief serving as the marker of inclusion in a 
particular religious community. This is why Protestant reform movements seek to realign the set of 
beliefs that define one as inside or outside the community while nevertheless insisting that belief itself is 
indispensable. This is the reform impulse that William Wells Brown invokes in Clotel when he labels the 
abolitionist woman Georgiana Peck a “true Christian” while leaving her father, an ordained but 
proslavery Methodist minister, outside the circle of “true Christianity.” Proper belief—in this case 
abolitionism—rather than ordination becomes the mark of inclusion in the Christian community. 
The problem with categorizing belief as merely propositional, however, is that this oversimplifies the 
definition of belief, reducing it to an entirely rational and individual process—an intellectual choice that 
the religious adherent makes and can “unmake” at any time. This definition overlooks both the emotional 
and unconscious processes involved in belief formation and the often communal nature of belief. 
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that men and women are currently compensated unequally. Belief-in exists in an open-ended 
temporal space in which that which is not could be, or perhaps has been in the past. It is in the 
chasm between that which is and that which might be or may have been that new possibilities for 
human agency can be found. 
Belief, then, is a complex interpenetration of intellectual propositions and affective 
investments that positions a person or group with respect to current conditions and future 
possibilities. As such it is a “continuing source of knowledge production” that intersects with and 
informs other sources of self-knowledge—including race, gender, class, and sexuality—and 
ways of being and acting in the world (McGarry 14). Belief, as Jenny Franchot notes, “ranges 
powerfully within, but always in some sense beyond the cultural, into the ethical and the 
mystical, braiding social and theological traditions with the interior life of the person” (834). 
And it can be a powerful spur to personal and collective agency, particularly for those who share 
beliefs in common. The effects of agentive belief are not always politically progressive or 
personally edifying; even among the texts discussed in this dissertation there are conflicting 
applications of Protestant belief, as when Augusta Jane Evans interprets free will theology in 
ways that bolster slavery and William Wells Brown as a means to decry it. To understand the 
workings of agentive belief, and of Protestant doctrinal agency in particular, it is necessary to 
treat human agency, the acts that arise from it, and the political content of those acts as separate 
but related phenomena. 
The fact that belief can serve as a potent social force and a catalyst for collaborative 
agency is the result of historical and social processes that have shaped the Western public sphere 
in the centuries since the Protestant Reformation. The cultural ascendancy of belief, as the 
anthropologist and cultural theorist Talal Asad has shown, is neither a historical constant nor a 
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universal phenomenon. In order for disenfranchised persons to effectively and publicly wield the 
doctrinal terms in which Protestant belief is expressed, the agentive power of belief had first to 
be established in Western cultures, a long and complex historical process that created the 
religious-secular conditions of possibility for the emergence of the writers included in this 
dissertation.  
The language of belief was disentangled from structures of clerical and political authority 
in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a process that reached its apex between 1790 
and 1820, the period known to scholars as the Second Great Awakening. Michael Warner’s 
current work on the history of the free thought and evangelical movements details how, in the 
centuries following the Protestant Reformation, public religious speech was transformed from a 
rare privilege closely circumscribed by considerations of rank, gender, age, wealth, or position of 
authority to a widely available discourse best wielded in the service of “conversionistic witness.” 
As the salvation of human souls came to be recognized as the highest earthly good, the 
exigencies of conversion enabled forms of public religious speech that relied for their 
justification on the perception of Christian sincerity—on strong belief—rather than on official 
ordination or social rank (M. Warner, “Freethought”). These new forms of religious speech could 
be either personal—as when attendees at outdoor revivals took to the stage on no more authority 
than their own experiences of conversion—or textual, encompassing pamphlets, tracts, 
broadsides, sketches, stories, and novels. The broadening field of acceptable public religious 
speech was thus facilitated by the growth of print publication, since print offered the opportunity 
for those disadvantaged by race, class, or gender to “enter into rational-critical debate around 
matters common to all” by producing (often anonymously) printed texts that might circulate in 
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the public sphere (M. Warner, Publics 57).7 Over time the print public sphere accordingly 
became “a social and ideological space for individuals to express unorthodox views and to draw 
together people of different persuasions” (Beneke 47). Together these historical phenomena laid 
the foundations that would eventually make it possible for the African-American novelist 
William Wells Brown, for instance, to stage a religious debate between ordained clergy and 
laypeople and between pro- and antislavery thinkers in his 1853 novel Clotel.8 
 The transformation of belief from a specialized language wielded by clerics and kings to 
a free-flowing discourse that entailed its own agentive capacities and could be transferred from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7
 Warner’s recent work demonstrates how, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the public circulation of error came to constitute a necessary condition for the formation of even privately 
held belief. Whereas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries theological error had been equated with 
plague, “threaten[ing] to deprive the inhabitants of [the colonies] not of their mortal bodies but of their 
immortal souls” (Beneke 26-27), under the influence of the free thought movement, which held that truth 
could only be reached through the widespread circulation of error, the “right of private judgment”—the 
precursor of the principle now called “liberty of conscience”—slowly rose to prominence as a value to be 
embraced rather than a heresy to be shunned (M. Warner, “Freethought”). The principle that religious 
truth might be collectively ascertained rather than, or in addition to, being received as revelation is the 
enabling condition for the forms of public religious debate examined in this dissertation. 
 
8 The rise of religious speech produced by persons of different ranks, genders, and races and the 
widespread circulation of such speech in the print public sphere culminated, in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries, in the event known to scholars as the Second Great Awakening. Lasting from 
approximately 1790-1820, the Awakening saw the creation of myriad new religious movements and the 
rapid growth of existing ones, particularly revivalist sects like the Methodists, Baptists, and Disciples of 
Christ. With its emphasis on visible and narratable religious feeling and on the primacy of personal 
experience, the Awakening, along with the liberalization of the culturally dominant New England 
Congregationalist churches, began to redistribute cultural authority in a process that religious historian 
Nathan Hatch has called the “democratization” of American Christianity. As much as the spate of outdoor 
revivals that most famously characterized the Second Great Awakening (and most unnerved the leaders of 
settled denominations including the Congregationalists and Anglicans), the flurry of pamphlets, printed 
sermons, tracts, and rebuttals produced during the Second Great Awakening solidified the sense that 
theological debates among people of different beliefs were best conducted in the print public sphere. 
Describing the spate of revivals, theological controversies, and denominational divisions that took place 
in the wake of the American Revolution—and the spike in religious adherence that accompanied them—
Hatch notes that “within a few years of Jefferson’s election in 1800, it became anachronistic to speak of 
[religious] dissent in America—as if there were still a commonly recognized center against which new or 
emerging groups defined themselves” (7). While religious and social historians have qualified some of 
Hatch’s findings (see, for instance, Jon Butler’s Awash in a Sea of Faith, which is in many ways an 
extended response to Hatch), his work stands as an important repudiation of the inaccurate narratives of 
decline that dominated histories of American religion through at least the 1980s. 
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one speaker/writer to another was a long and complicated process. Those groups whose language 
was presumed to be irrational, incomprehensible, or irrelevant and thus beyond the pale of public 
discourse found it particularly difficult to achieve authority in the public sphere, even through 
the supposedly “disembodied” medium of print.9 Inhabiting belief by accessing the discourse of 
Protestant theology was often a double-edged sword for the disenfranchised. On the one hand, it 
was the purported anonymity of print publication that made it possible for those excluded from 
centers of political and religious power by virtue of their gender, race, or class to nevertheless 
enter into the public sphere:  
[T]he invention of the printing press made possible the religious and political 
enfranchisement of previously subjugated peoples.... They argued successfully 
that print’s invisibility, which allowed ideas to circulate independently of the 
bodies that created them, freed [them] from their [race, class, and gender] 
identities and thus gave them a better chance to achieve parity with [white] men. 
(Baym, “Women’s Novels” 339) 
 
At the same time, however, the construction of the public sphere as a space of rationality 
assumed to be white and male reified gendered and raced divisions of public and private: since 
the public sphere was implicitly white and male and the private sphere implicitly non-white and 
female, those who wished to enter the print public sphere were required to “bracke[t] their 
embodiment and status” in order to converse on public matters.10 But because “[t]he bourgeois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Warner refers to the weakening of rank, gender, and class qualifications for public religious speech as 
the rise of “disembodied address,” but this term is misleading because it suggests that there is no 
relationship between texts and bodies, or that readers encountering a text—even an anonymous text—will 
not make assumptions about the body that produced it. 
 
10
 It is an axiom of feminist-inflected public sphere theory that the Western liberal public sphere has been 
and remains implicitly masculine. As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon notes, “gender is one of the key 
categories through which liberalism scripts the interrelated public and private lives of citizens of the 
liberal state,” and “the position marked out for women—particularly white women—within liberalism is 
private and familial” (2, 3). As Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler note, “[t]he [antebellum] public sphere 
was a... masculine realm, a site of rational political discourse and economic production characterized by 
competition rather than sentiment, by inscrutable business practices rather than transparent moral tenets” 
(Chapman and Hendler 3). 
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public sphere consists of private persons whose identity is formed in the privacy of the conjugal 
domestic family,” those most closely associated with the private sphere—including wives, 
children, servants, and slaves—were doubly identified with the domestic and the personal, so 
that even as they entered into rational public debate, their areas of expertise and authority, when 
acknowledged at all, were assumed to be domestic and personal (M. Warner, Publics 57).11 Any 
attempt to converse on topics related to politics, professionalism, business, theology, or the 
law—“public” subjects suitable for rational (read: white male) debate—drew forth images of the 
grotesque or unnatural, as when Samuel Johnson famously asserted that “a woman’s preaching is 
like a dog’s walking on his hind legs.”12 In order to “naturalize” their use of theological 
discourse, disenfranchised authors turned to the increasingly available realm of fiction, which 
offered a space—public but not overtly political—in which they might discuss theological 
matters and simultaneously depict the consequences of doctrinal questions for individuals’ and 
communities’ lives. The public space of fiction offered disenfranchised authors opportunities to 
prise open the doors of white-male-only religious, legal, and social debate (perhaps exemplified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11
 The “separate spheres” theory that dominated much late-twentieth-century criticism of women’s 
writing—and that has come under considerable debate by scholars—thus describes a nineteenth-century 
social ideal more than an actual historical state of affairs. As Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler note,  
[w]ithin domestic ideology, in its classic nineteenth-century formulations such as Catharine 
Beecher’s Treatise on Domestic Economy, the home was a feminine realm, where a woman’s 
influence reigned over the affections of her children and husband. For the man, domesticity 
offered a ‘haven in a heartless world,’ where he could seek comfort after a day in the 
marketplace…. That this binary was more a class, race, and national ideology than a universal 
social practice made it no less effective in shaping discourse on gender, affect, and cultural space. 
(3) 
 
12
 Boswell, Life of Johnson. Vol. ii. Chap. ix. 1763. 
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most clearly in the “pamphlet wars” of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries)13 and 
make space for enacting new theological ideas. 
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then, publicly proclaimed 
belief became the coin of the realm in colonial and early national America, such that deeply held 
beliefs came to be accorded authority precisely because they conformed to a Protestant 
providential worldview that linked strong belief with both personal conviction and transcendent 
truth.14 Within a public sphere structured by this Protestant worldview, the ability to “identif[y], 
cultivat[e], and tes[t] belief as a verbalizable inner condition” became the requirement for entry 
into public life (Asad 48). To intervene in the nineteenth-century public sphere was to negotiate a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13
 The most famous of these protracted theological wranglings was perhaps the “Wood and Ware” debate 
of the 1820s, in which the Edwardsean Calvinist Leonard Woods, of Andover Seminary, and the 
Unitarian minister Henry Ware conducted a two-year exchange of pamphlets on the subject of Trinitarian 
versus Unitarian theology. So rancorous did some of these public discussions become that Lydia Maria 
Child, a liberal Unitarian, eventually concluded that “religion diminishes in the same proportion that 
theology increases” (quoted in Holifield 208). 
 
14
 Religious studies scholars have in recent decades come to recognize that the primacy of belief (and its 
elevation above practice, ritual, and other religious forms) is a characteristic, not of all religions, but of 
Protestant religions in particular. As the anthropologist Webb Keane notes (drawing on Talal Asad), 
“[m]any religious traditions have little interest in either individual belief or public statements of doctrine, 
and many accept differences of interpretation as long as practices themselves remain consistent” 
(“Language and Religion” 431-432). Scholars of non-Protestant and non-Christian religions have 
accordingly begun seeking out methodologies of study that do not begin and end with the question, “what 
do these people believe?” The result has been a proliferation of useful ethnographic studies that seek to 
enumerate and describe the social structures and ritual practices of non-Protestant religious communities. 
As Amy Hungerford observes, “the new religious studies, which favor the thick description of religious 
practice (what is now called ‘lived religion’) over efforts to parse what religious people and churches say 
about their beliefs, makes belief, as Robert Orsi suggests, ‘the wrong question’” (xx).  
But the appropriateness of the question depends on the kind of answer one is trying to find. If one seeks 
to describe the many ways in which groups of human beings struggle to understand the meaning and 
purpose of existence in the face of the unknown or unknowable (a broad but perhaps serviceable 
definition of “religion”), then thick description of a plurality of practices is a fine way to do so. (Indeed, 
long before the anthropologist Clifford Geertz championed thick description as a method for recording 
and understanding the religious practices of non-Western peoples, William James founded the Gifford 
Lectures that would become the basis for The Varieties of Religious Experience on his belief “that a large 
acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas, however 
deep” (Varieties 5).) But if one seeks to understand the conditions for participating in a public sphere 
structured by a set of implicitly Protestant assumptions about how diverse groups of people with different 
beliefs should be allowed to speak to one another, then “What do these people believe?” is precisely the 
right question. 
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religious, political, and social milieu whose terms were ever changing but nevertheless firmly 
rooted in the principle that private belief was a matter for public debate. When Elizabeth 
Freeman approached Theodore Sedgwick to declare that she knew herself to be human and 
therefore deserved to be free, she was invoking her right to participate in a public sphere brought 
into being by declarations of belief. When Catharine Sedgwick invoked Freeman’s story over the 
course of her writing career, she demonstrated how fiction might function as a powerful public 
space within which to debate different beliefs and their attendant possibilities for human agency. 
As proscriptions against the writing and publication of fiction that had carried over from 
the colonial era began to fall away,15 learning to verbalize the “inner condition of true religion” 
through the medium of published fiction offered disenfranchised authors a means to enter into a 
culturally dominant Protestant public sphere whose terms of discourse were often explicitly 
theological.16 As a public space newly available to the disenfranchised, fiction provided an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15
 Fiction writing, especially for women and minority writers, was not an entirely accepted vocation in the 
antebellum United States. But while proscriptions against fiction (as well as theatre and other forms of 
entertainment) were rife, would-be fabulists received cautious encouragement from a number of respected 
religious sources. The Unitarian minister William Ellery Channing, of whom Catharine Maria Sedgwick 
was a great admirer, devoted many pages of his North American Review to calls for a uniquely American 
literature. (See, for instance, his “Essay on American Language and Literature” and “Reflections on the 
Literary Delinquency of America.”) The great evangelist George Whitefield, according to his memoirist, 
believed that “a pointed anecdote, or vivacious illustration, while it keeps alive attention by its variety and 
novelty, will oftentimes... lead unschooled men to recognize and admit a truth” (Gillies v). And the 
influential Common Sense philosophy of Scottish thinkers George Campbell and Hugh Blair 
recommended that common truths be sought in the everyday experience of individuals—the very stuff of 
which fiction might be made. See David Reynolds’s “From Doctrine to Narrative: The Rise of Public 
Storytelling in America” for a detailed discussion of the influence of these clerical pronouncements on the 
nineteenth-century public sphere. 
 
16
 As Winnifred Sullivan, Tracy Fessenden, and other religious studies scholars have shown, the U.S. 
public sphere is now and has always been structured by a set of assumptions about belief and behavior 
that align closely with Protestant epistemologies, even in cases in which “religion” or “the religious” is 
not at issue. This is not to say that there were no non-Protestant individuals or religious communities in 
the nineteenth-century United States; religious diversity has long been a characteristic of the American 
experience. Rather, it is to acknowledge that persons and communities throughout American history who 
have wished to participate fully in the public sphere have been required to conform to Protestant models 
of religious adherence—models that recognize a religion as “true” only if it is expressed in ways that are 
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imaginative realm in which the propositional religious beliefs debated in pamphlets and sectarian 
journals could be explored in terms of their affective and social dimensions—in which belief-that 
and belief-in could be productively joined. The mediating possibilities of fiction, though they did 
not render women and other disenfranchised persons immune to accusations of impropriety, 
arrogance, and dereliction of domestic duty, nevertheless offered opportunities for exploring the 
consequences of particular Protestant theologies within a shared imaginary space. 
The historical shift I have just described has most often been characterized by literary 
scholars in the language of competition or decline, most famously by Ann Douglas, whose The 
Feminization of American Culture (1977) told the story of an unfortunate fall: women writers 
and liberal ministers brought an austere Calvinist theological tradition to an end by combining 
theology with fiction in a series of rhetorical transformations that “feminized” and 
commercialized the public sphere.17 While acknowledging Douglas’s pathbreaking work on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
perceived to be “private, voluntary, individual, textual, and believed” (Sullivan 8). Sullivan calls this 
condition of American civic life “small-p protestantism.”  
The persistence of Protestant configurations of the public sphere does not imply that appropriate forms 
of participation in the public sphere have been stable or unchanging. “Private, voluntary, individual, 
textual, and believed”—and their perceived opposites, “[p]ublic, coercive, communal, oral, and enacted” 
(Sullivan 8)—are terms that, as Michael Warner has shown, are constantly under negotiation in Western 
societies: “Public and private sometimes compete, sometimes complement each other, and sometimes are 
merely parts of a larger series of classifications that includes, say, local, domestic, personal, political, 
economic, or intimate” (M. Warner, Publics 28). Consider that activities that counted as acceptable public 
religious behavior in 1832—school prayer, for instance, or the public holiday sermon—are now suited 
only to private religious practice. 
 
17
 While scholars in the fields of both religious studies and literary studies have sought to complicate 
Douglas’s thesis, its terms still inform much discussion of nineteenth-century religious literature. Dawn 
Coleman’s recent Preaching and the Rise of the American Novel (2013), for instance, while distancing its 
project from Douglas’s, nevertheless adopts Douglas’s assumption that there is an inherent antagonism 
between “religious” and “secular” sources of influence. This division makes it difficult to read 
disenfranchised authors as anything other than failed imitators of white, male ministers and obscures 
these authors’ contributions to nineteenth-century doctrinal discourse.  
The anti-clerical impulse found in so much writing by disenfranchised nineteenth-century authors (a 
subject I elaborate further in my chapter on William Wells Brown) has contributed to the critical tendency 
to characterize popular authors and members of the clergy as competing with one another for public 
attention and influence. But an attentive reading of nineteenth-century fiction suggests that most popular 
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nineteenth-century women’s religious influence, this project takes a more nuanced view of the 
antebellum public sphere as a discourse community in which theological ideas were not simply 
handed down from clerical authorities but instead were socially created, circulating widely and 
coming under continual debate both explicitly, in sectarian journals and printed sermons, and 
more subtly in the fictional productions that increasingly occupied the popular imagination.18 As 
historian Gregory Jackson notes, in nineteenth-century America 
 elite religious discourse was shadowed—sometimes even overshadowed—by a 
wealth of popular narrative materials organized around sermons, novels and other 
homiletic spaces.... ‘[F]ormal’ doctrine and theology coming out of synods and 
seminaries, churches and conclaves, and the private studies of ministers were 
transformed by remarkable men and women on the ground. (4)  
 
Such transformations were significant, not only for their effect on the American religious 
landscape (the area with which Jackson is concerned), but because they enabled individuals and 
communities to imagine new ways of being and behaving in the public sphere and new ways of 
acting in the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authors did not so much want to be preachers as they wanted to be something different and more effective 
than preachers. While pulpit preaching was often criticized for being pedantic and monotonous, female 
and African American authors saw literature as a way to appeal to the whole human organism: mind, 
body, heart, spirit, and soul. Literature was not simply a form of preaching; it was an improvement on 
preaching that could incorporate all the best aspects of pulpit instruction—appeals to the intellect, 
exploration of difficult ideas—while allowing for other forms of religious communication as well. 
David Reynolds’s Faith in Fiction: The Emergence of Religious Literature in America provides a useful 
taxonomy of antebellum religious fiction as well as an important counterpoint to Douglas’s depiction of 
the “feminization” of American culture. “The argument that a strong, masculine Calvinism gave way to a 
shrinkingly feminine liberalism is almost a reversal of fact,” Reynolds writes. Many liberal Protestant 
writers “saw Calvinism as a repressive system which not only thwarted human effort but created a timid 
languor and listlessness”; thus the effort to liberalize Calvinism through fiction could be depicted as 
heroic and full of masculine interest. 
 
18
 Ann Braude’s work on the important role of women in nineteenth-century religious communities 
responds to Ann Douglas’s famous feminization thesis while, in a certain sense, talking past it. In 
“Women’s History Is American Religious History,” Braude notes that Protestant churches did not 
experience a sharp increase in female adherents in the nineteenth century, as the term “feminization” 
might suggest. But this fact leaves Douglas’s larger thesis, that female religious adherents exerted an 
undue and unhealthy influence on nineteenth-century Protestant thought and are thus responsible for the 
failings of twentieth-century popular culture, largely intact. 
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It is the transformation of theology through the medium of fiction and the consequences 
of that transformation for human agency that this dissertation project details. It argues that the 
realm of published fiction provided a conventional space in which disenfranchised authors might 
safely explore theological problems and the ramifications of those problems for people’s lives. I 
use the term “conventional,” not in the derogatory sense of “hackneyed” or “lacking in 
originality,” but in the manner delineated by Lauren Berlant in her discussion of women’s 
culture: a conventional text offers “a profound placeholder that provides an affective 
confirmation of the idea of a shared confirming imaginary in advance of inhabiting a material 
world in which that feeling can actually be lived” (Berlant 3). While white male authors also 
used fiction to engage with theological questions, published fiction provided a particularly 
welcoming space for disenfranchised authors whose exclusion from seminaries and sectarian 
journals left them with few other outlets for public religious discussion. But more than a last 
resort for religious debate, fiction provided a generic space for exploring the consequences of 
theological positions. When Augusta Jane Evans turned to the genre of woman’s fiction to 
explore the consequences of free will theology for white southern women, for instance, she both 
intervened in an ongoing debate between Calvinist and Arminian thinkers and constructed a 
model of female agency grounded in Arminian theological convictions. For Evans and other 
female and African-American authors, the generic space of the historical novel, or woman’s 
fiction, or the bildungsroman provided a framework within which explorations of agency became 
possible and where characters—and by extension authors and readers—could “negotiat[e] 
belonging to a world” (Berlant 3). 
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The Secularization Thesis and the Study of American Literature 
That nineteenth-century fiction shows an abiding concern with matters of religious belief 
and practice is not a new observation, but until recently most treatments of nineteenth-century 
religious fiction—and particularly religious fiction written by women and African Americans—
have been hampered by inaccurate historical-theological models, particularly narratives of 
secularization. The secularization thesis is a sociological theory formulated and popularized by 
Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and, most famously, Max Weber that posits that Western 
social institutions are becoming less religious over time, that religion is a matter best suited to 
the private sphere, and (in some versions of the theory) that religion is destined to eventually die 
out entirely.19 The secularization thesis traces a narrative of progress (or decline, depending on 
one’s point of view) according to which the irrational superstitions of the past are being 
gradually replaced by rational certainties; Max Weber called this process “Entzauberung,” a 
word usually translated as “disenchantment” that has been more literally limned by religious 
historian Molly McGarry as “the elimination of magic from the world” (13). In critical narratives 
based on the secularization thesis, “religion can function only as an anachronistic invasion into 
public life that logically aligns with conservative and reactionary returns to moral values” 
(McGarry 5). The secularization thesis has thus provided a powerful sociological metanarrative, 
both for those who would position religion as a vestige of humanity’s primitive past to be 
excised and forgotten and for those who would claim the spiritual downfall of America and 
advocate for the “return” of religion to public life. But the thesis is historically incorrect, at least 
in the United States, where religious adherence has held steady, and occasionally risen, over the 
last two hundred years and where religion remains a matter for public debate and political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19
 See Jose Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World and Bryan Wilson’s “The Secularization 
Thesis: Criticisms and Rebuttals” for succinct formulations of the thesis and its history. 
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concern.20 It has maintained its place in scholarly discourse despite its inaccuracies because, as 
the religious historian R. Laurence Moore asserts, it helps historians and literary critics construct 
a usable past that points toward an increasingly enlightened and rational future (vii).  
But in addition to its historical inaccuracy, the secularization thesis is also ideologically 
problematic: it can be used to justify the othering of groups not considered sufficiently 
secularized—those for whom magic has demonstrably not been eliminated from their worlds. At 
the global level it serves as a prop to claims of Western cultural superiority: secularized societies 
are “the province of an Enlightened and white majority, describing and prescribing a transparent 
world set apart from primitive enchantments, mystery, and things that [go] bump in the night” 
(Modern, Secularism 283). At the national and regional level it helps to define what is truly 
un/American: religious individuals and groups are tolerated so long as they behave in ways that 
do not seem particularly “religious”—so long as their beliefs and practices are “rational, word-	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 Writing in 2010, historians Kevin Schultz and Paul Harvey noted that “[i]n 1870, 35 percent of 
Americans considered themselves religious adherents. Today, that figure stands closer to 62 percent. In 
America today... people identify with religious organizations at rates higher than at any time since the 
Puritans ruled Massachusetts in the mid-seventeenth century” (129-130). The religious historian Jon 
Butler, treating Christian adherence in particular, asserts that “the story of religion in America after 1700 
is one of Christian ascension rather than declension—Christianization rather than dechristianization—and 
of a Christianity so complex and heterogeneous as to baffle observers and adherents alike” (2).  
Scholars who remain convinced of the explanatory power of the secularization thesis often argue that 
church attendance numbers are of little use in gauging the social processes that fall under the heading of 
“secularization.” The sociologist Bryan Wilson, for instance, asserts that since “[s]ecularization is 
concerned not simply with patterns of social behaviour, but with the principles and assumptions by which 
society is organized and in accordance with which it operates... it is by no means inconceivable that 
[church] attendance figures might remain static, or even increase in societies the organization and 
operation of which were simultaneously becoming manifestly more secularized” (57). Such statements 
leave unanswered the question of how, exactly, secularization might be measured. In the 2012 General 
Social Survey, a record number of Americans—20 per cent—reported that they belonged to “no religion,” 
a statistic that received much attention in the press. (Note that this leaves 80 per cent of the U.S. 
population with some religious affiliation—a number even higher than that recorded by Schultz and 
Harvey in 2010.) But only three per cent of survey respondents said that they did not believe in God. 
While the former number has risen steadily over the last two decades, the latter has barely budged since 
the GSS began tracking religious affiliation in 1972 (Hout et al.). It is unclear whether these statistics 
should be read as evidence of secularization or of continuing religiosity. It is perhaps more accurate to 
say, not that America is “secularized,” but that “Americans are as religious as ever, even if their 
affiliations to particular faith groups have somewhat faded” (Schultz and Harvey 129). 
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centered, nonritualistic, middle class, unemotional, [and] compatible with democracy and the 
liberal state” (Orsi 15).21 When applied to narratives of American literary history, the 
secularization thesis has sometimes obscured particular forms of religious experience, including 
those in which ritual, emotion, and collective action take precedence over rational reflection or 
rugged individualism. 
At the literary-critical level, the persistence of the secularization narrative has made it 
difficult to accurately assess the importance of religion to nineteenth-century literary history and 
to the works of disenfranchised and minority authors in particular. Some critics, reading religious 
adherence primarily as a vestigial trace of an earlier era, have turned their attention instead to 
other important issues, underestimating how much religious belief and practice intersect and 
overlap with matters of race, gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, and regional and national origin 
to form individuals’ identities and to produce a literary and cultural landscape.22 Other critics, 
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 Groups and individuals who do not fit these categories—who maintain distinctive ritual practices, 
engage in charismatic forms of worship, reject or defy the norms of the nuclear family (by embracing 
polygamy or promoting unrestricted childbearing), or are suspected of allying with non-democratic 
political movements—are grouped together under a “nomenclature of marginalization (cults, sects, 
primitives, and so on)” and expected to keep their religion private (Orsi 15). 
 
22
 Recently a number of literary critics and scholars of religious studies have noted the tendency among 
late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century critics to overlook or ignore religion and have offered 
varying explanations for such oversights. Tracy Fessenden notes that “in American literary studies, a field 
historically given shape by its own narrative of democratization, religion receives little attention except 
when it figures as crucial to a progressive, emancipatory politics (Christian antislavery being the readiest 
example), and often not even then” (2). Susan Mizruchi argues that “in literary studies, the powerful 
impact of poststructuralism, with its skepticism toward universals and transcendence, created a general 
resistance toward religion as a subject of analysis. This was underscored by the rising visibility in the 
1980’s of America’s religious right, which reinforced an earlier tendency to identify religion with the 
forces of reaction” (x). And Joanna Brooks attributes critical silence on religious questions to “a rigid and 
outmoded Marxist rejection of religion as ideological delusion” that has been gradually but not yet 
completely superseded by “a more contemporary cultural studies understanding of religion as a venue for 
creative and political agency” (18). 
Criticism focused on sentimental literature is perhaps the one arena in which religion has remained 
consistently at the forefront of critical discussion. But in my third chapter, on Susan Warner’s The Wide, 
Wide World and Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah, I demonstrate how the application of inaccurate religious-
historical terms like “evangelical” has obscured the role of religion in sentimental texts. 
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while acknowledging the centrality of religion to much nineteenth-century writing, have treated 
religious piety and practice as problems to be explained away rather than as potential sources of 
agency, self-expression, companionship, and collective action. In many cases these critical works 
draw from a set of assumptions about the nature of religious adherence that are at best only 
partially accurate: that religion is primarily a tool of patriarchy rather than a matter of personal 
choice or a vehicle for self-expression; that gender and race are more authentic sources of 
personal identity than religious adherence; that religious language is a code, adopted consciously 
or unconsciously, behind which “real” concerns can be found; that religious belief results from 
ignorance or lack of education; and that nineteenth-century authors (women especially) would 
have been better off without religion than with it. Such assumptions frequently obscure the 
important role that religious adherence and belief played for disenfranchised nineteenth-century 
authors seeking avenues to personal and communal agency. 
Underlying such critical framings of religious adherence is an often unexamined belief 
that criticism is itself a fully and unproblematically secularized project, a “view from nowhere” 
from which religious (and other) biases have been successfully eradicated (Kaufmann 614). This 
belief has bolstered the mode of criticism that Bruno Latour calls “iconoclastic”—a word 
revealingly borrowed from the Protestant Reformation—or “antifetishist,” in which the critic 
replaces a hermeneutic regime s/he does not believe in with one s/he does believe in; the new 
regime is implicitly assumed to be free from the blind spots that plagued the old (“Why Has”).23 
So, for instance, Julia Stern, reflecting on the religious language that characterized nineteenth-
century novels of seduction and sentiment, asserts that 
[i]n both Susanna Rowson’s Charlotte Temple and Susan Warner’s Wide, Wide 
World, moral prescription and sentimental piety function as smokescreens for the 	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 I use the word “believe” advisedly. 
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deep and unresolved maternal mourning that cannot be voiced because to open the 
channel of such grief into direct expression is to violate a cultural taboo. (“To 
Represent” 385) 
 
Here, the “false” belief system signaled by sentimental piety is replaced with the “true” belief 
system offered by psychoanalysis; piety and moral teaching are positioned, not as sincere 
expressions of and outlets for maternal mourning, but as inauthentic cultural overlays that mask 
the real functioning of grief. It is the secular critic’s task to sweep away the ideological veil of 
religion to get at what is really happening below, at the level of the “real.”24 
Such critiques often depend, as Michael Kaufmann has noted, on an “unquestioned 
characterization of religious thought as dogmatic and irrational” and of the critic as entirely 
rational and free from religious taint—assumptions that both underestimate the complex nature 
of religious adherence and overestimate the objectivity of critical regimes (623).25 This results in 
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 This critical pattern, Latour reminds us, is inherently unstable: the whole edifice crumbles when the 
new critical regime—itself characterized by a set of beliefs about the nature of the unconscious mind, or 
the workings of power, or the indeterminacy of language—is subjected to the same iconoclastic processes 
(“Why Has” 240-241). Latour compares iconoclastic criticism to the elaborate arguments of conspiracy 
theorists: 
What’s the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized, that is a teachable version of 
social critique inspired by a too quick reading of... Pierre Bourdieu...? In both cases, you have to 
learn to become suspicious of everything people say because of course we all know that they live 
in the thralls of a complete illusio of their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an 
explanation is requested for what is really going on, in both cases again it is the same appeal to 
powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly. Of 
course, we in the academy like to use more elevated causes—society, discourse, knowledge-
slash-power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism—while conspiracists like to portray a miserable 
bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I find something troublingly similar in the structure 
of the explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal 
explanations coming out of the deep dark below. (“Why Has” 228-229) 
 
25
 To be sure, the assumption that religion is inherently dogmatic or irrational has been reinforced in 
recent decades by the rise in America of the “religious right.” The “religious right” is an outgrowth of a 
Protestant fundamentalist movement that began, as comparative religious historian Karen Armstrong 
notes, in the early twentieth century as a response to the “secularist hegemony” of scientific and 
pluralistic discourses and the increasingly widespread assumption that religion was a primitive form of 
human experience destined to die out over time. (In other words, fundamentalism is a response to the 
pervasiveness of Enlightenment rationalism and the ideological application of secularizing programs to 
particular religious communities.) Fundamentalism, Armstrong notes, is a thoroughly oppositional 
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a literary-historical view that is always weighted in favor of the critic’s knowledge over the 
author’s and that positions historical actors as subject to ideologies that made it impossible for 
them to recognize how religion ostensibly “neutralize[s] dissent” and “protect[s] the givens of 
ordinary life” (Berlant 4). Anne Goodwyn Jones’s Tomorrow is Another Day, for instance, poses 
the question of why nineteenth-century southern women did not leave their Protestant churches 
despite the fact that they were excluded from church leadership: 
Perhaps... they needed the consolation of religion more than they wanted to see 
what it did to them; perhaps the perfect mesh between what God and man said 
about woman made religious questions taboo; perhaps the lack of education 
prevented the development of the habit of intellectual analysis. (28) 
  
Assuming that religious belief can function only as an oppressive imposition on female 
experience—something “done to” women rather than a set of choices made by women 
themselves—this reading positions Protestant belief as self-imposed delusion, a sign of 
weakness, or evidence of ignorance. But Jones also chronicles her subjects’ active and self-
directed involvement in church organizations and committees and records in great detail their 
“habit[s] of intellectual analysis,” data that would suggest that religious adherence in fact 
provided southern women with avenues for personal expression and community engagement.26 
In these examples and elsewhere, the impulse to read religious adherence as an oppressive 
ideological force produces a critical impasse in which the nineteenth-century author appears at 
one and the same time both shrewd and deluded, both canny and duped. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
position that defines itself against a putatively rational and secularized public sphere, and it has spread 
from the United States and Western Europe to all parts of the globe, so that now almost every religious 
tradition—including Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and even Confucianism—has its own 
fundamentalist movement. Fundamentalism is a crucial area of study, but as a twentieth-century 
phenomenon it should not influence critical readings of early-nineteenth-century literature, which was 
produced under entirely different religious-secular conditions. 
 
26
 Indeed, the subject of Jones’s first chapter (and my third), Augusta Jane Evans, was well known among 
nineteenth-century readers and critics both for her religious devotion and her ostentatious intellectualism. 
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Thus the important work of recovery that has made women’s writing increasingly 
available to critics—work performed by scholars including Stern and Jones—has often fallen 
short of addressing the important role of religion in women’s writing and women’s lives. Recent 
attempts among religious historians and literary critics to give due attention to women’s religious 
experience have provided only partial remedies. The rise of the study of “lived religion,” for 
instance—the increasing willingness of religious historians to expand their objects of study 
beyond theological treatises and denominational histories to include the rituals, activities, beliefs, 
and superstitions of non-ordained adherents—has inadvertently reinforced the impression that 
women and people of color engage with religion primarily at an emotional or visceral level 
rather than in intellectually complex ways. As a term that describes the everyday experiences of 
individual believers, lived religion has “become a standard concern in religious studies, in part 
because it allows scholars to move beyond a singular focus on the theological debates of the 
learned elite or the public statements of a few leaders” (Griffith and McAlister 532). But because 
religious “leaders” and “elites” were, until the twentieth century, almost universally white and 
male, the movement away from the study of doctrinal ideas—the “flight from the possibility that 
a [certain] approach to ‘religion’ is too theological” (Stein and Murison 4, emphasis in 
original)—has resulted in a lack of attention to the theological contributions of the 
disenfranchised. Even as texts by female authors and persons of color from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries have been recovered and made available to scholars and students, the 
impetus to study the theological content of that literature has waned. Thus, while American 
literary historians from R.W.B. Lewis to Amy Hungerford have plumbed the depths of white 
men’s writing for evidence of their theological engagements,27 the religious commitments of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Lewis’s The American Adam (1955) sought the sources of American identity in the mythology of 
Genesis, and his representative Americans were all white and male: Hawthorne, Melville, Whitman, and 
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female authors and persons of color are generally consigned to the category of “lived religion” or 
“embodied experience” and assumed to exemplify the emotional or ritualistic elements of 
religious adherence rather than its intellectual aspects.28 As Laurie Maffly-Kipp notes in her 
study of African-American Protestant intellectuals, the “[c]ognitive work” of forming, 
contemplating, and debating belief “is too seldom understood as a form of religious practice,” 
especially in studies of non-elite religious adherents (10-11). Scholars anxious to diversify their 
models of religious experience by focusing on “lived religion” rather than theology—aspects of 
religious experience that are “simultaneously inhabited” rather than separate and divisible—have 
sometimes obscured the intellectual processes that contribute to the formation of belief 
(Hungerford 108). 
The persistent idea, reinforced by the discourse of “lived religion,” that white men 
approach religion rationally and theologically while women and racial minorities experience 
religion ritually and emotionally both obscures the intellectual engagement that women and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Holmes. Hungerford’s Postmodern Belief (2010) examines the ongoing if altered role of religion in post-
World War II American culture, but in its race and gender demographics its reach does not extend much 
beyond Lewis’s: of the eight authors Hungerford addresses only two are women and only one is African 
American. (But Hungerford, unlike Lewis, includes Catholic and Jewish writers among her subjects.) 
 
28 A comparison of recent scholarship on Herman Melville and Harriet Beecher Stowe demonstrates this 
nicely. A search of the MLA International Bibliography yields 595 peer-reviewed articles about Melville 
and 121 about Stowe published since 2000. While scholars approach both of these authors in religious 
terms, Melville’s texts are read for evidence of his engagement with Biblical motifs: representative titles 
include “‘A Wisdom That Is Woe’: Allusions to Ecclesiastes in Moby-Dick,” “One’s Own Faith: 
Melville’s Reading of the New Testament and Psalms,” and “The Hymn in Moby-Dick: Melville’s 
Adaptation of Psalm 18.” Stowe, meanwhile, is read against the backdrop of particular social 
movements—an aspect of “lived religion”—or as demonstrating the “influence” of her ordained father 
and brother: representative titles include “‘One Language in Prayer’: Evangelicalism, Anti-Catholicism, 
and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s The Minister’s Wooing” and “Family Influences on The Minister’s Wooing 
and Oldtown Folks: Henry Ward Beecher and Calvin Stowe.”  
I discuss this phenomenon in more detail in my chapter on Susan Warner and Augusta Jane Evans, 
where I demonstrate that even scholars concerned with women’s religious expression, including Jane 
Tompkins, Nina Baym, and Dawn Coleman, continue to align white male writers with a theologically 
rigorous Calvinism and female and minority writers with a vaguely defined, doctrinally vacant, and 
primarily emotional “evangelicalism.” 
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African-American authors bring to doctrine and theology—a problem this dissertation 
remedies—and reinforces an inaccurate “separate spheres” model of religious writing in which 
the religious engagement displayed by disenfranchised writers is understood to provide evidence 
of their expulsion from the public sphere rather than their involvement in it. Susan K. Harris’s 
“‘But Is It Any Good?’,” for instance, asserts that 
one function of sentimental language was to create a sacred space dedicated to 
women, analogous to the private sphere in which they moved.... Religious 
language functions as part of a ritual intended to draw participants’ attention away 
from their temporal lives and make them focus on their spiritual relationship to 
the divine. Auditors are encouraged to conceive of their experiences 
metaphorically, placing them in a universal context, to reenvision themselves as 
part of a set of universal patterns. (273) 
 
While this reading is intended to rescue sentimental religious language from accusations that it is 
“baroque” or “vacantly redundant,” it applies an anachronistic twentieth-century understanding 
of religious adherence as a private matter to a nineteenth-century milieu in which the ability to 
discuss religion intelligently signaled one’s ability to participate fully in the public sphere rather 
than one’s desire to withdraw from it. Equating the “private” with the “sacred” and then 
categorizing both as the domain of women, such readings obscure the important role that 
women’s writing played in nineteenth-century public religious discourse. At the same time, they 
position women’s religious adherence as a diminution rather than an accession of agency, one 
that subtly forces women into “universal” patterns over which they have little control.29  
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 Harris’s characterization of religious language as outside of time—as something that draws attention 
away from this world and onto the next—is also an overgeneralized definition of religious language. The 
kinds and functions of religious language make up one of the issues that most starkly divides religions, 
sects, and denominations from one another: “It is precisely the assumptions about the participants implicit 
in linguistic form that are often at issue when religious reformers seek to transform or forbid certain 
speech practices” (Keane, “Religious Language” 55). To imply that religious language functions the same 
way at all times and in all places for people belonging to all manner of different religious traditions is 
simply incorrect. 
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Such treatments of the role of religious language in nineteenth-century fiction actually 
reify gender and race divisions in the study of American literature: while white male authors are 
associated with the “public” and intellectual aspects of religion, including Protestant doctrinal 
debate, women and people of color are studied for their contributions to ritual and other “private” 
forms of “lived religion.” Such divisions exoticize and quarantine the religious expressions of 
women and racial minorities; as historians Kevin Schultz and Paul Harvey note, “American 
intellectuals have... tended to relegate religious history to a history of the lower classes, or the 
racialized, or the marginalized—where religion may safely reside” (134-135). To offer a fairly 
recent example, Joanna Brooks’s American Lazarus: Religion and the Rise of African-American 
and Native American Literatures (2003) details how subjugated peoples in the New World 
formed literal and literary communities around discourses of religion in response to colonial 
scientific and philosophical discourses that strove to position Native and enslaved peoples as 
inherently subhuman. “[I]f empiricist philosophy, natural science, and nationalist politics all 
aimed for the negation of these racialized subjects,” Brooks argues, “then it would take a 
supernatural and spiritual force to revive, renew and resurrect them” (46). While Brooks’s work 
usefully highlights the role of religion in enabling communal forms of agency (a subject this 
dissertation also addresses), at the same time it celebrates the “supernatural and spiritual” 
innovations of African-American and Native American communities precisely for their 
opposition to a scientific and rational public sphere, a formulation that implies a fundamental 
difference, not only between “rational” whites and “spiritual” persons of color, but between the 
secular critical “us” and the religious historical “them.” Even as their religious lives are 
recovered, then, disenfranchised authors have been re-othered by the critical framing of their 
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religious language as a foreign and exotic attribute, a relic of oppression rather than “a vital 
source of intertextuality, meaning, and identity” (Fox-Genovese 20). 
 
Secularism and Non-liberal Agency 
Responding both to the historical inaccuracy of the secularization thesis and to the way it 
undergirds critical discourses that obscure and marginalize the ways religious people make 
meaning in/of the world, a number of religious historians, cultural theorists, and literary critics 
have posited secularism theory as a corrective to the secularization thesis. Rather than describing 
a decline in religious adherence or positing a putative separation between the “public” realm of 
disembodied rationalism and a “private” realm of emotionality, superstition, and belief, 
secularism, as understood by the new theorists, describes the state of affairs, present in North 
American history since the earliest European colonization and always in flux, that creates the 
conditions of possibility for religious pluralism and theological change. Secularism  
names a conceptual environment—emergent since at least the Protestant 
Reformation and early Enlightenment—that has made “religion” a recognizable 
and vital thing in the world. To make inquiries into secularism is to ask how 
certain concepts of religion (and the social formations that revolve around them) 
became consonant with the way things were—in essence—as portrayed by a 
secular political order. (Modern, Secularism 7-8)30  
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 Literary scholar Michael Kaufmann helpfully lays out the basic outlines of secularism studies “in the 
form of two linked pairs of assertions”:  
(IA) There is no idea, person, experience, text, institution, or historical period that could be 
categorized as essentially, inherently, or exclusively secular or religious; (IB) Despite this first 
claim, we nevertheless act as if there is a meaningful difference between the secular and the 
religious; (IIA) Following the claims of (I), varying discursive contexts construct functionally 
meaningful differences between the two terms with differing motivations and consequences; what 
counts as ‘religious’ at one time and place may count as ‘secular’ in another; (IIB) Not only does 
the context help to define the two terms, but the difference between the two terms also helps to 
establish the acceptable boundaries of a given discursive context. (608) 
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Scholars of secularism espouse the thesis “that religion does not fall away to reveal a secular 
substrate [but] that in the modern world the secular and religious are fluid, interpenetrating, 
mutually constitutive, and culturally determined categories” (Coleman, Preaching 22). Our 
modern situation—our “secular age,” as Charles Taylor has dubbed it—is one in which 
individuals and religious communities “can no longer maintain religious belief without the 
simultaneous knowledge that others do not believe, or that others believe differently” 
(Hungerford xiv).31 Rather than asserting the disappearance of religion from modern life, 
secularism theory seeks to recognize and describe the ever-shifting imbrication of “religious” 
and “secular” categories in the modern world.32 
Among other things, secularism is the set of conditions—“emotional, epistemological, 
ethical”—that makes it possible to ask how and in what way one might believe in a particular 
representation of God as over and against another representation: God as loving father, for 
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 Drawing on the work of anthropologist Talal Asad and historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, who have 
interrogated the secularization thesis in the context of contemporary Europe, and philosopher Charles 
Taylor, who has offered a magisterial account of the secularity of twenty-first-century North America, 
literary critics including Michael Warner and religious studies scholars including Tracy Fessenden and 
John Modern have begun to productively apply the new premises of secularism studies to the cultural 
history of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century United States. Warner’s current work examines how the 
transatlantic evangelicalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave rise to Enlightenment 
conceptions of the public sphere; his scholarship reverses a historiographic secularization narrative 
according to which Enlightenment thinkers threw off the shackles of religion and emerged into the light 
of reason. John Modern’s work on secularism in nineteenth-century America exposes the poverty of the 
concept of “disenchantment” by demonstrating how secularism enables the imbrication of the material 
with the spiritual and facilitates the “haunting” of the modern world. And Tracy Fessenden’s Culture and 
Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature demonstrates how the assumption that 
undergirds the secularization thesis—that religion is disappearing from the public sphere—has obscured 
the processes by which particular Protestant practices have been taken up in popular and political culture 
and redefined, not as “religious,” but as “American.” 
 
32
 I place these terms in quotation marks because one of the outcomes of an epistemological shift from 
secularization to secularism is the increasing inability to pin down exactly what “religion” is, since every 
attempt to define religion as an ontological category will presuppose a recognizable nonreligious opposite 
and require a simplistic reduction in terms. This is one of many reasons why this dissertation treats a 
particular, recognizable historical instance of religiosity—doctrinal Protestantism—rather than examining 
nineteenth-century American “religion” as a whole. 
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instance, rather than God as angry arbiter of punishment (Modern, Secularism 3). Thus, when 
Catharine Maria Sedgwick used the historical novel as a medium in which to investigate the 
doctrine of sacrificial atonement she was not “secularizing” the question but simultaneously 
bringing into being and taking part in a religious-secular configuration in which fiction became 
an accepted public space for exploring orthodox Calvinist and liberal Unitarian understandings 
of God’s nature. In a larger sense, however, secularism also provides the set of conditions under 
which one might question the very phenomenon of belief and its role in modern life. This is the 
religious-secular configuration at evidence in Elizabeth Stoddard’s The Morgesons, a novel that 
is less concerned with the kind of god one believes in (as Sedgwick’s historical novels are) than 
with the way religious beliefs circulate and have effects in the world. It is precisely the 
descriptive flexibility of secularism theory—its acknowledgment that the religious and the 
secular are not static categories but must be considered in light of particular historical events and 
human identities—that makes it a productive theoretical ground for this project. 
But while secularism theory is a useful and necessary corrective to the prescriptive 
tendencies of the secularization thesis, with its pre-formed model of inevitable progress (or 
decline), its very descriptiveness means that it has little to say about the ways that agency 
functions within secular societies. When it comes to models of agency, in fact, the secularization 
thesis and secularism theory seem to occupy opposite ends of a spectrum. Secularization theory 
posits the decline of religion as an inevitable outcome of Western progress, a result of increasing 
rationalization and, with it, a decreasing need to contain or explain that which is mysterious. 
Secularization, then, is a process perceived to be out of human hands, a status signaled by its 
flagship term “disenchantment”: there is no “disenchanter,” only the process itself. Secularism 
theory, by contrast, shows a tendency to transform religious identity into a series of conscious 
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and individual choices: it offers “a conception of religion as overwhelmingly (but not 
exclusively) cognitive—a one-on-one psychic investment into the question of monotheistic 
divinity…. A choice well chosen” (Modern, “My God”). But both of these models are 
inadequate to describe the spiritual experiences of particular persons and groups, as they fail to 
account for the complex interleaving of cognition, emotion, memory, and desire as they combine 
to create belief, or for how the agencies enabled by belief reach beyond the perceived boundaries 
of individual choice and consciousness.  
This dissertation brings the complex problem of agency to bear on secularism studies in 
order to reveal how the secular conditions present in the nineteenth-century United States—
conditions specific to particular times, places, and religious communities—made possible forms 
of agency not previously available to disenfranchised persons. It demonstrates how the 
proliferation and circulation of religious fiction after the Second Great Awakening made it 
possible for female and African-American writers to imagine into being agentive possibilities 
that did not rely on political office, clerical ordination, or the franchise. Fiction became the 
medium for exploring these new forms of agency because it provided a space in which the 
religious language of disenfranchised persons might circulate in the public sphere outside of 
official sectarian outlets. As the cultural anthropologist Webb Keane notes, religious language is 
not merely descriptive but actually initiates new forms and configurations of agency: it enables 
“the creation or extension of agents and forms of agency beyond what is commonly available in 
unmarked interaction” by invoking the action of spirits, solidifying the collective identity of a 
religious community, or offering new interpretations of existing doctrines (“Language and 
Religion” 441). Religious language enfolded into popular fictional forms made fiction into a 
space for imagining such extended forms of agency. When Beulah Benton, the heroine of 
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Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah, offers the “divine decree that all should work” as a reason to 
avoid marriage and become a teacher and author, she is modeling a new form of agency in which 
woman’s duty is not to submit to a would-be husband but to engage in paid intellectual labor, 
defying separate spheres ideologies that would exempt women from the labor market and from 
intellectual pursuits (310). Beulah’s religious language, based on Evans’s unique interpretation 
of Arminian free will theology, offers a new model of female agency that made its way into the 
nineteenth-century popular imagination through the medium of fiction.  
While Evans’s particular model of religious agency advocates increasing autonomy for 
nineteenth-century women, this dissertation demonstrates that in order to comprehend the 
multiple forms of religious agency that circulated in the secular nineteenth century it is necessary 
to divorce the concept of agency from Western liberal ideals of self-determination and individual 
action. Models of Western liberal subjecthood have historically assumed the primacy of 
individuals above communities and assumed that agency adheres in the former rather than the 
latter. As Elizabeth Dillon notes, “[i]n ascribing the capacity to consent to the individual, 
liberalism... constructs and relies upon a strong definition of the modern subject as one who is 
free, autonomous, and capable of self-government and rational behavior” (2). Models of agency 
based on this liberal formulation import the assumption that agency can only be obtained by 
rejecting any authority except that to which one has consented—that which one has chosen for 
oneself.  
Liberal philosophy thus has embedded within it an implicit secularization impulse: those 
who would participate fully in the liberal public sphere must abandon unquestioning allegiance 
to forms of authority based in tradition or revelation—including the authority of God—and learn 
to act independently of any oversight but their own or that of their rationally chosen governors. 
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John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, for instance, assumes the ultimate cosmic 
authority of God but simultaneously asserts that man’s liberty “is to be under no other legislative 
power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth” (26). Since God is not subject to 
election and his laws not ratified by any elected legislature, his decrees must, by Locke’s 
definition, be despotic and his will “inconstant, uncertain, unknown, [and] arbitrary” (27). 
Lockean liberal models of autonomy and agency, then, cannot help but place religion (and 
religious persons) in the role of Other, since the Abrahamic faiths most clearly (and many other 
religious traditions as well) rest on the foundational belief that there is always a higher authority 
whose power must be acknowledged even when its dictates are questioned (Mahmood, 
“Agency” 183-185).  
The chapters that follow eschew the liberal model of autonomous agency as inadequate to 
describe the needs and actions of religious persons and communities; they employ instead a 
model grounded in the philosophies of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. Butler’s pathbreaking 
work has revealed that the liberal model of sovereign agency is a fantasy of the Western 
imagination; because agency is enabled by discourse, and because discourse requires, at 
minimum, both a speaker and a listener, “[t]he address that inaugurates the possibility of agency, 
in a single stroke, forecloses the possibility of radical autonomy” (Judith Butler 26). In other 
words, because “the process by which one becomes subjected to relations of power also 
constitutes the conditions for the exercise of one’s agency,” no act can be entirely autonomous or 
liberated (Mahmood, “Women’s Agency” 575). Subjects are interpellated through discourse, 
including (and sometimes primarily) religious discourse, and the interpellation of the subject 
brings agency into being whether “the address that inaugurates the possibility of agency” is a 
negative one or a positive one: negative speech interpellates the subject—discursively calls the 
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subject into being—just as efficiently as other forms of speech. This insight is key to 
understanding how nineteenth-century women and African Americans reinterpreted religious 
doctrines that sometimes defined them as unworthy or unclean and transformed those doctrines 
into vehicles for exploring their own agency. Just as Frederick Douglass learned that reading and 
writing were worth pursuing precisely because Hugh Auld forbade him access to them, 
nineteenth-century women told by their ministers to “keep silence in the church” (1 Corinthians 
14:34) and African Americans condemned by the curse of Ham (Genesis 9:25) intuited how 
powerful their own religious agency might be by noting its careful circumscription. Kept out of 
the pulpit, they found other discursive outlets for their religious language. 
Employing a discourse model of agency makes it possible to recognize kinds of religious 
agency that operate, not by rejecting all forms of authority, but by inhabiting and operating 
within the particular structures of authority to which one is subject. In order to recognize 
religious agency and the new forms it might take in fiction, then, it is necessary both to 
understand the particular doctrinal ideas at work in fictional texts and to recognize forms of 
agency—both individual and collective—that do not appear to be classically willful. These 
actions might include religious rituals, careful ascription to rules, unregulated emotional 
experiences, or non-normative dis/embodiments; there may even be secular circumstances in 
which passivity itself becomes an act of agency. When Ellen Montgomery, the child heroine of 
Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World, submits herself to the religious teachings of Alice 
Humphreys rather than the nonreligious commandments of Aunt Fortune, she is exercising 
agency within the Calvinist doctrinal terms that give her experiences meaning—terms that do not 
assume that individual self-determination is the highest spiritual good. 
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Liberal philosophy’s emphasis on the rational power of individuals to select acceptable 
forms of authority for themselves can also make it difficult to account for the possibility of 
collective religious agency or for forms of agency not based in rational choice. Most religious 
experience—even mainstream Protestant religious experience—is communal, involving the 
shared beliefs and collective practices of a group that is often (but not always) connected by a 
common race, region, or nation. Within such religious contexts, agency may manifest in forms 
that are shared, circulated, fluid, or collaborative. The will of individuals may be subordinated to 
the perceived wellbeing of the group, or agency may be understood as originating with 
immaterial beings rather than with individual men and women. In Elizabeth Stoddard’s The 
Morgesons, the circulating forms of supernatural agency that inhere in Spiritualist ritual inform 
both the Morgeson sisters’ relationships with each other and the relationship between author and 
reader. In this way the experience of reading comes to parallel the forms of collective agency 
exemplified in religious experience: while the act of writing and the act of reading may be 
performed in solitude, the creation of meaning is an act of cross-temporal collaboration engaged 
in by author and reader.33 
This dissertation, then, examines religious agency in its historical and doctrinal 
specificity, revealing how particular structures of belief enabled new forms of agency that might 
be modeled in fictional texts. Because these forms of agency sometimes defied the assumptions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The limit case for discussions of non-liberal religious agency in the nineteenth century is, of course, the 
Catholic Church. As religious studies scholars including Winnifred Sullivan and Tracy Fessenden have 
detailed, Catholics have long represented the paradigmatic Other in a public sphere structured according 
to implicitly Protestant assumptions about what constitutes the proper exercise of religion. The authors I 
study in this dissertation thus walked a precarious middle way between embracing a straightforward 
model of Protestant liberal subjecthood that limited public religious speech to white males (and therefore 
made these authors’ own speech incomprehensible or impossible) and a Catholic model of nonliberal 
subjecthood that would place their language beyond the bounds of public discourse by aligning it with an 
institution that openly defied the “precondition for political participation” that Protestant belief and 
practice had come to represent (Sullivan 7). 	  
	   38 
of implicitly white and masculine liberal discourse, they can be difficult to recognize outside of 
their religious contexts. Situating these texts within the secular situation of the antebellum and 
early postbellum United States reveals the multifaceted opportunities for agency made possible 
by Protestant religious belief and provides a clearer picture of the discourse network formed by 
the nineteenth-century public sphere.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
This project begins in the 1820s, in the waning years of the Second Great Awakening, 
when Protestant doctrinal discourse had established itself as a matter for vigorous public debate, 
and ends just after the Civil War, when the overwhelming cultural, social, moral, and religious 
changes wrought during the first half of the nineteenth century culminated in a national 
cataclysm and the American public sphere was reorganized around new postwar principles. My 
first chapter examines the effects of the liberalization of Orthodox Calvinism in early national 
New England, particularly the rise and reach of the Unitarian movement and the possibilities it 
provided for new configurations of female agency as explored in the historical fiction of 
Catharine Maria Sedgwick. I then go on to discuss the role of Protestant doctrine in early 
African-American fiction by examining white women’s abolitionist agency in William Wells 
Brown’s Clotel. From there I turn to the woman’s fiction of the 1850s as exemplified by Susan 
Warner’s The Wide, Wide World and Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah, demonstrating how these 
texts took part in ongoing debates about the relationship between free will and human action. My 
final chapter, on Elizabeth Stoddard’s The Morgesons, investigates the circulation of female 
agency enabled by Spiritualist belief and practice. I conclude the project with a coda that traces 
the fate of religious agency in critical discourses of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
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The first chapter of the project examines the changing nature of public religious agency 
in the early nineteenth century through a reading of Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s historical 
novels Hope Leslie (1827) and The Linwoods (1835). Sedgwick was both the first internationally 
recognized female author from the new United States and an active participant in the religious 
controversies that marked early national life in the northeastern U.S., and her historical fiction 
intervenes in those controversies by placing nineteenth-century doctrinal questions in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settings. For Sedgwick, I argue, historical fiction provided 
the imaginative space within which a woman deeply invested in questions of theology but barred 
from ordained ministry could explore the religious underpinnings of ritualized violence. Modern 
critics of Sedgwick’s work, noting her 1821 move from an orthodox Calvinist congregation in 
Stockbridge, Massachusetts, to a Unitarian church in New York, have frequently characterized 
her writings as uncritical attempts to disseminate Unitarian values. My chapter offers a deeper 
doctrinal reading of Sedgwick’s historical novels, arguing that they represent an important and 
extended contribution to Unitarian theological thought that engages in a critical exploration of 
the Protestant doctrine of substitutionary atonement. My reading demonstrates how Sedgwick 
employed fiction to bring questions of gender and race into conversation with problems of 
theology, illuminating how the doctrine of sacrificial atonement justified violence by the 
wealthy, white, and male against the poor, women, and people of color. Having once 
deconstructed the doctrine of atonement, Sedgwick promoted in its place a new model of female 
religious agency founded on the notion that women are more valuable as active producers of 
language than as passive victims of sacrifice. For Sedgwick, the true American woman could 
defy the ancient rituals of sacrifice that solidified hierarchies of male power and initiate social 
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change by speaking in spontaneous and transformative language that repudiated ritual forms and 
inspired in others—men included—new beliefs and actions. 
Drawing on Michael Warner’s theorization of the early Western public sphere as a space 
in which “conversionistic witness to strangers” becomes the highest moral good, I demonstrate 
how Sedgwick’s historical novels depict women as the natural purveyors of effective religious 
language and thus as worthy participants in the American public sphere, laying the groundwork 
for decades of women’s religious fiction to follow. Sedgwick’s model of true religious language 
as spontaneous, originary, and unique rather than repetitive and ritualized is explicable in terms 
of the twentieth-century language theories of J.L. Austin and Judith Butler; for Sedgwick, the 
perlocutionary speech acts performed by American women must and will supersede the 
illocutionary rituals modeled by now-dead Founding Fathers. Hope Leslie and The Linwoods 
thus depict the religious and political rituals performed by historical figures including John 
Winthrop, George Washington, and the Pequot chief Mononotto as regressive and repetitive, 
leading only to continued violence, while the spontaneous religious language produced by 
fictional figures including Magawisca, Hope Leslie, and Isabella Linwood offers a model for 
American moral progress. 
Sedgwick’s historical novels examine moments of conflict between societies in unequal 
relations of power to one another, and her proposed solution to such imbalances is the 
transformative language of white women: in Hope Leslie and The Linwoods white women learn 
to “speak religiously” (in the words of Bruno Latour) on behalf of women of color. My second 
chapter examines how William Wells Brown’s Clotel, which includes characters named for 
Sedgwick’s fictional Linwood family, challenges this model. Clotel, I argue, extends Sedgwick’s 
vision of women’s religious agency by disengaging doctrinal authority from clerical ordination 
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and relocating it in women’s religious language. But whereas Sedgwick depicted female 
religious agency as a natural and spontaneous outgrowth of white women’s putative moral 
superiority, Brown posits female public religious speech as the paradoxically positive outcome 
of women’s exclusion from the clergy, since this exclusion allows them to form independent 
interpretations of the Bible not sanctioned by official sectarian hierarchies. Employing a Kantian 
model of private and public speech in which clergy are understood to be “private” citizens 
serving the needs of their congregants while educated but non-ordained persons are “public” 
citizens with the right to speak freely in public space, Brown rhetorically repositions religious 
agency as an outgrowth of women’s increasing education and their freedom from clerical and 
political ties. Unburdened by ordination or elected political office, Brown’s fictional white 
abolitionist Georgiana Peck is free not only in the sense that she is unenslaved, but in her ability 
to form controversial opinions and act on them—converting others to abolitionism and 
eventually freeing her father’s 70 slaves—without invoking the wrath of congregants or 
constituents.  
While there has been much historical work on the source materials for Brown’s novel, 
few if any of Brown’s critics have examined the particular theological arguments laid forth in his 
fiction. My chapter explores how Brown uses scriptural exegesis to systematically discredit 
particular proslavery doctrines embraced by ministers both North and South—particularly John 
Peck of Rochester, New York, and Charles Colcock Jones of Liberty County, Georgia—while 
exalting the educated woman as the paragon of “true Christianity.” Problematically, however, 
Brown could imagine only the educated white woman in this paradigmatic leadership role; while 
the white heiress Georgiana Peck frees her father’s slaves, the novel’s mixed-race heroine Clotel 
Jefferson takes her own life, entrenching even further the already familiar stereotype of the 
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“tragic mulatta” and suggesting that even in fiction religious agency is available only to white 
women. Clotel has thus posed a problem for critics of African-American literature, who have 
sought an authentic representation of nineteenth-century African-American experience and found 
instead a text that borrows heavily from white sentimental conventions, including the “tragic 
mulatta” figure. My chapter addresses this critical concern by reading Brown’s novel in the 
context of two other African-American slave narratives, Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the 
Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (1845) and Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life 
of a Slave Girl (1861); together these texts reveal that African-American women’s religious 
agency could be better imagined within the generic space of fiction than in the autobiographical 
space of the slave narrative. Reading Clotel as an intermediate step between Douglass’s 
Narrative, which denies the possibility of women’s religious agency, and Jacobs’s Incidents, 
which depicts Linda Brent as the architect of her own salvation, I reveal the process by which the 
fictionalization of slave experience (including the fictionalization of Jacobs’s real-life escape) 
made African-American women’s religious agency into a viable imaginative possibility.  
While the doctrinal authority of the fictional white woman was established and solidified 
by Sedgwick and Brown, authors of the nineteenth-century form now known as “woman’s 
fiction” found that the story of an orphaned girl seeking a physical and spiritual home provided 
the perfect generic framework for the exploration of particular Protestant doctrines and their 
consequences for female agency. My third chapter, on Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World 
(1852) and Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah (1859), argues that the 1850s sentimental novel—a 
genre rarely read for its contributions to American theological thought—could and did provide 
fertile soil for intertextual debate about the relative merits of predestinarian and free will 
doctrines and their practical consequences for women’s lives. In this chapter I demonstrate how 
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careful attention to the divergent conceptions of free will embraced by the Calvinist Susan 
Warner and the Arminian Augusta Jane Evans can broaden critical understandings of religious 
agency as a complex aspect of nineteenth-century women’s lives. 
The sentimental novel has offered a particularly thorny problem to critics seeking 
evidence of women’s increasing agency in the mid-nineteenth century since sentimental fiction 
tends to advocate submission to the will of God rather than rebellion from it. Applying Western 
liberal models of the “sovereign subject” that equate agency with autonomy and identity with 
individuality (Judith Butler 16), critics from Ann Douglas to Jane Tompkins to Marianne Noble 
have obscured the doctrinal arguments at play in sentimental fiction by treating religion 
primarily as a cynical (and ultimately disposable) means of subverting male authority. Drawing 
on the work of anthropologist Saba Mahmood, who questions western liberal models of agency 
by exploring how women in traditional religious environments exercise agency collaboratively 
rather than competitively, my chapter reveals the multiple models of female agency depicted in 
the sentimental novel—models sometimes predicated on Calvinist norms of submission and 
humility and at other times on an Arminian ethic of self-determination. In Warner’s The Wide, 
Wide World Ellen Montgomery learns to exercise agency by conforming her will to those of her 
companions Alice and John Humphreys, not in order to subvert their authority but to bring her 
actions into alignment with a sequence of cosmic events predestined by God. In Evans’s Beulah, 
by contrast, the eponymous heroine rejects the attempts of her friends and benefactors to impose 
their wills upon her because she sees the exercise of free will as the highest expression of earthly 
good. My chapter compares these Calvinist and Arminian plots to demonstrate how critical 
models of “sentimental power” that ignore doctrinal distinctions obscure the multiple forms of 
female agency depicted in sentimental texts.  
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While Warner’s and Evans’s divergent theologies demonstrate the wide range of 
doctrinal positions espoused by authors of “woman’s fiction,” fictional treatments of women’s 
religious agency extended beyond both the generic structures of sentimental novels and the 
sectarian boundaries of established Protestant denominations. My fourth chapter examines the 
role of Spiritualist doctrine in Elizabeth Stoddard’s 1862 novel The Morgesons, demonstrating 
how Stoddard’s invocation of Spiritualist beliefs and practices enabled her to depict forms of 
collaborative cross-gender and cross-class agency that fell outside mid-nineteenth-century 
expectations for women’s piety. Because The Morgesons is deeply critical of the New England 
clerical hierarchy that characterized its 1830s milieu, critics have long read the novel as evidence 
for the secularization of American culture—the evacuation of religious thought and belief from 
everyday life. By tracing the Spiritualist tendencies of Stoddard’s novel and drawing on recent 
scholarship on nineteenth-century secularism by John Modern and others, I demonstrate not only 
that these death pronouncements were premature, but that Stoddard’s text should be read as a 
significant contribution both to the genre of Spiritualist fiction and to nineteenth-century 
religious thought.  
Nineteenth-century Spiritualism was a disruptive religious discourse that uncoupled 
agency from accepted hierarchies of authority and placed power in the joined hands of the weak, 
the poor, the sick, and the politically disenfranchised. Spiritualist mediumship and spirit 
communication thus offered opportunities for sympathetic connection and collaborative action 
among those with the least access to institutionalized religious and political power. I argue that 
The Morgesons employs and models shared forms of Spiritualist agency at both the textual and 
the metatextual levels. The Morgeson sisters’ mediumistic gifts, including clairvoyance and 
spirit-traveling, enable them to circumvent entrenched romantic, domestic, and economic 
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expectations and to form sympathetic connections across boundaries of gender and class. At the 
same time, Stoddard’s fictional invocation of Spiritualist practice freed her from the generic 
forms popularized by Warner, Evans, and other sentimental novelists and enabled her to 
inaugurate a specifically female form of Spiritualist fiction that celebrated Spiritualism’s 
agentive possibilities for women rather than decrying or narratively defusing them. 
Just as Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s fictional heroine Magawisca inspired the African-
American abolitionist Sarah Louis Forten, the fictional characters created by Brown, Warner, 
Evans, and Stoddard offered models for religious agency among the disenfranchised that began 
to take institutional form after the Civil War. In the postbellum era the New Thought, Christian 
Science, Spiritualist, Holiness, and Theosophy movements thrived under the leadership of 
spiritually gifted women who found the moral authority to exercise religious agency in the public 
sphere. And the postbellum expansion of black Protestant denominations like the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, first formed in the early nineteenth century, gave black Americans 
access to ordained religious leadership that was largely independent of white institutional 
structures. The social and political achievements of these movements, and of religiously 
motivated groups like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, were not universally 
successful or progressive, and the institutionalization of religious leadership by the 
disenfranchised often introduced new problems for religious communities and new questions 
about the legitimacy of religious authority. Nevertheless, the forms of agency enabled by 
Protestant religious identification and adherence were so potent and so widely acknowledged that 
by the end of the nineteenth century movements including “muscular Christianity” and the Men 
and Religion Forward Movement arose to reclaim Protestant religious agency for white men. I 
conclude this dissertation with a short coda that discusses how a model of subaltern agency so 
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widely acknowledged in the nineteenth century became so unrecognizable in the twentieth and 
twenty-first—why modern critics have had such difficulty seeing the forms of religious agency 
modeled in nineteenth-century texts, often reading religion as an oppressive ideology rather than 
an opportunity for agency and expression. Drawing on the work of Vincent Pecora and Michael 
Kaufmann I argue that the secularization of the academy that began with the turn to the twentieth 
century made religious agency unreadable for literary critics employing a secularized form of 
criticism, and that this secularization of academic discourse is exemplified in the work of 
William James, particularly The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and “The Will to 
Believe” (1897). 
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CHAPTER 1: “My Resolve is the Feminine of My Father’s Oath”: Sacrificial 
Violence and Religious Language in Hope Leslie and The Linwoods 
 
I began this dissertation with the story of the Sedgwick family and Elizabeth Freeman, who 
became a “second mother” to the Sedgwick children after she was emancipated and joined their 
household as a paid servant. The Sedgwick children needed a “second mother” because their 
biological mother, Pamela Dwight Sedgwick, was frequently ill, suffering from severe 
depressions for which she was occasionally institutionalized. These depressions were 
exacerbated by her husband’s long absences from home when, serving in the U.S. House of 
Representatives or the Massachusetts Supreme Court, he would leave his wife and children alone 
for months at a time while he performed his civic duties in Philadelphia or New York. 
Theodore’s children recognized that his public career was enabled by the private sacrifices of his 
family, and as an adult Catharine would record the effect these sacrifices had on her mother 
Pamela, noting that “Her long separations from my father seem to have been almost cruel to her” 
but that Pamela never “expressed one word of remonstrance or dissatisfaction” 
(“Autobiography” 63).34 Pamela’s chief traits, in Catharine’s memory, were her “character, her 
wisdom, her conjugal devotion, and self-negation.” Though Theodore “lament[ed] over” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34
 For quotations from Sedgwick’s autobiography I have used Mary Kelley’s definitive print edition, 
found in The Power of Her Sympathy: The Autobiography and Journal of Catharine Maria Sedgwick. To 
avoid confusion between the autobiography and others of Sedgwick’s (and Kelley’s) writings quoted 
here, in-text citations of the autobiography follow the format (“Autobiography” [page # in Kelley]). 
Quotations from Sedgwick’s letters are drawn, whenever possible, from the microfilm edition of her 
papers published by the Massachusetts Historical Society; these quotations are cited in the text in the 
format (CMS Papers, Letter to [recipient], [date of letter]). On a few occasions I have used quotations 
from Mary Dewey’s 1871 Life and Letters of Catharine M. Sedgwick; these are cited in the format 
(quoted in Dewey, [page number]). Full bibliographic information for all of these sources can be found in 
the list of works cited. 
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Pamela’s frequent illnesses, he comforted himself with “the conviction of an overruling duty to 
his country” (“Autobiography” 58). Pamela’s private “self-negation” was the corollary to 
Theodore’s public career: Theodore’s duty to his country “overruled” Pamela’s physical and 
mental health, and her private suffering was the sacrifice that enabled his public service.  
As with the story of Elizabeth Freeman, Catharine and her siblings offered varied 
interpretations of Pamela’s sacrifices on Theodore’s behalf. When Pamela died Catharine’s 
brother Harry composed a eulogy in which Pamela appeared as a Christ-figure, led to the 
slaughter for the sake of her husband, her children, and her country:  
It may not be profane or irreverent to suppose that, with some distant resemblance to 
our Redeemer, she did not suffer solely for herself…; and we may be permitted to 
hope that her example and her memory… will contribute to the eternal welfare of 
those she most loved. (Quoted in Sedgwick, “Autobiography” 66) 
 
When Catharine wrote of her mother’s death, by contrast, she was unwilling to assign 
redemptive power to Pamela’s pain. In writing of Pamela’s death she would say only that, “Her 
sufferings are past, and… prepared her to enjoy more keenly the rest and felicities of heaven” 
(“Autobiography” 63). For Catharine, Pamela’s trials had “past” but they brought about no 
greater good and held no redemptive power. Unlike her brother, Catharine refused to depict her 
mother’s death as the necessary sacrifice for her father’s personal redemption or his political 
success.35 
This chapter examines Catharine Sedgwick’s career-long concern with questions of 
sacrifice and atonement and their consequences for women’s religious agency. It interrogates the 
centrality of sacrifice in Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s novels Hope Leslie (1827) and The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The rhetorical contrast between Catharine’s interpretation of her mother’s death and that of her brother 
Harry follows the pattern I traced in my introduction, where I discussed their divergent framings of 
Elizabeth Freeman’s antislavery suit. Henry Sedgwick seems to have viewed the Sedgwicks’ personal and 
public affairs almost entirely from Theodore’s point of view: Theodore had the “principal agency” in 
Mum Bett’s freedom and is the primary beneficiary of Pamela’s self-sacrifice. 
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Linwoods (1835) and argues that Sedgwick employed the genre of historical fiction to 
deconstruct Protestant doctrines predicated on sacrifice and to imagine in their place a theology 
of women’s active religious language that might serve as a new doctrinal basis for American 
social progress. It shows how Sedgwick systematically dismantled the orthodox theology of 
sacrificial atonement and replaced it with a doctrine of religious language that both assumed and 
enacted the religious superiority of women. In doing so Sedgwick defined women’s religious 
agency as a product of their active language rather than a passive attribute of their racially and 
sexually marked bodies.  
I argue that Sedgwick’s novel of colonial Massachusetts, Hope Leslie, mounts a 
sophisticated critique of atonement theology that reveals how social models based on atonement 
not only unfairly victimize white women and women of color but also impede social progress. 
Having successfully deconstructed the doctrine of atonement and the social and political 
constructs built upon it, Sedgwick then went on to imagine a model of women’s religious agency 
that relied not on women’s passive and victimized bodies but on their active religious language, a 
model she explores in her Revolutionary War novel The Linwoods. In The Linwoods Sedgwick 
imaginatively positions women as the rightful possessors of spontaneous religious language and 
worthy contributors to a public sphere structured according to the terms of Protestant debate. By 
situating her religious explorations in the context of America’s most significant founding 
moments—the flowering of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and the last months of the American 
Revolution—Sedgwick rehistoricizes women’s roles in the American public sphere. 
Sedgwick’s repositioning of women as the possessors of religious language rather than 
the receptacles of ritual meaning can be productively analyzed in the terms of speech act and 
discourse theory. The speech acts that Sedgwick’s all-American heroines Hope Leslie and 
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Isabella Linwood learn to perform are, in the terms posed by J.L. Austin and elaborated by Judith 
Butler, not illocutionary but perlocutionary: they proceed not “by way of conventions, [but] by 
way of consequences” (Judith Butler 17). They derive their force precisely from the fact that they 
are not ritualized: they are always spontaneous, always unique, and always arise, not from 
predetermined scripts, but from a well of sincere feeling. In Sedgwick’s imagined America, 
spontaneous speech acts are the agents of social change and the particular province of women, 
whose access to spontaneous religious speech positions them as worthy participants in an early-
national public sphere in which religious and political language were thoroughly imbricated.  
I begin this chapter by examining the intersection of religion and politics in the early 
nineteenth century in order to demonstrate how Sedgwick’s turn to religious language 
represented an intervention in the public sphere rather than a withdrawal from it. I then go on to 
discuss Sedgwick’s historical novels Hope Leslie and The Linwoods: I argue that Hope Leslie 
deconstructs the Protestant doctrine of atonement by revealing that it depends, like vengeance, 
on ritualized violence against the dispossessed. I then show how Sedgwick’s next historical 
novel, The Linwoods, substitutes an ethic of active religious language for a social model that 
relies on repeated violence. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of cross-cultural translation 
and the problems it raises for a doctrine of religious language, namely, whether it is possible to 
adopt a new religious language without appropriating the language of others. 
 
Religion and/as Early National Public Discourse 
In April 1804, then-14-year-old Catharine Sedgwick wrote to her father, away serving in 
Congress, of a recent election in Stockbridge: 
The town-meeting is over; the Jacobins have carried the day; they have a majority 
of seven for governor, ten for lieutenant governor and senator…. [T]heir most 
	   51 
diabolical act was endeavoring to lessen Dr. West’s salary; fortunately they did 
not succeed. Thus you see, my dear papa, I have become quite a politician…. 
(Quoted in Dewey, 80) 
 
The new Democratic majority in Stockbridge—whom Catharine, adopting the attitude of her 
Federalist father, refers to disdainfully as “Jacobins”—began its tenure by addressing a pressing 
political matter: the local minister’s salary. The minister of Stockbridge’s Congregational 
church, Dr. Stephen West, was Catharine’s uncle and the immediate clerical successor to the 
eminent Jonathan Edwards, and his salary, guaranteed by the state and drawn from public funds, 
was a matter of considerable political importance.36 When Catharine described her adolescent 
self as “quite a politician,” she was registering the recognition that questions of ecclesiastical 
polity and doctrinal difference were as much matters of political debate as of religious concern. 
Catharine’s adult writings would reflect this early training in the imbrication of religion 
and politics, with her historical novels, in particular, probing the relationship between political 
and religious authority to reveal the way these discourses worked together to consolidate white, 
male power. Hope Leslie, set in the early years of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, reveals how 
the Puritan fathers justified political and military action with religious reasoning, positioning 
Native peoples, for instance, as “sweet sacrifice[s]” on the altar of Christianity (56). The 
Linwoods, Sedgwick’s novel of the Revolutionary War, analyzes the military policies of General 
George Washington and Sir Henry Clinton in light of their resemblance to (or difference from) 
those of a just deity: one character remarks that Washington is “godlike” in that “he finishes off 
little things as completely as great” (73). Even in short sketches like “A Reminiscence of 
Federalism” (1834) Sedgwick turned a canny and perceptive eye on the relationship between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36
 Sedgwick’s mother Pamela Dwight Sedgwick was a lifelong member of Dr. West’s congregation, and 
Catharine was of the opinion that Pamela’s strict Calvinist faith contributed to her “gloominess” and 
frequent bouts of depression. See Tim Kenslea’s The Sedgwicks in Love for a thorough history of the 
Sedgwick family’s origins, their influence in Stockbridge social life, and Theodore’s political career. 
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religion and politics; in “Reminiscence” she depicts a Congregationalist minister whose staunch 
orthodox Calvinism and Federalist politics go hand in hand, driving Democratic voters out of his 
church and earning him the nickname “Parson Fed.” 
Critical treatments of Sedgwick’s work, however, have rarely remarked on her 
sophisticated exploration of the intersection of religion and politics in the colonial and early 
national public sphere. Sedgwick’s critics and biographers generally make note of her 
Congregationalist upbringing and her decision to join a Unitarian church as an adult, but are 
more likely to characterize her as an uncritical mouthpiece for liberal Christianity than a 
perceptive participant in American religious and political discourse.37 Those critics who have 
moved beyond a simple equation between Sedgwick’s Unitarian faith and her progressive fiction 
have shown a tendency to divorce her texts’ political and social concerns from their religious 
reflections and to subordinate the latter to the former. Mary Kelley, for instance, reading religion 
primarily as a repository for “moral” and “cultural” ideas and an arena separate from the public 
sphere of political action to which Sedgwick’s father and brothers belonged, positions 
Sedgwick’s religious adherence as a means to an end, a tool by which she can “retain power and 
authority in the domain of culture” by addressing her fiction to an “immense moral field” (392-
393). Charlene Avallone, writing of race relations in Sedgwick’s fiction, asserts that Sedgwick’s 
novels “displace” questions of race and gender “from political to religious discourse” as part of 
an ideological scheme designed to maintain the “difference[s] essential to white American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This attitude characterizes the work of Sedgwick biographers Edward Halsey Foster and Jane Giles and 
literary historian Carolyn Karcher, who claims that Sedgwick “entered on her literary career with the aim 
of diffusing the blessings of Unitarianism” (Karcher xv). But Sedgwick’s relationship with the Unitarian 
movement was more ambivalent than these critics acknowledge; in her letters she expressed concern over 
the movement’s “articles of unbelief” and quarreled with Unitarian friends over the coldness of the 
movement’s ministers and adherents (Letter to Susan Channing, March 12, 1821). As this chapter will 
demonstrate, Sedgwick’s literary career was less an advertisement for Unitarianism than an interrogation 
of its central theological problems. 
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identity and the established social order” (113). In Kelley’s and Avallone’s readings, religion 
belongs to an apolitical private sphere onto which concerns of gender, race, and class are 
“displaced” and thus do not affect the public sphere where political action and real social change 
occur. 
Such public-private formulations of nineteenth-century religious influence rely on several 
misconceptions: that a firm and fixed distinction can be made between the public and private 
spheres; that the categories of human experience that belong to each are temporally stable rather 
than historically determined; that politics and religion are separate discourses; and that politics is 
a matter for the public sphere and religion for the private. These misconceptions are grounded in 
the secularization thesis that I discussed in my introduction, in some versions of which 
secularized thought and discourse “do not so much replace religious thought and discourse as 
they displace them to the private domain of personal experience, belief, and practice” (Kaufmann 
607). Taking for granted that religious matters are and always have been a matter for the private 
sphere, Sedgwick’s biographers and critics treat the religious aspects of Sedgwick’s fiction either 
as simple reflections of her personal beliefs or as matters unrelated to public issues. But as the 
young Catharine’s comments on the “Jacobins” demonstrate, in the early-nineteenth-century 
United States religious matters were very much a subject for public and political discussion. To 
tie the discourses of race, gender, and class to the public discussion of religion was to bring those 
topics into a public sphere already deeply concerned with doctrinal and ecclesiastical questions, 
not to hide them from view or denigrate their importance.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The problem with relegating matters of religion to the private sphere lies not only in the particular 
historical inaccuracies of such formulations but in the way such assumptions oversimplify the very terms 
“public” and “private.” As Michael Warner has demonstrated, the terms of the public and private spheres 
shift constantly despite how much they might “seem to be preconceptual, almost instinctual, rooted in the 
orientations of the body and common speech” (Publics 23). There can be no firm distinction made 
between the public and the private, especially in Western liberal social systems in which the idea of a 
	   54 
To understand the religious and political commitments of Sedgwick’s texts it is necessary 
to situate them within the particular religious-historical configuration of the early national 
northeastern United States. Sedgwick’s novels, sketches, and letters show particular attention to 
the interpenetration of religion and politics, not only because Sedgwick was personally religious, 
but because her adolescence and early adulthood had been marked by an ongoing controversy 
regarding the proper relationship between religious and political institutions in the public sphere: 
the disestablishment movement that sought to sever the Congregationalist church from the 
Massachusetts state government.39 Until the official disestablishment of the Congregationalist 
church in 1833, the state’s residents were still taxed in support of this institution—and its 
clergy—whether they attended or not, and political and religious affiliations often fell along 
predictable lines, with staunch Congregationalists supporting the Federalist party and members 
of other sects, or those not affiliated with a church, opposing them. As the historian Steven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
public sphere rests on the definition of private selves; instead “public and private sometimes compete, 
sometimes complement each other, and sometimes are merely parts of a larger series of classifications…. 
Almost every major cultural change—from Christianity to printing to psychoanalysis—has left a new 
sedimentary layer in the meaning of the public and the private” (M. Warner, Publics 28). And as the 
boundaries between the public and the private shift, the interconnected discourses of religion and politics 
constantly transgress them. This is true both for any given moment in time and when viewed in historical 
perspective: behaviors deemed essentially private in one era and under a particular political regime are 
considered appropriately public in another.  
 
39
 By 1800 most of the states in the newly formed union had disestablished the state churches (like the 
Anglican Church in New York and Virginia) that marked the colonial period. But Connecticut and 
Massachusetts, Congregationalist mainstays since the seventeenth century, maintained their 
establishments into the early 1800s, with Massachusetts holding out until 1833. The Congregationalist 
establishment in Massachusetts, in particular, did not go down without a fight. As late as 1827, the year 
Hope Leslie was published, Congregationalist leaders were still trying to restrict voting rights in the 
choice of local pastors to only those citizens who were official members of the church. (Congregationalist 
churches were often attended by large numbers of people who chose never to officially become 
members—or who attempted to join but were denied admission, often because of theological disputes 
with the existing membership.) Such attempts flew in the face of high court decisions—including those of 
Judge Sedgwick, Catharine’s father and one-time Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court—
confirming the right of all voting citizens to choose their local pastors, and represented a clear attempt on 
the part of Orthodox clergy to stamp out the increasing influence of Unitarian ministers and believers 
(“Review: Art. V.” 124). 
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Green notes, scholars of American history often treat the disestablishment of religion and the 
separation of church and state as settled facts rather than ongoing processes, projecting a current 
model of church-state separation onto earlier eras in which these two institutions were vastly 
more intertwined than they currently are. Nineteenth-century Americans, Green notes, made far 
less of a distinction between the discourses of politics and religion than twenty-first-century 
Americans are wont to do:40 
In 1800, the United States represented the only secular government on earth, 
revolutionary France excepted…. Yet, for most of the [nineteenth] century, the 
‘wall of separation’ was more of an illusion than a reality; despite the 
Jeffersonian/Madisonian vision, the new republic that emerged in the early 1800s 
was popularly described as a ‘Christian nation’…. (9) 
 
The official disestablishment of the Congregational Church in Massachusetts did not occur until 
11 years after Sedgwick had begun her literary career. Even then, nineteenth-century America 
remained “a ‘Protestant empire’ where Protestant/evangelical beliefs and values dominated the 
nation’s culture and institutions” through “revivals and reform associations, blasphemy and 
Sabbath laws, religious oath requirements, and state maintenance of a Protestant-oriented public 
school system” (Green 9). To read religion and politics as separate discourses in early-
nineteenth-century fiction is to misrepresent the makeup of the early national public sphere, in 
which the disestablishment of religion and its definition as a “private” discourse was 
accomplished neither in theory nor in practice. 
The evolving role of religion in the public sphere was thus a defining fact of life in the 
early national milieu in which Sedgwick’s novels appeared, and to read the religious aspects of 
her fiction as separate from or tangential to political concerns is to misunderstand the role of 
women’s religious language in nineteenth-century public life. To treat religious discourse solely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The continuing imbrication of religion and politics in American life can be seen most starkly in the de 
facto, if not de jure, religious tests applied to those running for elected office. Having the “right religion” 
is a basic requirement for almost all political candidates, but certainly those seeking the presidency. 
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as an aspect of or a window onto private life is to overlook the historical conditions of the early 
national era, in which the proper relation between religion and politics was as much a matter for 
public debate as for private concern, and religious discourse provided a space, not for avoiding 
public and political matters, but for engaging productively with them. By invoking religious 
questions—particularly ongoing debates about the doctrine of atonement—Sedgwick’s novels 
participate in a public sphere in which religious questions were just as much a matter for public 
discussion as were matters of electoral politics or civic government. By situating these debates in 
new historical settings, Sedgwick explored their effects on the new nation’s civil institutions as 
well as its religious ones. 
 
Deconstructing Atonement in Hope Leslie  
Sedgwick’s historical novel Hope Leslie, set in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 
aftermath of the Pequot War,41 interrogates the Christian doctrine of atonement through the lens 
of Massachusetts’ colonial history. By drawing parallels between the atonement doctrines 
embraced by the English colonists and the rituals of revenge attributed by the Puritans to the 
Native population, Sedgwick suggests that the doctrine of atonement is a shaky foundation on 
which to build a new nation because it perpetuates violence against the weak to further the goals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41
 The historical event dubbed the “Pequot War” by the Massachusetts Bay colonists is better described as 
a massacre. Both John Winthrop, seventeenth-century governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and the 
nineteenth-century historians Benjamin Trumbull and William Hubbard couched the conflict as a “battle” 
in which the Puritans had won a righteous and hard-fought victory. Sedgwick’s retelling—which she 
places in the mouth of Magawisca—restores the historical reality of the scene (confirmed by twentieth-
century historians), in which white settlers besieged and burned an undefended Pequot village, murdering 
women and children in a horrifying act of pretended retribution that was less military maneuver than 
vicious ambush. As Sandra Zagarell has noted, Hope Leslie does not merely adopt the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony as its setting; Sedgwick also wrote to set the record straight on the injustices of the Pequot War. 
Sedgwick’s account of the conflict with the Pequots “expos[ed] the repositories of the nation’s early 
history, the Puritan narratives, as justifications of genocide” (Zagarell, “Expanding” 235). 
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of the strong, who couch their violent actions in the language of the “public weal.” Hope Leslie 
thus contributes to an ongoing nineteenth-century debate about atonement (a major matter of 
contention between orthodox Calvinist and liberal Unitarian theologians) while simultaneously 
exploring the social consequences of atonement theology for a nation still in the early stages of 
its development. 
 The most famous scene in Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie is one in which the Indian maiden 
Magawisca, desperate to save the English colonist Everell Fletcher from beheading at the hands 
of her father, throws herself in front of the falling ax. The Pequot chief Mononotto, planning to 
avenge the death of his son Samoset by sacrificing an English boy of the same age, has 
kidnapped Everell Fletcher and taken him to the “sacrifice-rock” where such rituals of revenge 
are conducted. As the Pequot elders prepare for the ritual, Mononotto’s daughter Magawisca 
scales the side of the sacrifice-rock and arrives just in time to interrupt the event; throwing her 
arm between her father’s ax and Everell’s neck, she cries, “‘I have bought his life with my 
own.’” Everell is saved but Magawisca’s arm is severed, and Everell flees east to rejoin the 
Puritan colonists. Magawisca disappears with her father into the western forests of 
Massachusetts; Everell, upon returning to the Massachusetts Bay, spreads the tale of the “sister 
that had redeemed his life with her own” (97).  
The scene narrates an ethical shift from a religious and social model of revenge to one of 
atonement: Everell, whose death will avenge the murder of Mononotto’s son, is redeemed at the 
last moment by Magawisca’s willing self-sacrifice. Magawisca’s “redemption” of Everell—
twice the narrator repeats that Magawisca has “bought” or “redeemed” Everell’s life—borrows 
and reverses the structure of the Indian captivity narrative, in which white colonists paid a 
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ransom for the return of a family member kidnapped by natives.42 But Magawisca’s 
“redemption” of Everell invokes not only the literary-historical tradition of the captivity narrative 
but the theological construct that lay behind the very concept of redemption: the doctrine of 
atonement, by which Christ’s death on the cross redeems mankind from the sins of Adam and 
brings about human salvation.43 In casting Magawisca as a redeemer who voluntarily takes 
Everell’s place and pays for the sins of the white colonists, Sedgwick fictionalizes the scene of 
atonement—the crucifixion—and casts a Native American woman in the role of Christ.  
The historical setting of colonial Massachusetts and the fictional story of Everell and 
Magawisca provided Sedgwick with an imaginative space in which to consider the doctrine of 
atonement so central to Protestant Christianity and to nineteenth-century public religious debates, 
to lift this theological construct out of its rancorous contemporary milieu, and to examine it from 
a different but still politically relevant point of view. The question of atonement was not under 
debate in the Massachusetts Bay Colony of the 1640s, when Hope Leslie is set, but was very 
much in play in the Massachusetts of the 1820s, when Hope Leslie was published. Atonement 
theology was a major bone of contention between the early-nineteenth-century New England 
Orthodox establishment and the small but rapidly expanding American Unitarian movement, and 
Sedgwick’s personal history made her privy to the debates surrounding atonement theology: her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42
 In her work on Indian captivity in Hope Leslie, Karen Woods Weierman notes that Magawisca’s rescue 
of Everell recapitulates the legend of Pocahontas and John Smith. Weierman, following Mary Kelley, also 
discusses the similarities between the story of Faith Leslie—Hope’s younger sister who is carried into 
captivity, marries Mononotto’s son Oneco, and converts to Catholicism—and the captivity narrative of 
Eunice Williams, Sedgwick’s ancestor on her mother’s side (“Reading and Writing”). 
 
43
 Richard Slotkin details the religious archetypes that the early Indian captivity narratives illustrated for 
Puritan writers and readers:  
The sufferer represents the whole, chastened body of Puritan society; and the temporary bondage 
of the captive to the Indian is dual paradigm—of the bondage of the soul to the flesh and to the 
temptations arising from original sin…. The captive’s ultimate redemption by the grave of Christ 
and the efforts of the Puritan magistrates is likened to the regeneration of the soul in conversion. 
(94) 
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“Uncle West” was considered an authority on the doctrine of the atonement, and Sedgwick spent 
much of her childhood listening to him expound his theories in Sunday sermons and during visits 
to the Sedgwick home.44 
Atonement, as the construct that underlies the Protestant interpretation of Christ’s 
crucifixion and mankind’s redemption, is one of the doctrines most central to Christian theology, 
and in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries it was the subject of intense debate 
among orthodox and Unitarian theologians. In its most general terms atonement is “the satisfying 
Divine Justice by Jesus Christ giving himself a ransom for us, undergoing the penalty due to our 
sins, and thereby releasing us from that punishment which God might justly inflict upon us” 
(Buck 37).45 Stephen West subscribed to the “governmental” theory of the atonement laid out by 
the theologians of the New Divinity movement, in which the crucifixion did not satisfy a debt 
but instead displayed the true majesty of God:46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Raised in an Orthodox Congregationalist church in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, Sedgwick joined the 
New York Unitarian Society in 1821 and corresponded occasionally with William Ellery Channing, the 
unofficial spokesperson for the Boston Unitarian movement (Giles 44).44 Sedgwick’s personal writings 
show that she gave much thought to the question of atonement: in the 1860s, when she wrote her 
autobiography for her niece Alice Minot, she could still limn the differences between Stephen West’s 
Hopkinsian (governmental) model of the atonement and the substitutionary doctrine held by the New 
York clergyman John Mitchell Mason, whose church she had left over thirty years before 
(“Autobiography” 95, 99). 
Catharine’s letters to her siblings indicate that she held a somewhat jocular attitude toward West’s 
Calvinist theology long before she left his church. Scolding her brother Charles in a letter she wrote: 
“Indeed, my dear Charles, all the sermons I hear in a month, and all the writers on human depravity, with 
Hopkins at their head... can not counteract the… mass of flattery you have so elegantly served up in your 
letter.... The next letter that you write, by way of unraveling this web of mischief, I desire may be filled 
with extracts from [Samuel] Hopkins’s Diary, [Jonathan] Edwards’s Meditations, and Uncle West’s 
Sermons” (Letter to Charles Sedgwick, February 20, 1812). “Uncle West,” of course, is Stephen West, 
whose sermons were in fact frequently published as pamphlets. 
 
45
 This succinct definition of atonement is from the 1821 edition of Charles Buck’s Definitions of All 
Religious Terms, a standard reference work already in its sixth American edition by the time Sedgwick 
wrote Hope Leslie. 
 
46
 Buck’s Definitions of All Religious Terms recommends West’s 1785 treatise The Scripture Doctrine of 
Atonement as an important source on the subject. West’s reputation as a theologian was respected enough 
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Respecting atonement, it is to be observed that it summarily consists in an 
exhibition of the righteous displeasure of God against sin, made in some other 
way than in the punishment of the sinner…. One great end of the coming and 
death of Christ, was to delineate this disposition of the divine mind, and make a 
full and sensible exhibition of it. In his sufferings and death this divine purity, and 
hatred of iniquity, were sensibly and gloriously expressed. (West 121-122, 
emphasis in original) 
 
In other words, God requires Christ to atone for the sins of man because only by allowing his son 
to die can God display his hatred of sin.47 For West and other adherents to the “governmental” 
theory, Christ’s death was necessary in order to display to mankind how God could be both 
infinitely just—requiring punishment for sin—and infinitely merciful—pardoning the sinner—at 
one and the same time.  
The idea that God’s justice could be best displayed through the death of a sinless man 
was one of the orthodox theologies most repugnant to Unitarians (including Catharine 
Sedgwick’s brother Harry, who had helped found a New York Unitarian congregation in 1819). 
Unitarian theologians, most notably William Ellery Channing and Henry Ware, “could [not] 
accept the sacrificial theory of the atonement, according to which God unleashed salvific power 
only by demanding the violent death of his sinless son. The God whose image they hoped to 
embody was a perfectly loving parent who identified with, cared for, and shared the sufferings of 
every human individual” (McKanan 4-5).48 Channing and other Unitarians’ chief objection to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that he was deemed worthy to succeed Jonathan Edwards at the clerical post in Stockbridge. 
 
47 The competing theory of the atonement, held by the Old Calvinists, was the “substitutionary” model, in 
which Christ’s death is believed to satisfy a debt that mankind has incurred by sinning against God. Both 
the governmental and substitutionary models interpret Christ’s death and resurrection as expressions of 
God’s justice and mercy, satisfying a penalty for sin while not exacting that penalty directly from sinners. 
(See Holifield 132-156.) 
 
48
 The rise of Unitarian thought in early America was part of a larger liberal movement among Protestant 
Christians that stretched back to at least the seventeenth century. The characteristics of liberal Protestant 
theology include “an emphasis on the immanence of the sacred; a reliance on the authority of lived 
experience as a counter to traditionally authoritative religious claims; a willingness to engage insights 
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doctrine of atonement was the monstrous god it seemed to depict: “How plain is it also, 
according to this doctrine, that God, instead of being plenteous in forgiveness, never forgives; for 
it is absurd to speak of men as forgiven, when their whole punishment is borne by a substitute? A 
scheme more fitted to bring Christianity into contempt, and less suited to give comfort to a guilty 
and troubled mind, could not, we think, be easily invented” (Channing, Sermon 33). Unitarians, 
then, objected to the doctrine of atonement for both doctrinal and practical reasons: not only was 
it unreasonable to expect a loving god to behave in such a way, but such beliefs had dire 
consequences, bringing torment rather than comfort to those who accepted them.49 
It is the social consequences of atonement theology that Catharine Sedgwick, who joined 
All Souls Unitarian Church in New York in 1821, explored in Hope Leslie. Sedgwick’s fictional 
interrogation of atonement theology went beyond the philosophical speculations of her clerical 
colleagues, demonstrating in fictional form how models of collective salvation and social 
progress based on an atonement model disproportionately victimize the already disempowered, 
particularly women and Native Americans. Where William Ellery Channing “disavowed as 
horrendous the idea of a Grotian gallows erected at the center of the cosmos” (Williams xiv), 
Sedgwick brought those cosmic concerns down to earth—to the Boston and New York soil on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from secular culture in the construction of religious ideas; and an understanding of theology as, finally, 
more expressive than prescriptive or even descriptive” (Bednarowski 9). The term “liberal” in this case is 
a theological designation, not a political one. Its antithesis in nineteenth-century parlance was not 
“conservative” but “Orthodox.” 
The Unitarian movement’s most salient theological innovation, as its name indicates, was a rejection of 
the Trinity: the traditional understanding of God, codified at the Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D., as made 
up of three separate but coequal attributes, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Unitarians, applying reason to 
their readings of the Bible, found no scriptural evidence for such a doctrine, and postulated that Christ 
must therefore be human rather than divine. 
 
49 Unitarian thinkers, committed to the notion that God’s nature could be apprehended through reason, 
found orthodox explanations of the atonement nonsensical. If in order to express his true nature God must 
require the death of a sinless human being, then God’s true nature is not merciful but monstrous. 
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which nineteenth-century Unitarians set their feet.50 By examining theological questions within 
the quasi-fictional milieu of the historical novel—by telling a story both recognizable (in its 
historical outlines and its inclusion of figures like John Winthrop) and original (in its invention 
of characters including Magawisca, Everell Fletcher, and Hope Leslie)—Sedgwick explored the 
real-world consequences of the theologies upon which male clerics expounded. Sedgwick’s 
fictional interrogation of atonement theology placed Unitarian doubts in national and historical 
context, depicting in a literary milieu the consequences of a society in which fathers—both 
family fathers and Founding Fathers—behave like monstrous gods rather than loving parents.  
In Hope Leslie Sedgwick discredits atonement theology by highlighting how Christian 
models of atonement that supposedly depict a loving and merciful God are little different, in their 
effects, from social models based on violent revenge: both rely on an ethic of sacrifice that treats 
the weak and disempowered as the tools of the strong and powerful. Sedgwick draws this parallel 
by depicting the Massachusetts Bay colonists, who claim to love and forgive their enemies, as 
less moral than the Pequot Natives whose social systems ostensibly rest on an ethic of revenge. 
Rather than positioning the Massachusetts Bay colonists as the enlightened successors to 
primitive Pequot culture, as stadialist descriptions of early North American history usually did,51
 
Sedgwick equates the rituals of the Pequots with the vengeful behavior of the English colonists 
to reveal how both social models rest on an ethic of sacrifice that justifies violence against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50
 Boston was the intellectual center of the Unitarian movement in America. The standard joke was that 
Unitarians believed in “the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the neighborhood of Boston.”  
 
51 George Dekker’s work discusses the stadialist ideologies that undergirded the American historical 
romance of the 1820s and ’30s, particularly the work of James Fenimore Cooper. (Dekker mentions 
Sedgwick’s work only in passing.) Stadialist historical theories posited that civilizations moved through 
four distinct stages of progress, each defined by “characteristic social institutions and cultural forms” 
(Dekker 75). Hope Leslie, while conforming to a stadialist model of historical progress, rejects the notion 
that English colonists were more enlightened than their Indian neighbors. Instead, by drawing parallels 
between Puritan and Pequot acts of violent sacrifice, Sedgwick discredits the sacrificial model itself. 
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disempowered by appealing to a higher communal good.  
Sedgwick erases distinctions between revenge and atonement by emphasizing how both 
doctrines rely on an ethic of violent sacrifice. Sedgwick repeatedly invokes the word “sacrifice” 
in order to link the supposedly enlightened behavior of the white Christian colonists with the 
putatively primitive traditions of the Pequot Indians. Describing the unprovoked attack against 
the Pequots that initiated Mononotto’s act of revenge against Everell, Sedgwick’s drily ironic 
narrator quotes William Bradford’s account of the event, in which he characterized “the horrible 
scent” of burning Pequot flesh as “a sweet sacrifice” to God (56). Similarly, when Mononotto 
takes Everell to a sacred Pequot site to avenge the death of his son Samoset, he finds the tribal 
elders “seated around their sacrifice-rock—their holy of holies” (95).52 In the midst of the march 
to the sacrifice-rock Sedgwick’s narrator inserts a long rumination on the “sacrifices” of the 
Puritan forefathers and “the consecrated church” that they built “on the rock of heathen sacrifice” 
(75). Sedgwick’s proliferation of the word “sacrifice” equates the bloody history of the English 
settlers with the ostensibly violent behavior of the Native Americans whose lands they 
appropriated, emphasizing the similarities between Christian and native histories of “sacrifice” 
rather than any distinction between them. The Puritan settlers who believe in atonement and the 
Indian natives who (in Sedgwick’s telling) valorize revenge are little different, since both of their 
social models require violent sacrifice to produce communal identity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52
 Sandra Zagarell notes that Mononotto’s acts align him with stereotypical portrayals of Indians, 
particularly those crafted by James Fenimore Cooper, as violent and vengeful. The difference between 
Sedgwick’s Mononotto and Cooper’s Uncas, however, is that the “acts of Cooper’s Indian have nothing 
to do with the whites’ policies; he is intrinsically malevolent, and the murder he commits touches off a 
wanton massacre of the English. Hope Leslie’s narrative structure, however, situates its analogous and 
undeniably horrifying act as part of a chain of white-initiated historical events” (“Expanding” 233-34). In 
providing the historical context for Mononotto’s act, Sedgwick undercuts naturalized depictions of 
Indians as inherently and irreparably violent (an ideology that justifies their extermination) and accords 
them the status of intelligent political actors who respond purposefully to the unjustifiable acts committed 
against them. 
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When Magawisca arrives at the sacrifice-rock to “redeem” Everell’s life at the expected 
cost of her own, her brave act alters the terms of the event from one of vengeance to one of 
atonement, in which an unwilling victim is replaced by a willing and self-elected one. This 
moment does indeed, as Christopher Castiglia suggests, juxtapose “the male world of the Old 
Testament—based on violence, vengeance, and ‘artificial codes of law’” with “the feminine 
world of the New Testament—based on mercy and love, represented by the evoked spirits of the 
mothers” (173). But what Castiglia’s optimistic reading fails to recognize is that in the religio-
political world that Hope Leslie depicts there is little to distinguish an Old Testament model of 
vengeance—exemplified by both the Pequot elders and the Puritan fathers—and the New 
Testament model of atonement embodied in Magawisca’s brave act.53 The possibilities for 
human agency under both of these systems are severely limited: one is either the perpetrator or 
the victim of violence, and the only choice available is whether to go willingly to one’s death or 
be sent there by another. 
The problem of limited agency is a function of the ritual nature of sacrificial systems, 
whether of vengeance or of atonement. Societies built on rituals of sacrifice come to presuppose 
“a cult of violence or a belief that through violence (even victimization) one may regenerate or 
redeem the self or the group” (LaCapra 78). Sacrificial ethics are structurally similar in their 
dependence on the power of ritual: the sacrificial act must take place in a recognizable context if 
it is to properly “regenerate or redeem the self or the group.” Christ’s atonement is only 
meaningful within the context of Old Testament ritual practices, in which the “first fruits” of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53
 Castiglia’s own reference to the “evoked spirits of the mothers” actually reveals the limitations of such 
optimistic readings, since all of the mothers in Hope Leslie are dead, victims of patriarchal suppression 
and violence perpetrated in the name of vengeance or sacrifice. Hope and Faith Leslie are orphaned and 
sent to America when their mother, forced into a loveless marriage by her overbearing father, dies and 
bequeaths them to the man she once loved. Magawisca’s mother, captured during the Pequot Massacre in 
an act of “mercy” by one of the English soldiers, dies in English captivity. Everell Fletcher’s mother is 
killed when Mononotto attacks the Fletcher homestead in an act of revenge for the massacre. 
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harvest or a newborn animal were brought to the temple to be burned on the altar. When 
Bradford describes the smell of burning Pequot flesh, he too invokes these ancient rituals. 
Mononotto, preparing Everell for beheading, emphasizes the similarities between Everell and the 
son whose death he will avenge: “‘as Samoset died, that boy shall die’” (77). And Magawisca’s 
act of “redemption” invokes both the Old Testament ritual of animal sacrifice and the New 
Testament act of redemption performed by Christ on the cross. All of these acts of sacrifice and 
redemption are structurally similar, Sedgwick suggests, because they rely on ancient rituals that 
perpetuate violence rather than preventing it. 
Sedgwick’s focus on ritual language and its relationship to human agency—particularly 
female agency—anticipates the work of J.L. Austin and Judith Butler, whose theories of the 
speech act investigate how particular kinds of language bring about change in the world. 
Building on Austin, who distinguishes between perlocutionary and illocutionary language, Butler 
describes the relationship between the cross-temporal nature of ritual and the effective force of 
illocutionary speech acts: 
[Illocutionary] utterances do what they say on the occasion of the saying; they are 
not only occasional, but in Austin’s words ‘ritual or ceremonial.’ As utterances, 
they work to the extent that they are given in the form of a ritual, that is, repeated 
in time, and, hence, maintain a sphere of operation that is not restricted to the 
moment of the utterance itself. (3) 
 
But even as they make agency possible, these illocutionary rituals limit the kinds and extent of 
the agency available to ritual participants. Religious anthropologist Webb Keane, drawing on the 
work of linguist Maurice Bloch, describes how ritual practices function to maintain the cultural 
status quo:  
Since ritual… severely restricts the participants’ choices of intonation, 
vocabulary, syntactic forms, and acceptable illustrations (such as scriptural or 
mythological allusions), it wields… a highly impoverished kind of propositional 
language.… [I]t is coercive: once participants have entered the ritual frame, they 
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are committed to a pre-ordained sequence of events. (“Language and Religion” 
434) 
 
Human agency, while not obliterated by ritual forms, is restricted to those acts and utterances 
that are conceivable within the “ritual frame.” While the identity of those who occupy the 
positions may change—the sacrifice may be an animal or a person—the structures of ritual 
remain the same. 
When Magawisca interrupts her father’s attempt to sacrifice Everell she performs an 
illocutionary act that, while it results in Everell’s freedom, nevertheless does not significantly 
disrupt the terms of the ritual. Throwing her arm between her father’s axe and Everell’s neck, 
Magawisca cries “‘I have bought his life with my own,’” both describing and performing the act 
of redemption. Everell’s life is saved, not only by Magawisca’s bodily interposition, but by her 
illocutionary proclamation that the price for Everell’s life has been paid in full. This illocutionary 
pronouncement demonstrates both the possibilities for and the limits of Magawisca’s agency 
within the terms of Pequot ritual traditions. Magawisca chooses to take Everell’s place at the 
sacrifice-rock, but her brave act does not change the essential terms of the ritual, in which some 
body must be sacrificed to avenge the death of Samoset.54 Indeed, in generalized terms—in 
which Magawisca and Everell, in addition to being individuals and friends, are representatives of 
cultures at the point of violent contact, Magawisca’s act exacerbates existing inequalities: the 
intended sacrifice, eldest son and heir of the white colonizer, escapes unscathed, while 
Magawisca, doubly disempowered by virtue of her gender and race, is mutilated instead. 
 As Hope Leslie progresses Magawisca’s severed arm becomes the symbol of the 
ritualized violence perpetrated against her and of the limited agency available to her so long as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 To understand the illocutionary terms of the ritual at the sacrifice-rock, imagine Magawisca standing 
beside her father, perfectly unscathed, shouting “I have bought his life with my own.” Under such 
conditions, her statement would be meaningless—Austin would say “infelicitous.” 
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she continues to participate in either the vengeful rituals of her father or the atoning rituals of the 
white Puritan colonists. Embarrassed by her “deformity,” Magawisca never removes the blanket 
that hides her severed arm until she is put on trial for her supposed treachery; when she does so, 
it is in the context of her request that Winthrop and the Puritan magistrates punish her quickly 
rather than returning her to prison. Revealing her “mutilated person” she invokes the memory of 
her dead mother—another victim of Puritan “justice”—to demand her own execution: “‘I pray 
you, send me to death now…. Thou didst promise… to my dying mother…. In her name, I 
demand of thee death or liberty’” (308-309). Recognizing that the courtroom ritual of the Puritan 
settlers is little different from the “sacrifice-rock” of the Pequot elders—both are sites at which 
women and children are sacrificed to the putative needs of the state—Magawisca once again 
concedes to the terms of the ritual and offers her body for destruction. 
Magawisca’s missing arm, then, serves as reminder, not only of her noble sacrifice, but of 
the inability of such sacrifice to enact lasting change—it indexes both action and impotence 
simultaneously. The social inefficacy of sacrifice is a frequent theme in the remaining chapters 
of Hope Leslie. (The scene at the sacrifice-rock occurs only about a quarter of the way through 
the novel.) Magawisca’s sacrifice, while brave and admirable, does little to alter relations 
between the Pequots and the Puritans, which remain marked by the same patterns of war and 
recrimination that preceded her act. In fact Magawisca’s sacrifice effects little change beyond the 
immediate circle of the Fletcher family: while Everell, his father, and Everell’s cousin Hope 
Leslie feel a lasting debt to Magawisca, the colony as a whole admits no obligation to her. When 
Magawisca returns to the colony years after the scene at the sacrifice-rock, she is captured by the 
English authorities and accused of planning an attack on the colony. The Fletcher family’s 
entreaties can do nothing to prevent her imprisonment; when Mr. Fletcher admonishes colonial 
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governor John Winthrop that “‘certainly we owe much to this woman,’” Winthrop replies, “‘You 
owe much undoubtedly… but it yet remains to be proved, my friend, that your son’s redeemed 
life is to be put in the balance against the public weal’” (245). Winthrop’s statement makes clear 
that a single act of “redemption” can do little to alter public policies of vengeance, violence, and 
mistrust: “‘private feelings must yield to public good,’” he insists, with the “public good” 
defined by Winthrop himself.55 Sacrifice, the events of Hope Leslie reveal, is not an effective 
way to bring about lasting progress or intercultural understanding. 
While Sedgwick’s objections to atonement theology were characteristic of her 
increasingly Unitarian views, Hope Leslie does not merely repeat the anti-atonement 
pronouncements of Channing and his clerical colleagues. Rather, Sedgwick’s particular political-
theological insight was the recognition that within systems that valorize atonement and sacrifice 
the responsibility for absorbing and absolving communal guilt will fall disproportionately on the 
backs of those already disempowered: women, people of color, the poor, and children. Both John 
Winthrop and Mononotto position the disenfranchised as “natural” objects of sacrifice, “‘to be 
mortared in like… common brick[s], wherever may best suit the purposes and views of the 
builders’” (169). Hope Leslie makes this point, not only by casting a Native American woman in 
the role of Christ, but by highlighting the similarities between a “law of vengeance” (349) and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Critic Dan McKanan, noting Sedgwick’s suspicion of atonement theology, nevertheless classes her 
among a group of liberal authors who ostensibly reintroduced atonement doctrine through a back-door 
maneuver whereby innocent victims of violence “would be compensated with eternal felicity,” thereby 
reinforcing “the notion that the suffering of the innocent was itself a source of nonviolent power” (43). 
McKanan offers the sinless death of the Fletcher infant as an example of the reintroduction of atonement 
logic. But this analysis, based on a single scene in the novel, overlooks Hope Leslie’s larger critique of 
atonement theology, for the death of the Fletcher infant is another in a series of events that serves, not to 
echo the doctrine of the atonement, but to repudiate it. The death of the infant stops the massacre at the 
Fletcher cabin, as McKanan notes, but has no further salubrious effects: it does not prevent Mononotto 
from kidnapping Faith or from taking Everell to the sacrifice-rock. The “sacrifice” of the Fletcher infant 
(whom Sedgwick never even honors with a name) serves no redemptive purpose in the novel; it is merely 
a senseless act of violence that benefits no one—not even Mononotto, whose plans for revenge backfire 
against his own family. 
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system of atonement, a “written rule of forgiveness” in which forgiveness must nevertheless be 
bought with blood (349). 
Hope Leslie, with its extended rumination on the ethic of sacrifice that links acts of 
revenge and acts of atonement, depicts what the critical theorist Rene Girard describes as the 
“sacrificial crisis”:  
a “sacrificial crisis” occurs in societies whose members begin to doubt the 
apparently magical efficacy of the sacrificial system…. At such a time the cruel 
operation of sacrifice underlying society begins to be perceived…. The primary 
moral result of sacrificial crisis is the production, and recognition, of an essential 
global similarity amongst human beings, and with it the absolute need to renounce 
the violent designation of some supposed “Other”…. (Dennis 5) 
 
But having reached the “sacrificial crisis” and dismantled the theological construct of atonement 
which she perceived to be built upon “the cruel operation of sacrifice,” Sedgwick was left with 
an even larger question: if American progress was not to be built on the graves of its heroes and 
heroines, then how was America to prosper? Sedgwick’s second historical novel, The Linwoods, 
not only demonstrates the finality of Sedgwick’s rejection of sacrifice as a basis for social 
cohesion—it is a Revolutionary War novel in which hardly anyone dies—but represents her 
sustained effort to replace a theology of violent death with one of living language: to replace 
women’s victimized bodies with their active voices. The Linwoods rejects ritual forms and 
instead explores possibilities for women’s spontaneous religious language—language that is 
perlocutionary rather than illocutionary and not bound either by ossified historical narratives or 
orthodox religious forms. 
 
Religious Language in The Linwoods 
It is to escape the endlessly iterative ritual conditions in which women’s bodies can 
occupy only the role of sacrificial victim and women’s voices can only repeat the memory of 
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sacrificial violence that Sedgwick begins to develop a theory of spontaneous religious 
language—one in which women’s language gains effective power precisely by freeing itself 
from illocutionary ritual forms. Hope Leslie, concerned as it is with deconstructing the problem 
of atonement while nevertheless celebrating noble acts of self-sacrifice like those performed by 
Magawisca, never fully develops this theological insight. It would take another historical novel, 
The Linwoods, to more thoroughly explore and depict the transformative possibilities of 
women’s religious language. 
The Linwoods or, “Sixty Years Since” in America tells the story of Isabella and Herbert 
Linwood, siblings born in the pre-Revolutionary English colonies to a Loyalist father who 
regards Washington and the rest of the revolutionaries as rebellious criminals. When Herbert 
runs away from home to join Washington’s army, Mr. Linwood vows that Herbert will never 
reenter the family home. Isabella begs for leniency but Mr. Linwood strengthens his 
condemnation of Herbert by swearing an oath against his son: “‘You know, Belle, I have sworn 
no rebel will enter my doors.’” Isabella’s reply highlights both her gender and her subordinate 
position as Mr. Linwood’s daughter: “And you know, sir, that I have—not sworn; oh, no! but 
resolved, and my resolve is the feminine of my father’s oath, that you shall hang me on a gallows 
high as Haman’s, before I cease to plead that our doors be open to one rebel at least” (113). 
Mr. Linwood, white, male, wealthy, and with the might of the British crown behind him, should 
be the more powerful speaker in the exchange: his masculine “oath” should prevail over 
Isabella’s feminine “resolve.” And yet it is Isabella—young, female, disenfranchised, and in 
rebellion against the crown—whose language is efficacious: Herbert will eventually be 
readmitted to the Linwood household over his father’s unheeded objections. The Linwoods is the 
story of the process by which Isabella’s feminine resolve is revealed to be more efficacious than 
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Mr. Linwood’s masculine oath, and to be the true language of America.  
In keeping with Hope Leslie’s rejection of ritual forms, The Linwoods, too, denies the 
efficacy of ritual language. Describing the coercive force of ritual forms, Webb Keane insists 
that the only way to escape the “pre-ordained sequence of events” prescribed by ritual is to 
perform “the extreme act of rejecting the very premises of the ritual” (“Language and Religion” 
434). Herbert Linwood performs this rejection by refusing to drink the toast to George III, and 
Isabella Linwood performs it by refusing to swear an oath. Unlike Magawisca, who in sacrificing 
herself for Everell affirmed her father’s violence by redirecting it toward herself, Isabella 
repudiates ritual speech altogether, offering spontaneous feminine resolve as an alternative to her 
father’s masculine oath.  
To use the theoretical terms set forth by J.L. Austin and Judith Butler, Mr. Linwood’s 
speech is illocutionary while Isabella’s is perlocutionary. According to Butler,  
Illocutionary speech acts produce effects. They are supported… by linguistic and 
social conventions. Perlocutionary acts, on the other hand, are those utterances 
that initiate a set of consequences: in a perlocutionary speech act, “saying 
something will produce certain consequences,” but the saying and the 
consequences produced are temporally distinct…. Whereas illocutionary acts 
proceed by way of conventions, perlocutionary acts proceed by way of 
consequences. (17) 
 
Mr. Linwood’s illocutionary speech attempts to effect Herbert’s permanent banishment from the 
Linwood home simply by pronouncing it so. But his speech is infelicitous because the in the new 
American nation the “social conventions” that would make it effectual—the rituals of English 
society—no longer hold sway. Isabella’s perlocutionary language, on the other hand, is felicitous 
precisely because it does not rely on preset rituals to effect change. Instead, it initiates a sequence 
of events that produces the desired outcome, as she later pleads with the royal governor for her 
brother’s release from prison, then convinces her father to readmit Herbert to the family home. 
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What distinguishes Isabella Linwood from her father and makes her the true 
representative American (The Linwoods is in part the story of Isabella’s transformation from 
Loyalist to rebel) is her ability to wield what the cultural theorist Bruno Latour calls “religious 
language”: her power to transform the opinions and behavior of other people by virtue of nothing 
more than the sincerity and force of her language. In his essay “‘Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame,’ 
or, How Not to Misunderstand the Science and Religion Debate,” Latour defines “religious 
language” as language that transforms the persons involved.56 Acts of religious language, he 
writes, either “transport the spirit from which they talk and they can be said to be truthful, 
faithful, proven, experienced, self-verifiable, or they don’t reproduce, don’t perform, don’t 
transport what they talk from and immediately, without any inertia, they begin to lie, to fall apart, 
to stop having any reference, any ground” (“Thou Shall” 29). In addition to transporting the 
person (spirit) by whom they are spoken, acts of religious language also have the potential to 
transform the spirit to whom they are spoken: they “produce in part personhood”; they generate 
“new states, ‘new beginnings,’ as William James would say… in the persons thus addressed” 
(30). Latour’s “religious language,” then, is a type of felicitous perlocutionary act: one that is 
efficacious, not because of its ritual context or the authority of the speaker, but rather because of 
the affective transformation produced by the speech act. Religious language, for Latour, can be 
transformative even when its content has little or nothing to do with religion:57 though religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Latour contrasts religious speech with what he calls “double-click communication,” which is speech 
that can only transmit facts rather than transforming persons. It is thus the preferred mode for speaking 
about scientific topics (“Thou Shall”). 
 
57 Latour uses the example of love-talk: the factual content of the phrase “I love you” is irrelevant if the 
person saying it and the person to whom it is being said are not moved in some way by the utterance: 
lovers who are affectively transformed by the words “I love you” can be transformed regardless of 
context (the words need not be spoken as part of a larger ritual, though they sometimes are) and 
regardless of originality of content (the words can be transformative though they have been spoken 
hundreds of times.) For Latour, the couple transformed and transported by the words “I love you” is using 
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language is “a way of preaching, of predicating, of enunciating truth,” to produce such acts of 
religious language is “not to talk about religion, but to talk… religiously” (“Thou Shall” 28, 
emphasis in original).58 
In The Linwoods it is Isabella’s language that most often displays this transformative 
power, marking her as the most powerful linguistic and religious force in the novel. When 
Herbert Linwood considers deserting Washington’s army in order to gain his father’s forgiveness 
and be readmitted to the Linwood family, one sentence from Isabella is enough to end his doubts 
and fix his resolve on the side of the rebellion. “‘Herbert, is it possible you waver?’” Isabella 
asks in a voice that “thrill[s]” through Herbert’s soul, and the description of his response 
indicates the religious power of Isabella’s question: “He started as if he were electrified: his eye 
met hers, and the evil spirits of doubt and irresolution were overcome. ‘Heaven forgive me!… I 
waver no longer’” (148). Isabella’s spontaneous perlocutionary speech has temporal effects that 
extend beyond the moment of pronouncement, “initiat[ing] a set of consequences,” as Butler puts 
it, that keeps Herbert loyal to the republican cause even months later when he is starving in an 
English military prison: “‘there was one moment—but one, thank God! when, tempted by more 
than all the gold and honour in the king’s gift, I swerved. I was saved by a look from Isabella’” 
(217). The religious terms that pepper these scenes—“evil spirits,” “tempted,” “Heaven forgive 
me,” “Thank God,” “saved”—mark Isabella’s language and actions with the imprint of spiritual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious language just as surely as is the priest who pronounces that “the body of Christ is broken for 
you” (“Thou Shall”). 
 
58
 Indeed, Latour himself is attempting, in “Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame,” to talk religiously about the 
science and religion “debate” to an assumed audience of intellectuals, historians and critical theorists. I 
place the word “debate” in quotation marks because Latour himself does not see the conversation as a 
debate; part of his point in defining “double-click communication” as over against religious language is to 
emphasize that different types of language are suited to different kinds of utterances—in this case, 
utterances that convey facts versus utterances that “transport persons.” To expect religious language to 
convey facts is nonsense: it is as ridiculous as a husband who, when asked to prove that he loves his wife, 
presses “play” on a tape-recording of himself saying the words ten years ago. (The example is Latour’s.) 
	   74 
authority.59 
In Sedgwick’s linguistic-theological system, then, it is transformative religious language 
rather than an adherence to ritual forms that produces individual and social change. This 
transformative religious language is most fruitful when it is an expression of one’s “natural” self, 
springing forth spontaneously from a pure heart. Because oaths and rituals, both violent 
(Mononotto’s sacrifice of Everell) and non-violent (Mr. Linwood’s banishment of Herbert) 
restrict the terms of human agency by reinforcing predetermined roles and hierarchies, the only 
truly efficacious language—the only language that might effect real change—is spontaneous, 
arising outside the confines of even the simplest ritual forms. While attending dinner at the home 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 It is Sedgwick’s insistence on efficacious religious language—on language that produces consequences 
in the world—that distinguishes her most strongly from the Unitarian clergy with whom she 
corresponded. It was precisely the failure of Unitarian clergymen to speak or write religiously that gave 
Sedgwick most pause as she considered her decision to leave the Orthodox Congregational church. To her 
friend Susan Channing, sister-in-law of William Ellery Channing, she wrote: 
[Boston Unitarians’] indifference seems to me to indicate a want of that zeal which should always 
be the fruit and aid of a good cause—. While those of the orthodox faith are traversing sea & 
land, forsaking brethren & sisters, & houses & lands, & penetrating the untrodden wilderness, 
those of a “purer & rational faith” seem neither to lift their hands, or breathe their prayers for its 
propogation. (CMS Papers, Letter to Susan Higginson Channing, February 19, 1821) 
Later in 1821 she wrote again to Susan: 
[I]t does seem to me there is a want of seriousness, and of holy fervor in your clergymen_. I have 
sometimes felt this very painfully_. There is among them a great ardor for intellectual attainments 
& superiority, but many of them want the holy devotedness that seems to me essential to their 
high calling_. (CMS papers, Letter to Susan Higginson Channing, December 5, 1821) 
This Unitarian failing was so disturbing to Sedgwick, and of such lasting importance, that seven years 
later she was still expressing her concerns—this time to William Ellery Channing himself: 
When I think of all that has been done and suffered to Christianize the earth; how the ocean has 
been crossed, and trackless deserts penetrated, to preach to the ends of the world, I can not but 
wonder that there is not enough zeal to prompt some of our apostles to come to this great 
missionary field [New York]…. There are one or two [Unitarian preachers] (and not more) who 
break down all barriers when they are here; the rest, as to proselyting, might as well stay at home 
and preach to their own people. (CMS Papers, Letter to William Ellery Channing, April 28, 1828) 
The aspects that Sedgwick finds lacking in Unitarian ministers’ preaching—“zeal,” “fervor,” and “holy 
devotedness,”—are precisely those that would transform mere preaching into religious language. For 
Sedgwick, Unitarian ministers somehow manage to speak about religion without speaking religiously. 
Latour would describe their words as “irrelevant, parasitical”; Sedgwick describes them simply as 
“preach[ing] to their own people,” as they transport and transform no one—not even themselves (“Thou 
Shall” 29). 
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of Sir Henry Clinton, commander of the English forces in New York, for instance, Isabella offers 
a toast to “‘our native land’” that is echoed by Eliot Lee, a soldier in the Continental Army who 
is in New York on a diplomatic errand from General Washington (132, emphasis in original). 
Rather than following the traditional form of the toast offered by Mr. Linwood, “‘The King—
God bless him,’” Isabella’s toast arises spontaneously and, rather than deferring to a higher 
authority, includes in its “our” all those at the table who identify themselves as Americans. She 
also breaks the normal ritual of the toast by pledging with water rather than wine. The narrator 
emphasizes Isabella’s refusal to conform to the ritual of the toast: “Miss Linwood violated the 
strict rules that governed her contemporaries. She was not a lady of saws and precedents” (132). 
Her spontaneous speech is transformative, transporting both herself and Eliot Lee: for Isabella it 
is the first sign of her eventual conversion from Loyalist to revolutionary, and for Eliot it is the 
beginning of his romance with Isabella.  
Spontaneity, then, is the defining feature of Sedgwick’s theology of religious language, 
but such spontaneity is a precarious precondition that must arise from natural feelings rather than 
adhering to calculated ritual forms. The narrator warns that such speech acts as Isabella’s can be 
“afforded” only by “them to whom they are spontaneous” (132). Any speech act not marked by 
spontaneity—by “a burst of true feeling”—runs the risk of falling into ritual forms that reproduce 
existing hierarchies rather than transforming persons and events (132). After relating the 
circumstances of Isabella’s toast, the narrator notes drily that “[w]e would by no means 
recommend an imitation of [Isabella’s] spontaneous actions,” an address to the reader with 
multiple implications: spontaneous speech acts can be dangerous when engaged in among 
unsympathetic listeners, but they are also simply ineffectual. Since transformative power consists 
in spontaneity, any imitation of Isabella’s speech acts will be futile. 
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Sedgwick highlights the particular embodiment of Isabella’s religious language: scenes of 
her transforming others’ emotions and actions are always accompanied by descriptions of her 
“thrilling” and “delicious” voice, her “moistened eye,” and “the tears… of a young and beautiful 
woman” (148, 132, 241). Here again, however, the movements and emanations of the body must 
be set free from predetermined forms; where Magawisca inserts her body into her father’s violent 
ritual in order to save Everell Fletcher, Isabella defies ritual performances lest she be hemmed in 
by their implications. The avoidance of ritual in favor of spontaneity extends even to the simplest 
actions of Isabella’s body. Isabella refuses to dance at a party that she has attended for the sole 
purpose of pleading with Sir Henry Clinton for Herbert’s release from prison; another woman 
leads the dance in accordance with “the ritual of precedence” and the “rank assigned to her.” In 
this case Isabella’s body is employed not to fulfill the requirements of such “rituals of 
precedence” but to support her petition to Henry Clinton, who agrees to her requests only when 
she bursts into tears “in spite of herself” (237). Isabella’s speech and actions are efficacious 
precisely because they are spontaneous and unpremeditated—happening “in spite of herself”—
rather than predicated on conventional forms. 
In addition to its spontaneity, Isabella’s religious language is efficacious because it 
demonstrates a high level of what the philosopher (and student of J.L. Austin) Donald Evans 
calls “self-involvement.” Self-involvement, according to Evans, is assessed in terms of the 
degree and variety of a speaker’s investments in a particular utterance; statements can thus be 
categorized and analyzed, not only according to whether they are perlocutionary or 
illocutionary—whether they fall within ritualized frames—but by the level of personal 
investment shown by the speaker. Self-involvement lies along a spectrum from weak to strong so 
that, for example, the statement “I am six feet four inches tall” has a low degree of self-
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involvement because it states a fact with few implications or consequences for the speaker. The 
statement “I am a follower of the prophet,” on the other hand, potentially has a high degree of 
self-involvement because it implies “a variety of entailments”—moral, behavioral, cultural, 
perhaps national—each of which reveals something important about the speaker’s personhood 
(Briggs 150).60 The anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo has invoked a similar concept of self-
involvement to describe the interpenetration of embodied and cognitive processes in the 
experience of human emotion. According to Rosaldo, “[e]motions are thoughts somehow ‘felt’ in 
flushes, pulses, ‘movements’ of our livers, minds, hearts, stomachs, skin. They are embodied 
thoughts, thoughts seeped with the apprehension that ‘I am involved’” (143).61 It is Isabella 
Linwood’s embodied self-involvement that gives her language religious authority and makes it 
efficacious even in contexts in which she, as a woman and a colonist in rebellion against her 
king, can claim no other right to be heard. 
In The Linwoods the necessity for embodied self-involvement extends even to the written 
word; though text is itself a mediation between bodies, Sedgwick’s theology of religious 
language requires that even letters display the spontaneous self-involvement of the writer. 
Writing to Sir Henry Clinton for news of her brother’s fate, Isabella Linwood begs for “‘some 
kind word of relief’” but receives instead a letter expressing Sir Henry’s regret that he has “‘no 
absolute power by which he can remit, at pleasure, the offences of disloyal subjects’”—he cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Such entailments might be behavioral, moral, or otherwise; the salient point is that the statement 
involves a high degree of personal investment on the part of the speaker. Evans’s concept of self-
involvement is thus similar to Latour’s concept of religious language in “Thou Shall Not Freeze-Frame”: 
Latour’s paradigmatic piece of religious language, “I love you,” is generally a highly self-involving 
statement. One can also argue that Latour’s notion of “double-click communication”—language that 
states facts but does not transform persons—can be correlated with low self-involvement. 
 
61 June Howard notes that Rosaldo’s work has provided an important contribution to the study of 
women’s writing, particularly sentimental fiction, with its emphasis on the weeping, mourning, and 
suffering body (66-67). 
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act spontaneously in response to the dictates of kindness (185). Moreover, the letter is not from 
Sir Henry at all, but from his secretary; Sir Henry has not even signed it. Isabella’s mother 
asserts that a letter from Sir Henry and a letter from his secretary amount to “‘the same thing,’” 
but scolds Isabella for overlooking ritual appurtenances like “‘gilt paper’” and a wax seal (185-
186). “‘I did not observe the paper, and I forget whether I sealed it at all,’” Isabella responds, 
noting bitterly that Sir Henry has observed the “courtesies” of correspondence without offering 
any real redress (186). Sir Henry has performed the ritual duty of replying to Isabella’s letter 
without displaying any self-involvement whatever: he has neither composed the letter in his own 
hand nor signed it. Isabella’s response is to transform Sir Henry’s self-involvement by increasing 
her own. At their next meeting she extracts from him a piece of writing that is both spontaneous 
and embodied: “‘Here on the table is pen, ink, and paper; and here is a chair—sit down, and 
write three lines,’” she insists when he tries to defer her request to a “‘cabinet-council’” (243). 
Isabella demands an immediate response to her request, knowing that the ritual forms of the 
“cabinet-council” may override Sir Henry’s spontaneous act of kindness in allowing for 
Herbert’s temporary release.  
Isabella’s ability to transform Sir Henry’s behavior by means of her spontaneous and 
self-involved speech points to the political and social implications of Sedgwick’s theology of 
religious language. Within the narrative and symbolic structure of The Linwoods, General 
George Washington and Sir Henry Clinton occupy positions similar to that occupied by John 
Winthrop in Hope Leslie: they are figures through which Sedgwick can interrogate the 
connection between religious and political authority. In The Linwoods Washington and Clinton 
are political “gods” with competing expectations for their subjects: Sir Henry Clinton requires 
deference (punishing the revolutionaries for “‘‘the offences of disloyal subjects’”) while 
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Washington commands respect (“‘General Washington requires no more than he performs,’” 
Eliot Lee observes) (185, 110).62 But rather than choosing one over the other, The Linwoods 
positions Isabella as superior to both by virtue of her command of spontaneous religious 
language. Male spontaneity, Sedgwick suggests, is dangerous and destructive, even in the best of 
men:  
It is well known that Washington’s moderation and equanimity were the effects of 
the highest principle, not the gift of nature. He was constitutionally subject to 
gusts of passion, but he had acquired a power, almost divine (and doubtless from 
a divine source), by which he could direct the whirlwind and subdue the storm. 
(204) 
 
Eliot Lee, the novel’s other receptacle of manly and civic virtues, has also “been trained in the 
school of exertion, of self-denial, and self-subjection” (321). And Herbert Linwood’s 
imprisonment is the result of his congenital habit of putting “‘action before thought’” (143). 
Sedgwick’s ideal Americans, then—those best suited to produce and to wield the religious 
language that can effect social change—are women, whose spontaneous, self-involved language 
needs no refining.  
In portraying women as the natural purveyors of religious language, and religious 
language as the only effectual mode of action, Sedgwick undermines the ideology, expressed so 
succinctly by John Winthrop in Hope Leslie, that “‘passiveness…, next to godliness, is a 
woman’s best virtue’” (160). Religious language is by definition active—a “performance,” as the 
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 When Isabella Linwood approaches Sir Henry to request Herbert’s release from prison, she asks him to 
imagine himself a benevolent and loving god: “I commend [Herbert] to your mercy; think of him as if he 
were your own son, and then mete out to him, for the rashness of his filial affection, such measure as a 
father would allot to such an offence” (185). Unitarians and other liberal Christians viewed God as a long 
father rather than an angry or impersonal judge: “To give our views of God in one word,” Channing 
asserted, “we believe in his parental character” (Sermon 27, emphasis in original). In holding to 
“artificial codes and traditionary abuses,” Sir Henry instead behaves like the God espoused by Orthodox 
theologians—one who places his imagined son in the role of scapegoat: Herbert, innocent of the charge of 
spying, will nevertheless be punished for it (185). 
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Winthrop of Hope Leslie would disapprovingly call it.63 The Linwoods, then, weaves a tale of 
America’s transformation from oppressed colony to independent nation in which it is 
spontaneous religious language rather than repeated ritual violence that grounds the new nation’s 
claims to existence.64 By embedding this doctrine of spontaneous religious language in a story of 
the American Revolution, Sedgwick transforms the colonial rebellion into a primarily rhetorical 
struggle, one in which England is aligned with illocutionary, ritual language and the past and 
America with perlocutionary language and the future. Since the strength of the new American 
republic was to be built on the virtue of its citizens, robbing women of their capacity for active 
virtue by insisting on their passivity would rob the nation of its rightful saviors; a nation without 
active women and their religious language would be a nation abandoned by God. 
 
Conclusion: Religious Language and the Problem of Appropriation 
In addition to their tendency to perpetuate violence and existing social inequalities, ritual 
forms can also prevent intercultural understanding. Both Hope Leslie and The Linwoods are 
historical novels about the clash of cultures, and both suggest that outmoded ritual forms can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Sedgwick likewise subtly questions the doctrine that original sin entered the human race through 
woman: while George Washington and Eliot Lee must struggle against the unbidden “gusts of passion” 
that would lead them into sin, Isabella seems to have appeared on earth fully formed and already able to 
wield religious language. 
 
64
 Sedgwick was already formulating an interest in religious language when she composed Hope Leslie, 
though in that novel religious language is marked more by its absence than by its presence. Hope’s 
encounters with Sir Philip’s servant “Roslin,” really the disguised Rosa, show a terror of women whose 
language is either meaningless or nonexistent: when Roslin attempts to warn Hope away from Sir Philip, 
Hope is baffled by her cryptic words, finally bursting forth impatiently with “‘What do you mean? Do 
you mean any thing?’” before abruptly ending the conversation (176). Rosa’s eventual “conversion” is a 
turn not only away from sin but toward effectual religious language: as she sinks to her knees to pray that 
God would “‘shield the innocent—save her from the hand of the destroyer,’” Rosa notes that her prayers 
rise to heaven though she herself is fallen, and in fact Hope Leslie is saved from destruction (337). Later, 
Rosa’s final words—“‘it cannot be worse for any of us!’”—make good her final act: the destruction of 
herself and Sir Philip (342). 
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provide no firm basis for future cultural progress. Ritual performances and ritual speech have 
meaning only to those who understand them—to those who recognize the ritual’s terms and 
consent to operate within them. Ritual forms, then, can prevent intercultural communication by 
reifying cultural distinctions. As Sedgwick works to deconstruct ritual forms in Hope Leslie, the 
novel proliferates scenes of misrecognition and false translation in which members of different 
European and native cultures fail to understand one another’s ritual traditions. When the Indian 
healer Nelema cures a colonist bitten by a poisonous snake, the Puritan patriarchs misinterpret 
her ritual incantations as devil-worship and imprison her. When Magawisca produces a crucifix 
at her trial to prove that Sir Philip Gardiner secretly conforms to the rituals of the Catholic 
church, the magistrates interpret it as a sign that Magawisca herself is Catholic, a member of an 
apostate sect.  
To replace these incompatible ritual forms Hope Leslie and The Linwoods offer an 
alternative model of collective religious action: one based in the translation of religious language 
rather than in the repetition of religious ritual. The turn toward translation—the vision that 
cultures with separate ritual traditions might eschew those traditions and enter into dialogue with 
one another—appears first in Hope Leslie as an unrealized ideal. Sedgwick’s concern with 
translation, both its importance and its failures, is emblematized in the figure of John Eliot, who 
produced the first complete translation of the Bible into a native North American language. Eliot 
appears in Hope Leslie at Magawisca’s trial, where he offers a long prayer on her behalf meant to 
convince the Puritan magistrates that she is innocent of any crime against the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony. But his argument on Magawisca’s behalf rests on the remembrance of her sacrifice and 
thus has, like all other invocations of sacrifice in Hope Leslie, only limited effectiveness, turning 
the court’s opinion in her favor only temporarily. The closest the novel ever comes to a true act 
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of translation is in the parting scene between Hope Leslie, Everell Fletcher, and Magawisca. As 
she attempts to convince Magawisca to stay among the Puritans, Hope Leslie does not remind 
Magawisca of the violence perpetrated against her by the Puritans but instead attempts to adopt 
the idiom of the Pequot people. Though earlier in the novel Hope had refused to understand 
Magawisca’s figurative language—“‘do not speak to me in these dark sayings,’” she commands 
when she first meets the Indian woman, “‘what is it you mean?… Speak plainer to me’” (196)—
at their final parting Hope adopts the metaphorical mode that Magawisca employs: “‘Promise us 
that you will return and dwell with us—as you would say, Magawisca, we will walk in the same 
path, the same joys shall shine on us, and, if need be that sorrows come over us, why, we will all 
sit under their shadow together’” (349). Though Hope fails to convince Magawisca to stay in the 
colonies, her attempt to speak in Magawisca’s language rather than her own represents a step 
toward true cultural translation. 
Translation, though, is a treacherous process that threatens to shade into appropriation; 
one may adopt the language of another culture in order to more efficiently subsume or colonize 
that culture. Hope Leslie, after all, learns Magawisca’s idiom by borrowing it from Magawisca 
herself. Having already won Everell Fletcher’s affections away from his childhood friend, Hope 
now threatens, however benevolently, to steal Magawisca’s voice as well.65 The problem of 
religious language is the danger that it will repeat, in linguistic form, the violence perpetrated in 
sacrificial systems: the annihilation of one voice or body at the expense of another. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 As Judith Fetterley notes, Sedgwick’s construction of Hope Leslie and Everell Fletcher as 
representative Americans relies on an Enlightenment feminist ideal that assumes the equality of white 
men and women: Hope is entitled to equal status with Everell because “gender [is] the sole and hence 
potentially insignificant” difference between them (508). In comparison with Magawisca’s overwhelming 
racial and religious difference, Hope and Everell appear almost identical. If Hope and Everell are the 
same, then Magawisca’s body was sacrificed to save them both, and Hope, having made of use of 
Magawisca’s body, will now take away her voice. 
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In The Linwoods Sedgwick attempts to circumvent this problem by depicting scenes in 
which a white woman effects positive change through an act of translation that nevertheless does 
not appropriate the language of an oppressed people. When the 8-year-old Isabella Linwood 
finds out that the family’s slave, Rose, would rather be free than have a pretty new dress, she 
searches for a way to fulfill Rose’s wish. When Isabella’s father offers her “‘any thing you’ll ask 
of me’” if she takes a French prize at school, Isabella wins the competition, then demands as her 
reward Rose’s manumission (137). In a novel about the American Revolution it is fitting that 
Isabella would win Rose’s freedom by learning the language of the only other democratic nation 
in the eighteenth-century world. But the scene positions emancipation as a gift granted to slaves 
by white benefactors (English, French, or American) rather than something to be fought for and 
won by African Americans themselves. As Charlene Avallone asserts, Isabella’s act of 
benevolence “reinforces race and class differences between women and leaves the institutional 
structures of patriarchal authority— including slavery—intact” (116). The scene is not about 
Rose learning a language that would allow her to represent her own interests, but about Isabella 
learning a new language and then bestowing its effects upon Rose. 
Isabella’s individualized linguistic agency is necessary precisely because Rose does not 
belong to any distinctive African-American religious community that would offer opportunities 
for collective religious agency. By carving religious agency out of its ritual contexts Sedgwick 
also diminishes opportunities for collaborative agency: the ritual sacrifices performed by 
Sedgwick’s fictionalized historical interlocutors—the Old Testament Israelites, the 
Massachusetts Bay colonists, and the Pequot Indians—may have reified social hierarchies, but 
they also provided a means of cultural cohesion and collective action grounded in the 
“condensed historicity” of ritual practice (Judith Butler 3). As Joanna Brooks’s work on the 
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Brotherton community, black Freemason lodges, the AME Church, and other African-American 
and Native American religious groups makes clear, shared religious beliefs and rituals provided a 
source of strength for communities of color who had been subjected to Enlightenment narratives 
that “aimed for the negation of… racialized subjects” (46). By condemning the ritual practices 
espoused by the Puritan colonists and the Pequot Indians portrayed in Hope Leslie, Sedgwick 
also undermines a particularly potent form of communal identity and agency. 
My next chapter addresses William Wells Brown’s 1853 novel Clotel and reveals how it 
turns the tables on this tokenizing process by which the religious language of women of color is 
appropriated or marginalized by well-meaning white women. Brown was an admirer of 
Sedgwick, and some editions of Clotel include characters named for Isabella Linwood. But 
Brown’s depiction of white women’s religious agency avoids the appropriation of black voices: 
Georgiana Peck, the white minister’s daughter, comprehends but never adopts the language of 
her father’s slaves, and her linguistic agency is exercised not to demonstrate her own self-
determination but to effect those slaves’ emancipation. At the same time Brown emphasizes the 
communal structures within which African-American religious agency is expressed: in Clotel 
slave communities respond to proslavery preaching by performing a collective reinterpretation of 
the Biblical texts that are used to justify their oppression. In Brown’s formulation of religious 
agency the white woman’s religious language, while efficacious, places her beyond the bounds 
of any sustaining sect: Georgiana Peck is an outsider even in her own home, and once she has 
fulfilled her abolitionist purpose in the novel she withers away, unsupported by a religious 
community like the one in which Brown’s African-American characters participate. In Clotel it is 
Hope Leslie, not Magawisca, who stands at the fringes of the family and the state; it is the white 
woman whose religious language must serve the greater good.	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CHAPTER 2: “The Bulwark of Christianity and of Liberty”: Clotel and 
(White) Women’s Religious Agency 
 
In 1834 the black abolitionist writer Sarah Louisa Forten, writing under the pseudonym 
“Ada,” published her poem “An Appeal to Women” in The Liberator.66 Forten’s verses, though 
addressed only to “women,” are an appeal, specifically, to white women; speaking in the first-
person plural, Forten and her fellow African Americans claim kinship with white women: “Our 
‘skins may differ,’ but from thee we claim/A sister’s privilege, in a sister’s name.” The privilege 
of sisterhood, in turn, rests on the assumption of shared belief. Forten admonishes her white 
sisters to “act a Christian’s part”—to let a belief in Christian unity transcend differences of color 
and class: “We are thy sisters,—God has truly said,/That of one blood, the nations he has made” 
(60-61). 
Sixteen years later, William Wells Brown’s abolitionist novel Clotel (1853) made a 
similar plea in fictional form. Reflecting middle-class white women’s increasing authority over 
the production and interpretation of Protestant doctrine, Brown’s novel includes, intertwined 
with tales of virtuous women, daring escapes, and heroic self-sacrifice among African-American 
slaves, the story of one white woman’s doctrinal agency exercised on behalf of the enslaved. In 
this chapter I will investigate Brown’s choice to place at the center of his abolitionist novel the 
story of a white minister’s daughter, Georgiana Peck, who voices the novel’s theological 
arguments and provides a fictional example of antislavery doctrine put into action. I do so, not to 
efface the importance of Clotel’s African-American characters, but to reveal how Brown, a 	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 Forten appeared in the introduction to this dissertation, where I noted her use of the nom de plume 
“Magawisca.” 
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canny observer of the pitfalls of antislavery politics, positioned white women as ideal 
collaborators in the struggle against slavery. In the process, Brown both reflected and hastened 
the increasing identification of white women with legitimate religious authority.  
In crafting his abolitionist novel, Brown drew on the conventions of white sentimental 
fiction; as Sara Blair notes, “Clotel meditates… on the very limits of sentimental culture, of 
sympathy as a cultural politics, and of the textual forms created to give expression to both” 
(464). But as Ann duCille has elaborated, Clotel, despite its early and important place in African-
American literary history, is overlooked or understudied in many critical treatments of 
nineteenth-century fiction. This is true even though Brown’s novel is “particularly indebted to 
and in deep intertextual, intercultural dialogue with what Nina Baym calls ‘women’s fiction,’” a 
ubiquitous nineteenth-century genre that has received much critical attention since its recovery in 
the 1970s (“Where” 452).67 Clotel’s uneasy place in the pantheon of woman’s fiction (Baym’s 
1977 study includes only works by white women authors) is due, according to duCille, to the 
ambivalent responses of various critical schools: held at arm’s length by critics of African-
American literature because it is “historically inaccurate and heavily dependent on the borrowed 
conventions of ‘white’ sentimental fiction” (“Where” 453), Brown’s novel has also been 
neglected by feminist critics, the frequent champions of sentimental fiction, because it 
“institutionaliz[es] the image of the tragic mulatta that dominates early African-American 
fiction” (“Where” 455). 
But another reason for the critical neglect of Clotel may lie in Brown’s decision to 
include—and celebrate—a white woman with little to no narrative connection to the novel’s 	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 duCille and her respondent, Blair, wrote in 2000, and while there has been some improvement since 
then, with a number of important critical articles and books on Clotel appearing in recent years, the 
relative dearth of critical treatments remains surprising considering Clotel’s undeniably important place in 
African American literary history. 
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enslaved heroines Clotel, Currer, and Althesa. Interwoven with the primary story of Clotel—
Thomas Jefferson’s beautiful slave daughter who is betrayed by her white lover and eventually 
commits suicide in a failed attempt to rescue her daughter from slavery—is the secondary story 
of Georgiana, a well-educated white woman who converts her husband to Christianity and 
abolitionism and frees her father’s entire slave population after she inherits his plantation. The 
juxtaposition of the victimized and abused black woman with the triumphant abolitionist white 
woman seems an inauspicious beginning for the tradition of African-American fiction, and those 
critics who engage with Clotel’s complicated form often overlook the character of Georgiana 
despite the fact that her story occupies a full third of the novel’s narrative space. 
Those critics who do engage with Georgiana’s character correctly note that Brown draws 
close parallels between his eponymous African-American heroine and the white minister’s 
daughter. Michael Berthold, for instance, calls Georgiana Clotel’s “foil,” who as “the 
empowered white woman of the text who proposes to her husband and runs her own farm” 
wields a power that Clotel cannot (24-25). Georgiana, like Clotel, is the product of a hypocritical 
parent: Clotel’s father, the political patriarch Thomas Jefferson, decried slavery while profiting 
from slave labor; Georgiana’s father, the religious leader Reverend Peck, proclaims the liberating 
power of Christ while robbing seventy slaves of their freedom. Clotel and Georgiana occupy 
subject positions that point up the contradictions in the antebellum treatment of women: Clotel, a 
beautiful woman of mixed race, was raised to value sexual purity above all else, but because she 
is enslaved cannot even be legally married; Georgiana received a religious and abolitionist 
education that would fit her for the ministry, but instead returns home and submits to her father’s 
proslavery dictates.68  
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 Georgiana’s first words in the narrative reveal her liminal position in her father’s household: “papa will 
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I argue that Brown draws close parallels between the enslaved Clotel and the privileged 
Georgiana Peck, not to suggest that white and African-American women are equally oppressed, 
but to emphasize the considerable power wielded by white women in comparison with black 
women and to depict how that power might be used on their own and their black “sisters’” 
behalfs. Brown drives home both the similarities between Clotel and Georgiana and the immense 
social gulf that separates them by depicting the two women as equally white and equally 
“white”—by drawing both a physical and a moral parallel between them. When Clotel is offered 
at auction Brown’s narrator notes that “she stood, with a complexion as white as most of those 
who were waiting with a wish to become her purchasers [and] her features as finely defined as 
any of her sex of pure Anglo-Saxon”; her price only increases when the auctioneer asserts that 
“‘the chastity of this girl is pure;… she is a virtuous creature’” (49). Georgiana, too, has both fair 
skin and a flawless character, and yet rather than being bought by her husband at auction she 
chooses her own mate, even going so far as to propose to him herself. Ann duCille asserts that 
Brown’s mulatta figures, including Clotel, “stand in his work as hallmarks of the deep-seated 
hypocrisy of a world out of joint—emblems of the barbarism of a ‘civilized society’ that put 
white lady and ‘true womanhood’ on a pedestal and black slave and black womanhood on the 
auction block, even though they looked the same” (Coupling 18, emphasis in original).69 But I 
assert that Georgiana Peck exists in the novel, not only as the symbolic counterpart of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overlook my differing from him, for although I am a native of the South, I am by education and sympathy 
a Northerner” (74). As Eva Allegra Raimon notes, Georgiana’s words parallel the contemporary discourse 
surrounding the figure of the mulatto, in which the mulatto “literally embod[ied] both Northern and 
Southern ideologies” (4). While Clotel is physically mixed, then, Georgiana is a regional and intellectual 
mulatta. 
 
69
 By making both Clotel and Georgiana white, Brown emphasizes that it is the fact of her enslavement, 
not the color of her skin, that robs Clotel of legal and social equality. In doing so he successfully 
deconstructs what Russ Castronovo considers one of the primary functions of the white sentimental 
novel: “to constitute whiteness as a seemingly noncontingent, nonsocial identity” (“Incidents” 243). 
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beautiful and chaste Clotel, but as the figure through which Brown can interrogate a particular 
model of religious freedom.  
Brown’s novel, I argue, approaches racial and religious freedom as intersecting concerns 
and the white woman as the figure in whom these concerns meet and can be explored. In 
Brown’s novel about the impact of chattel slavery on black and white women, Georgiana Peck 
emerges as the character with the most freedom because she is neither owned by a man nor 
affiliated with an organized religious or political group. Brown’s particular formulation of 
women’s religious agency, I will show, is modeled on a Kantian division between “public” and 
“private” citizens in which those who hold ordained or elected office—including clergymen and 
politicians—are less free than those who do not (or indeed cannot). While this model of women’s 
agency can seem to reify gendered divisions of public and private by locating women’s agency 
primarily in the nursery and the classroom, it actually represents a sophisticated response to the 
confused public-private relations of the plantation household and to the intertwining of religious 
and political arguments in the slavery debate. 
In the first section of this chapter I demonstrate how Brown (and other abolitionists, 
including Richard Hildreth), dissatisfied with the response of Protestant clergy to the problem of 
slavery, deconstructed the supposed power of white, male ministers by highlighting their 
imbrication in sectarian systems of authority that encouraged them, not to act as moral beacons 
on the slavery question, but to defer to their congregants’ opinions. Under such conditions, 
women become the only true religious authorities; their exclusion from the clergy paradoxically 
ensures their doctrinal independence and moral agency. By disengaging doctrinal authority from 
clerical ordination and envisioning fiction as a space for cross-racial religious collaboration, 
Brown envisioned Protestant women as members of a larger Christian community that might 
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transgress sectarian boundaries while maintaining the shared structures of Protestant belief that 
uphold communal identity and make collective action possible. 
In the context of Brown’s Clotel this dynamic is played out in the character of Georgiana 
and her slaveholding father, Reverend John Peck. While Reverend Peck, a Methodist minister, 
searches the Bible for ways to vindicate his own and his neighbors’ slaveholding practices and 
hires a “missionary” to control the doctrines to which his slaves have access, Georgiana, free 
from the necessity of appeasing bishops or congregants, converts her father’s guests to 
abolitionism, gives his slaves access to the Bible, and, after her father’s death, frees the slaves 
she has inherited. These actions are made possible by Georgiana’s independent reading of the 
Bible and her willingness to form doctrinal opinions different from those of her father and of his 
church, the Methodist Episcopal Church South (which had split from the northern Methodist 
church in 1844 over the question of slavery). Unlike her father and the southern Methodist 
clerical hierarchy, Georgiana reads the Bible as the “bulwark of liberty” rather than of slavery 
(74). The story of Georgiana and her father works to realign religious authority, not with male 
clerics, but with female Christians, and to position Georgiana’s abolitionist interpretation of 
scripture as both theologically and philosophically sound. While Reverend Peck and his 
missionary mouthpiece, Mr. Snyder, repeat the proslavery “catechism” of the real-life Reverend 
Charles Colcock Jones, Georgiana voices an antislavery theology “founded in the school of 
Christianity” (136). The position of Georgiana-as-character parallels the position of Clotel-as-
text: both claim membership in a transnational Protestant Christian community—Brown wrote 
and published Clotel in England—while repudiating the pronouncements of its ordained 
representatives. Together they present a critique-from-within that locates Christian agency, not in 
particular clergymen, but in the act of doctrinal interpretation itself. 
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Brown’s figuration of white women’s moral agency, however, leaves the black woman in 
the role of sacrificial victim: while Georgiana Peck successfully frees her father’s seventy slaves 
before succumbing to consumption, Clotel Jefferson cannot even rescue her daughter from 
slavery before throwing herself from the Long Bridge in Washington, D.C.. As in Catharine 
Sedgwick’s work, Clotel’s white women speak for women of color rather than allowing them to 
speak for themselves, reifying the notion that effective religious language and doctrinal agency 
are the province of white women alone. Brown’s narrative thus follows the pattern that Karen 
Sanchez-Eppler finds in the abolitionist speeches of Angelina Grimké and other white 
abolitionist women, in which ”the bound and silent figure of the slave represents the woman’s 
oppression and so grants the white woman access to… discourse denied the slave” (Sanchez-
Eppler 19).70 In the third section of my chapter I contextualize Brown’s problematic depiction of 
black women’s (lack of) doctrinal agency by contrasting Clotel with Frederick Douglass’s 1845 
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself and Harriet 
Jacobs’s 1861 Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. Reading Clotel in this context positions the 
novel not as a failure of imagination but as an important step in the development of both 
nineteenth-century African-American fiction and African-American religious thought. Brown, by 
adopting the fictional medium employed successfully by Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, and other religious women writers, opened up an imaginative space for women’s 
doctrinal agency not generally offered by the slave narrative, which operated within certain 
expectations of authenticity and under the watchful eye of white editors like William Lloyd 	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 As Sanchez-Eppler notes, and as I discussed in my introduction, the ostensibly disembodied “persons” 
guaranteed rights under the Constitution were assumed to be white and male, so that both white women 
and black slaves were excluded from representation under the law. This situation necessitated rhetorical 
forms that emphasized the specific embodiedness of women and slaves. But even as these interconnected 
discourses came into being they instantiated asymmetries of power between white women and slaves, so 
that the white abolitionist woman drew her authority to speak from the presumed voicelessness of the 
slave. 
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Garrison. Clotel’s depictions of black women’s religious agency, limited though they may be, are 
nevertheless a marked improvement on the inarticulate female victims depicted in Douglass’s 
nonfiction Narrative. But it was not until Jacobs’s Incidents combined the personal urgency of 
the slave narrative with the creative possibilities of the sentimental novel that black women’s 
religious agency received robust textual embodiment, as Jacobs’s Linda Brent masters the 
language of Protestant doctrine and compels her “Christian” persecutor to acknowledge that she 
is the superior preacher. 
Examining Clotel’s treatment of the white abolitionist woman Georgiana Peck helps to 
reveal the forms of agency at work in Brown’s text and in other writings by African-American 
authors—forms predicated as much on religious adherence as racial identity. But it also 
demonstrates how African-American authors manipulated white literary tropes by turning the 
figure of the pious white woman to their own purposes. I conclude this chapter with a discussion 
of the paired figures of the abolitionist white woman and the enslaved black woman in Forten’s, 
Brown’s, and Jacobs’s texts. I demonstrate that by creating saintly but static white female figures 
and contrasting them with complex, clever mixed-race characters, these three authors expose the 
abolitionist white woman as little more than a useful narrative construct that need exist only so 
long as she serves her rhetorical purpose. 
 
The Minister and the Lady, or the Public and Private Uses of Doctrine 
In an 1848 article in the North Star, Brown’s influential contemporary Richard Hildreth, 
white abolitionist and author of the first American antislavery novel, The Slave, or Memoirs of 
Archy Moore (1836), pondered the question “What Can a Woman Do?” in service to the 
	   93 
abolitionist cause.71 His answer assumed women’s broad influence within domestic or semi-
domestic spaces: 
For instilling into the public mind, and diffusing through society those new 
opinions, in which all social changes must have their origin, women possess 
peculiar advantages. They have an access to the hearts of men, which no man has; 
they have an access to the hearts of children, peculiar to themselves, those 
children who are soon to become men and women, and to influence, for good or 
evil, the destinies of the race. (par. 6) 
 
Hildreth’s preferred arenas for female influence are the “village school” and the Protestant 
church. “Is it not notorious,” he asks, “that at this moment, every Protestant sect in America, is 
mainly upheld, its churches built, its ministers paid, its associations and charities sustained, by 
the efforts and influence of the women? In every church the female members far out-number the 
men; and the men who are there, seven times out of ten; are carried there and kept there by the 
women.”72 If one thinks of the church as a space outside of public life, cordoned off from the 
political arenas in which “real” events take place, then Hildreth’s article is a patronizing attempt 
to limit women’s influence: by confining their efforts to the domestic or pseudo-domestic spaces 
of the nursery, the classroom, and the Sunday school, women may guide the “sporting and 
prattling” of children but not the deeds of grown men.  
But there is another aspect to Hildreth’s argument—one that acknowledges that public 
influence carries limitations of its own, and that political and clerical roles, once entered into, are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 A native of Massachusetts and a Harvard graduate, Hildreth had spent time on a Florida plantation in 
the 1830s in an attempt to improve his health. Archy Moore is notable for its depiction of slavery as an 
economic system that corrupts both master and slave and keeps both parties dependent on one another. 
Four years after the publication of Archy Moore, Hildreth published his Despotism in America (1840), 
which became an important sourcebook for the growing abolitionist movement.  Hildreth was also active 
in the Temperance movement and was well known as an historian and newspaper editor. 
 
72
 As Ann Braude has shown, the historians who crafted narratives of American religion in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries would conveniently forget what Hildreth knew: that women have always made up 
the majority of religious adherents—of every Christian or non-Christian sect—in America, from the 
colonial period to the present. (See Braude’s “Women’s History Is American Religious History.”) 
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freighted with official expectations not imposed in the semi-public spaces of the classroom and 
the church. In answer to his titular question, Hildreth asserts that women, though they “cannot 
vote… cannot preach… cannot legislate,” can nevertheless do  
more than voter, preacher or legislator. Each and all of those, is but the instrument 
to promulgate or carry into effect, some preestablished opinion. No man can 
preach except as the expounder and defender of opinions already espoused by his 
hearers, or a part of them. If he preaches his own opinions in contradiction to 
theirs, he must be content to lack salary and a pulpit…. No man can legislate 
except in conformity to the opinions of those who make him a legislator; and the 
voter does only signify by his vote, his adherence to a certain principle or opinion 
which he thereby proclaims and vindicates. Behind all these is the opinion 
preached, voted for, made into law,—and whence comes that? (par. 5) 
 
In Hildreth’s formulation, the power to hold public office is double-edged: while membership in 
the ministry or the congress carries built-in authority, the preacher or legislator has a limited 
range of moral motion, since his congregation or his voters may rescind the authority they have 
granted him.73 His “opinions”—Hildreth’s catch-all term for religious, political, and social 
doctrines—are limited by the fact that he serves at the pleasure of his church or party. Women, 
who do not—indeed cannot—take official positions under the auspices of any organized 
sectarian or political authority but are free to make their own moral and theological choices, thus 
have more freedom to espouse new doctrines and advocate on behalf of controversial causes 
because they need not fear the disapprobation of congregants or constituents.  
As Michael Warner details in Publics and Counterpublics, the notion of the constraints 
embedded in public office can be traced to Immanuel Kant’s 1784 essay “What is 
Enlightenment?” in which Kant distinguishes between the “public” and “private” uses of reason 
and considers the role of the clergy in public and political life. In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant 	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 Writing for Frederick Douglass’s abolitionist newspaper, Hildreth is not arguing against women’s 
political equality but in favor of women’s greater influence; granted that they cannot vote, preach, or 
legislate, women can nevertheless work for the abolitionist cause (or for “any great idea” they embrace) 
using the tools at their command. 
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figures clerical office as a position in which speech and public debate are necessarily limited by 
the sect in which one serves: in his role as an ordained officeholder “a clergyman is bound to 
preach to his catechistical pupils and his congregation according to the confession of the church 
he serves because he has been accepted under these conditions” (par. 5). In speaking to his 
congregation, the clergyman is speaking only to a domestic (“häusliche”) gathering: he is, in 
other words, a “private” citizen, bound by the expectations of his “domestic” parish. On the other 
hand, a scholar (“Gelehrter,” or learned one), speaking and writing from a position not bound by 
clerical ordination or official church duty, may criticize religious organizations as well as 
political and civil authorities without fear of betraying either his congregants or ecclesiastical 
authorities. The scholar, then, is a “public” citizen in a way that the clergyman is not, simply by 
virtue of his ability to speak and write for an “actual public” (“eigentlichen Publikum”) rather 
than for a “domestic” congregation.74 Warner notes that Kant’s alignment of public and private 
seems counterintuitive to most modern readers: western political thought generally considers a 
civil officeholder to be a “public figure” and a scholar or writer to be a “private citizen” (Publics 
44-45). But because the officeholder cannot act officially outside of his civil capacity while the 
scholar’s scope is the whole world, in the Kantian formulation the scholar’s effects are more 
public than those of the officeholder.  
It is this understanding of public and private that Hildreth seems to have in mind when he 
encourages women to involve themselves in the antislavery cause. Whereas male clergy are 
hamstrung by their “private” commitments—they must “be content to lack salary and a pulpit” if 
they defy their proslavery congregants and colleagues—women may affect public affairs by 	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 These brief translations of Kant are my own. While I am indebted to Warner’s Publics and 
Counterpublics for its succinct introduction to “What is Enlightenment?”, I am particularly interested in 
Kant’s reflections on the role of the clergyman in the public and political spheres, a topic that Warner 
does not address at length. 
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bringing their education and religious devotion to bear on matters of public concern. Women, 
Hildreth posits, are the “contemplative souls” whose unrestricted ideas may “leaven” the “whole 
lump” of public opinion precisely because female thinkers and writers need not restrict their 
ideas to those already approved by religious or political authorities (Hildreth par. 5). For 
Hildreth, educated women are the “scholars” of the nineteenth-century public sphere, those who 
can act and think independently precisely because they are excluded from ecclesiastical and 
political hierarchies. 
To acknowledge women’s exclusion from the roles of “voter, preacher or legislator,” 
then, was not necessarily to deny their right to engage in public life. As historian Lori Ginzberg 
has demonstrated, William Lloyd Garrison and the abolitionist writers and speakers he employed 
(including Brown and, occasionally, Hildreth) were heavily invested in the efficacy of “moral 
suasion,” a holistic method for effecting fundamental social change through authorship, public 
debate, and participation in abolitionist societies rather than (or sometimes in addition to) direct 
political action (609). Reformers committed to “moral suasion” insisted that society would 
improve, not when laws were changed or when everyone had the vote, but when people’s minds, 
hearts, and opinions were thoroughly reformed.75 The means of “moral suasion” was especially 
available to women and disenfranchised men, whose very exclusion from the clergy and from 
political office would render them less susceptible to the temptations offered and the limitations 
imposed by sectarian and party obligations.76 
William Wells Brown’s submissions to The Liberator, the National Anti-Slavery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75
 Ginzberg argues that the eventual turn among radical female reformers toward electoral politics and 
away from “moral suasion” undercut the efficacy of their movements by narrowing their field of action 
and redefining non-electoral forms of civic virtue, not as universal values to which all Americans should 
aspire, but as “solely, even biologically, women’s responsibility” (622). 
 
76
 See Henry Mayer’s All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery for a discussion 
of Garrison’s rejection of electoral politics as a means to end slavery. 
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Standard, and other Garrisonian news outlets show a long-standing concern with the means of 
moral suasion and with two other related themes: the failure of American clergy to defy the 
proslavery members of their denominations, and the “public” (in the Kantian sense of being 
unrestricted by clerical or political office) responsibilities of women. In an 1844 report on an 
antislavery meeting in Western New York, Brown wrote to the Standard that the “Clergy are 
opposed to me here, because I am opposed to the clergy; and I am opposed to the Clergy, 
because they are the deadliest enemies of our cause, of all reforms, and of Christianity. The 
churches are closed against us. Yes, those modern Pharisees are, as Gerrit Smith says, the most 
corrupted body of men on earth” (“Letter” [1844]).77 A month later, in a letter written to William 
Lloyd Garrison from Ohio, Brown noted that the clergy’s opposition to his cause sprung from 
fear of their congregants’ displeasure: “I find the clergy here not as corrupt upon the subject of 
slavery as they are in New-York and the New-England States. I suppose it is because there are 
not as many clergy here, and, consequently, they are not so dependant [sic] upon the people” 
(“Reformatory”). Here Brown positions antislavery feeling as a question of supply and demand: 
clergy who have larger congregations can afford to make some of their members angry, since 
presumably there will remain enough faithful members to pay the minister’s salary. The minister, 
as a “private” citizen hired to serve a “domestic” congregation, must choose his opinions based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The Pharisees are the Israelite sect that come in most often for condemnation in the four gospels, where 
their crime is placing obeisance to law above compassion for people. Christ warns his disciples to 
“beware… the doctrine of the Pharisees,” who make ostentatious shows of piety (strictly observing the 
Sabbath, announcing their temple sacrifices aloud) while ignoring the Torah’s commandments to care for 
the sick and the poor (Matthew 16:12, King James Version). By comparing American clergy to 
“Pharisees,” then, Brown aligns them against the spirit of Christ.  
Brown’s passing reference to Gerrit Smith invokes another abolitionist critical of Protestant clergy. 
Smith, a wealthy New York landowner and prominent antislavery advocate, rejected sectarian religion but 
contributed liberally to non-denominational groups like the American Tract Society, American Bible 
Society, and American Sunday School Union. 
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on the size of his church and the strength of their proslavery convictions.78  
Both white and African-American clergy came in for condemnation in Brown’s letters; 
during an 1847 visit to Philadelphia Brown wrote to Garrison:  
But shame upon the colored clergymen of Philadelphia and their churches! With 
but two exceptions, they were shut against me. As soon as I arrived in the city, a 
committee was appointed by a meeting of colored citizens to secure places and 
get up meetings for me, and on application, they found the doors of all the 
churches, colored and white, closed against bleeding humanity, except the Big 
and Little Wesley churches. Honor to them, but shame upon the hypocritical 
religion of the colored man which will prompt him to shut his door against a 
brother slave…. (“My First”) 
 
If anything, African-American clergy were even less free to support the abolitionist cause: 
beholden to the white denominational hierarchy under which they had been ordained, they were 
bound by clerical office to ignore the plight of a “brother slave” lest their special status be 
revoked. 
At the same time that Brown’s letters condemn Protestant clergy, black and white, for 
their failure to support the antislavery cause, they show increasing approval for the role played 
by women in the abolitionist movement. Writing in 1847 to the abolitionist Samuel May, Brown 
noted that he was  
more and more convinced of the propriety of invoking the aid of females to the 
slave’s cause.… Nothing looks more cheering to me than to see a circle of women 
working with their own hands for the redemption of their enslaved countrymen. 
And why should they not labor for the downfall of slavery? Are not more than a 
million of females driven daily to the sugar, the cotton, the rice and tobacco 
plantations of the South? Are they not denied the marriage rite? Is not Jesus 
crucified every day on the plains of the South, in the person of the unprotected 
slave? I never fail to urge upon the women the discharge of their duty to the slave. 
(“Letter” [1847]) 
 
In advocating for women’s antislavery involvement Brown, like Hildreth, does not recommend 	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 The American clergy’s culpability for slavery and their tendency to put the size of their congregations 
ahead of moral considerations was not a new theme for nineteenth-century abolitionists. See Jon Butler’s 
Awash in a Sea of Faith for a detailed discussion of the role that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
clergy played in solidifying the slave system in North America. 
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that women seek the vote, since political party affiliation, like clerical ordination, limits 
possibilities for moral action and encourages compromise. In an 1846 letter to Sydney Howard 
Gay, Brown had warned women against aligning themselves with any political party that would 
take their money even though they could not vote: “this move of the new party, to get the women 
with them, shows their hypocrisy: and no woman should join that ‘League,’ for it is, 
emphatically, a league with the devil, to cheat the women out of their money” (“New Liberty”). 
Brown, like other Garrisonians, refused to pledge support to any political party (even the 
ostensibly antislavery Liberty Party) that might be tempted to compromise with slaveholders for 
the sake of elective gain. And while Brown embraced women’s antislavery action, he insisted 
that such action should take decidedly extrapolitical forms. 
Perhaps Brown’s most explicit statement of his preference for non-ordained women over 
ordained men is his account of a public gathering in London’s Exeter Hall in 1853. The account, 
given in a letter to William Lloyd Garrison, was published in The Liberator on June 3, 1853, and 
subsequently reprinted in other antislavery papers. The London crowd looks forward with 
eagerness to a speech by the Congregationalist minister Calvin Stowe, expecting Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s husband to be an antislavery orator of great power. Brown records that 
Professor Stowe, as you might expect, was looked upon as the lion of the 
speakers; but his speech disappointed all, except those of us who knew enough of 
American divines not to anticipate much from them on the subject of slavery. For 
my own part, I was not disappointed, for I have long since despaired of anything 
being done by clergymen; and the Professor’s speech at Glasgow, and subsequent 
addresses, had prepared me to look for but little from him…. (“Letter” [1853]) 
 
To sharpen the contrast between the minister and his famous wife, Brown goes on to depict the 
wild greeting given Mrs. Stowe, whom he describes as a “greater lady” than the duchess she 
accompanies:  
At this stage of the meeting, there was a degree of excitement in the room that can 
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better be imagined than described. The waving of hats and handkerchiefs, the 
clapping of hands, the stamping of feet, and the screaming and fainting of ladies, 
went on as if it had been in the programme…. (“Letter” [1853]) 
 
Comparing the Reverend Stowe’s spoken words with Mrs. Stowe’s written ones, already well 
known in London, Brown accords the greater pedagogical and persuasive force to the latter: “Mr. 
Stowe is not very young, yet he is only a child in the anti-slavery movement. He is now lisping 
his A, B, C, and if his wife succeeds in making him a good scholar, she will find it no easy 
thing.” In the Stowe marriage it is Harriet who is the “scholar” and Calvin who aspires to her 
learned status:79 Calvin is a private curiosity briefly put on display for the benefit of London’s 
abolitionist community, while Harriet is a public citizen recognized for her intellectual 
contributions to the antislavery movement. In Brown’s account, all of the religious agency in the 
Stowe marriage is wielded by Harriet: while Calvin produces “no agitation” for the cause of 
Christian antislavery, London is full of “Mrs. Stowe’s converts” (“Letter” [1853]). 
While this reading of Hildreth and Brown might appear to reinforce a “separate spheres” 
model of nineteenth-century social relations, with women relegated to the nursery and the “little 
village school” (Hildreth par. 7), it actually reflects a more complex model of public and private 
relations than does the “separate spheres” binary, which grew out of studies of white middle-
class gender norms. Scholars of southern history and African-American literature have noted 
how the ideology of the separate spheres—the notion that in a properly organized society women 	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 Critic Mary Getchell notes how Brown both built upon and complicated the model of antislavery 
writing offered by Stowe: 
Brown is more insistent [than Stowe] on the particular political moment he represents than the universal 
or spiritual state of man. He draws attention to moral and political hypocrisy by relating his sentimental 
characters not to abstract or transcendent conditions, but to the level of genuine individual suffering and 
survival. And unlike Stowe, who relegates her source material to a supplementary text published as The 
Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Brown insists on the presence of his own source material as an inseparable 
part of the novel itself. Brown unconventionally embeds his parable in its own referential context, thus 
insisting on the contingency of meaning in Clotel. Through this technique he is able to juxtapose the 
gritty brutality of realistic discourse with the sentimental and sometimes saccharine portrayals of slave 
experience found in the Clotel plot. (85) 
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will guard the private space of the home while men populate the public space of the 
marketplace—worked to obscure the realities of the slaveholding household, in which economic 
and personal considerations were inextricably bound together, often by means of violence. 
Gillian Brown notes that slavery “disregards [the] opposition between the family at home and the 
exterior workplace. The distinction between work and family is eradicated in the slave, for whom 
there is no separation between economic and private status” (505). Hortense Spillers puts it more 
succinctly: slavery is “the most public private institution” (28). The familial relations of the 
plantation economy, in which the head of household was not only the figurative father of his 
slaves but also often their literal father, and in which the integrity of slave families could be 
ruptured at any moment by the exigencies of the marketplace, reveal the inseparability of private 
and public economies. Hildreth’s and Brown’s seemingly paradoxical assertion that those 
without electoral or clerical power have greater access to moral power is a sophisticated response 
to the confused public/private relations instantiated by slavery–one that recognizes the “private” 
as a locus for particular forms of agency that might be put to use in the abolitionist cause.  
 
Preaching on the Plantation: Mr. Snyder and Georgiana Peck 
Having repeatedly advocated in his antislavery letters and lectures for women’s 
increasing involvement in the abolitionist cause, Brown’s first work of fiction, Clotel, provides a 
literary example of white women’s doctrinal agency in the figure of Georgiana Peck. In chapters 
titled “The Religious Teacher,” “The Young Christian,” “The Liberator” and “The Christian’s 
Death,” Brown positions Georgiana as the true representative of Wesleyan Christianity and 
Garrisonian abolitionism, not despite the fact that she can neither be ordained by the church nor 
vote in elections, but precisely because of it. Brown’s figuration of female power places the 
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locus of women’s agency outside of the sectarian structures of both the Protestant church and 
party politics and indicates how white women’s unfettered religious speech might counter the 
proslavery doctrines of ordained clergy with new antislavery interpretations of both the Bible 
and popular proslavery texts.  
In Clotel Georgiana Peck serves as a foil, not only to the novel’s mixed-race heroine (as 
Berthold, duCille, and other critics have noted), but to her own father, the Methodist minister 
John Peck. Brown depicts Reverend Peck as a weak-minded apologist for slavery who will not 
denounce the institution or free his slaves because his livelihood—as both a plantation owner and 
a clergyman with a proslavery congregation—depends on its perpetuation. His daughter 
Georgiana, by contrast, argues her antislavery convictions from specific Biblical texts, including 
the teachings of Christ, the Ten Commandments, the assertion of monogenesis in the Book of 
Acts (“God has created of one blood all the nations of men”), and various admonishments and 
proof-texts from the Old and New Testaments. Without the burden of ordained ministry and a 
proslavery congregation, and having received an excellent Northern education, Georgiana is free 
to interpret the Bible according to antislavery principles and to share this antislavery doctrine 
with her future husband, Mr. Carlton. In the Peck household it is Georgiana who is the true 
religious scholar, Reverend Peck’s “superior and teacher,” and it is her religious agency that will 
eventually free her father’s slaves (99).  
Brown’s fictionalized critique of the ordained clergy extends to both the general, 
encompassing multiple denominations and sects, and the particular: Reverend Peck is identified 
as a Methodist minister, ordained in a denomination whose founder was notoriously opposed to 
slavery. Reverend Peck, whose first appearance is the novel finds him buying a slave at auction 
while dressed in the clothing that “proclaim[s] him to be a clergyman” (57), has been “educated 
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for the ministry, in the Methodist persuasion. His father was a strict follower of John Wesley, 
and spared no pains in his son’s education, with the hope that he would one day be as renowned 
as the great leader of his sect” (71). One of the opinions for which John Wesley was most 
renowned was his opposition to slavery: his Thoughts Upon Slavery, first published in England 
in 1774, went through numerous British and American editions, appearing in a Philadelphia 
printing by Joseph Crukshank almost immediately after its publication in England.80 Nineteenth-
century antislavery agitators in both England and America made much of the fact that the 
founder of Methodism had explicitly decried the practice by which so many of his American 
followers would grow wealthy, and in the final chapter of Clotel Brown lists the number of 
slaves owned by members of various Christian denominations in the U.S.:  
It is estimated that in the United States, members of the Methodist church own 
219,363 slaves; members of the Baptist church own 226,000 slaves; members of 
the Episcopalian church own 88,000 slaves; members of the Presbyterian church 
own 77,000 slaves; members of all other churches own 50,000 slaves; in all, 
660,563 slaves owned by members of the Christian church in this pious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 During his only trip to America Wesley took great interest in the treatment of slaves, and African 
Americans came in large numbers to hear the revivalist preaching of Wesleyan missionaries and itinerant 
preachers in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. But as Joanna Brooks notes, the official 
split between the Anglican and Methodist churches after the Revolutionary War and the growing power 
of slaveholders in the U.S. South “softened” antislavery sentiment among American Methodists (29), and 
“the original stands against slavery taken by men like Wesley and the first leader of the newly formed 
Methodist Episcopal Church, Francis Asbury, were eventually compromised and ultimately undercut, so 
that by the 1840’s, Southern Methodist preachers… were composing biblical arguments in favor of 
slavery” (Painter 29). Religious historian Christopher Evans describes the historical shift in this way: 
Wesley’s English Methodist societies carried staunch provisions barring slaveholders from 
membership, and in the early years of American Methodism an effort was made to keep this 
antislavery ethos strong. As Methodism’s primary areas of expansion were in the slave-holding 
South, however, the ability to enforce these antislavery provisions became untenable…. The gap 
between Methodism’s antislavery theology and its acquiescence to slavery ultimately led to 
several early nineteenth-century schisms, in which free African Americans in the North created a 
series of black Methodist denominations that pioneered the development of African American 
Christianity. Although Methodism survived the generation after Asbury without a schism over 
slavery, at the 1844 general conference, the Methodist Episcopal Church did formally split over 
the issue, creating a division in the church that would not be formally healed until a merger in 
1939. (688) 
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democratic republic! (208)81  
 
The denominations are listed in descending order of slave ownership except for the first two: 
Brown lists Methodists first even though Baptists own slightly more slaves. By designating both 
Reverend Peck and his daughter Georgiana as Methodist, Brown highlights the hypocrisy of a 
sect that condones slaveowning while claiming to revere its own antislavery founder—a betrayal 
that parallels the hypocrisy of a nation that enslaves men and women while proclaiming that “all 
men are created equal.” When Georgiana enters the narrative by interrupting her father’s 
proslavery sermonizing with her own conviction that the Bible is an antislavery document, she is 
thus implicitly positioned as the true heir to John Wesley, a “strict follower” of his antislavery 
positions.82  
Reverend Peck, so far from embracing Wesley’s antislavery principles, openly defends 
slavery on religious grounds and hires a “missionary,” Mr. Snyder, to preach to his slaves. 
Snyder’s “preaching” consists of borrowings from the Reverend Charles Colcock Jones’s 
Catechism, of Scripture Doctrine and Practice, for Families and Sabbath Schools; Designed 
Also for the Oral Instruction of Colored Persons, a devotional manual published in 1837.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81
 According to William Edward Farrison, Brown sourced these statistics from Edward S. Matthews’s 
“Statistical Account of the Connection of the Religious Bodies in America with Slavery.” 
 
82
 Brown’s choice to specify that Reverend Peck and his daughter are Methodists, in addition to 
highlighting the hypocrisy of slaveholding Wesleyans, may have also reflected his immediate audience. 
Brown was living in England when he wrote Clotel, and the novel was published by Partridge & Oakey of 
London, whose catalog included “material with a moral, reforming and religious content” (Winship). The 
Methodist sect, an offshoot of Anglicanism, was founded in London in the late-eighteenth century, and by 
1840 10 per cent of the English and Welsh population were classified as “Arminian Methodists” (Field). 
Baptists, on the other hand, though numerous in the U.S. South, were rare in England, and Brown may 
have put Methodists at the top of his slaveholders’ list in order to immediately catch his audience’s 
attention, since his English readers were far more likely to be Methodist than Baptist. 
 
83
 Jones, though a Southerner who headed a church in Georgia, had studied at the theologically 
conservative Andover Seminary and rose to prominence among Southern clergymen by fashioning 
himself as an authority on the proper Christian treatment of slaves. In addition to his Catechism, of 
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Though Mr. Snyder is fictional, Jones’s Catechism was a well known and much circulated text, 
and Brown includes it as an example of how Christian instruction could be used to excuse the 
cruelty of masters and enforce the docility of slaves: 
‘Q. What command has God given to servants concerning obedience to their 
masters?—A. ‘Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not 
with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God.’… 
‘Q. Is it right in a servant, when commanded to do any thing, to be sullen and 
slow, and answer his master again?—A. ‘No.’… 
‘Q. But suppose the master is hard to please, and threatens and punishes more 
than he ought, what is the servant to do?—A. ‘Do his best to please him.’ 
‘Q. When the servant suffers wrongfully at the hands of his master, and, to 
please God, takes it patiently, will God reward him for it?—A. ‘Yes. 
‘Q. Is it right for the servant to run away, or is it right to harbour a 
runaway?—A. ‘No.’ (80-81)84  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Scripture Doctrine and Practice, Jones also penned a separate tome on The Religious Instruction of 
Negroes in the United States. Critics of Clotel including M. Giulia Fabi and William Edward Farrison 
have attributed Snyder’s sermon to Thomas Bacon, whose sermons on masters and servants were 
published in England in the eighteenth century and reprinted in America in the early nineteenth. While 
Bacon may have been an inspiration for Brown in depicting Snyder and Peck, Snyder’s sermon is quoted 
almost word-for-word from Jones. 
 
84
 Snyder predictably drops the lines from the Catechism in which Jones admonished masters to “give 
unto [their] servants that which is just and equal,” including “comfortable houses, comfortable clothing, 
[and] wholesome and abundant food,” and to “keep their families together” (C. Jones, Catechism 128, 
emphasis in original). Snyder also inserts a few lines that absolve Reverend Peck of guilt, and perhaps 
even of free will: “is the master to blame for whipping his servant?—Oh no! he is only doing his duty as a 
Christian” (81). Finally, Snyder adds his own pseudo-scientific flourishes to Jones’s work, asking “Why 
may not the whites be slaves as well as blacks?” The answer is that “the Lord intended Negroes for 
slaves” because “their hands are large, the skin thick and tough, and they can stand the sun better than 
whites” (81). 
Snyder’s phylogenetic musings on the suitability of the black body for hard labor are not found in 
Jones’s Catechism but reflect burgeoning discourses of scientific racism that often went hand in hand 
with religious arguments for slavery. In a discussion of how Brown uses contemporary ethnological 
theory in Clotel, Adélékè Adéèkó points out Reverend Peck’s argument “that the human natural rights 
divinely endowed at creation were destroyed at the fall of Adam and Eve, and that the messiah’s physical 
atonement on the Cross re-established the right for only deserving Christians” (122). Adéèkó is interested 
in Reverend Peck’s philosophizing because it reflects the novel’s larger concern with hemocentric 
theories of human identity that “represent kinship and social responsibility in terms of blood 
relationships” (131). Contemporary ethnologists claimed that humans of different races were of different, 
and incompatible, blood origins and that the intermixture of these different bloods led to corrupted and 
doomed offspring. (As Adéèkó and others have noted, this “scientific racism” gave a veneer of scientific 
authority to the ongoing trope of the “tragic mulatto/a,” which Brown himself employed.) Unlike her 
father, Georgiana Peck rejects these polygenetic theories of racial origins, instead invoking the Biblical 
assertion that “God has created of one blood all the nations of men,” a belief that leads her to the 
conclusion that the “Christian religion is opposed to slaveholding in its spirit and its principles... and it is 
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Though the Catechism is uncredited in Clotel, the narrator later identifies Jones by name as one 
of the Christian ministers “who regard religious instruction, such as they impart to their slaves, 
as calculated to make them more trustworthy and valuable as property” (111). Mr. Snyder, bound 
by the missionary society that employs him and by the proslavery opinions of Reverend Peck, 
must preach such sermons despite the fact that he is personally antislavery: he confides privately 
to the visiting Northerner Mr. Carlton that slavery “is the incubus that hangs over the Southern 
States” (87). Brown contrasts Mr. Snyder’s rote religious instruction with that offered to the 
slaves by Georgiana Peck, who employs a Socratic method of instruction in which she reads the 
Bible aloud and invites her hearers’ independent interpretations—interpretations that need not 
conform to a sectarian script. 
Brown’s invocation of Jones’s well known and widely used Catechism reflects the 
complex generic blending that characterizes Clotel. Much of the critical literature on Clotel has 
been dedicated to understanding the novel’s odd form: its chronological jumpiness, its plot 
digressions, and its borrowings from other textual sources. While some critics of Clotel have 
approached the text as little more than a failed attempt to imitate novelistic conventions, others 
have read its pastiche of fictional and journalistic forms as a sophisticated negotiation of 
audience expectation and artistic choice. John Ernest has famously described Brown as a 
“cultural editor” who sought not only to compose affecting stories but to compile facts and 
arguments for his readers’ benefit, much in the manner of antislavery journal editors like Elijah 
P. Lovejoy. Peter A. Dorsey has argued in a similar vein that Clotel is best read, not as an 
example of the high literary form of the novel, but as a piece of antislavery writing that follows 
the conventions of that subgenre, in which Stowe, Theodore Weld, and the host of antislavery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the duty of all who wish to meet God in peace, to discharge that duty in spreading these principles” (95). 
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writers and lecturers who made up Brown’s acquaintance “sought to submerge their authorial 
roles as ‘fiction’ writers by presenting their work as invitations to public authentication” (258).85 
By placing Jones’s popular Catechism in Mr. Snyder’s mouth Brown blurs the line between 
fiction and nonfiction, spurring readers to consider how Christian doctrine circulated in 
proslavery contexts.  
But more than merely reflecting nineteenth-century textual practices, Brown’s use of 
Jones’s Catechism actually models the process of deconstruction and reinterpretation by which 
antislavery Christians might counter proslavery doctrines. Brown’s text manipulates the 
Catechism, turning this proslavery text from a weapon of oppression to an occasion for 
hermeneutic creativity and ironic commentary on white culture. Jones’s self-important preface to 
the third edition of his book claims that “when we have a class of grown-up children, to instruct, 
it is our shortest, our wisest, and most benevolent course, so to instruct them as to settle their 
faith” (5, emphasis in original). The express purpose of the Catechism, then, is to “settle the 
faith” of Southern slaves—to preclude any dangerous theological questioning that might 
undermine their perfect servitude. But Snyder’s use of the Catechism has the opposite effect on 
Reverend Peck’s slaves: it leads them to question the intelligence and sincerity of white people 
and the validity of their own enslavement. “‘Dees white folks is de very dibble [devil],’” says 
one slave, Dick, after Snyder has preached his sermon and left, “‘and all dey whole study is to 
try to fool de black people.’” The Catechism in this case confirms, not that black people were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85
 M. Guilia Fabi argues that in addition to reflecting conventions for nineteenth-century antislavery 
writing Brown’s disjointed narratorial style actually instantiates in textual form “the uncertainty and 
limited control that were characteristic of slave life. For instance, in having characters appear and 
disappear without previous notice from the text... he gives his audience a readerly experience of the 
familial disruption caused by slavery” (xvii). Fabi criticizes those scholars who “continue to search for a 
‘unifying principle’” in Brown’s work, claiming that such criticism results in “a telling attempt to resist 
the condition of uncertainty of slave life as Brown re-creates it on a fictional level, and… an effort by 
such critics to recover some control in a situation of powerlessness and frustrated expectations” (xvii). 
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born to be slaves, but that white people are evil. Another slave, Aunt Dafney, asserts that “‘I got 
no notion of dees white folks, no how. Dey all de time tellin’ dat de Lord made us for to work for 
dem, and I don’t believe a word of it.’” In this case the Catechism not only fails to “settle faith” 
but actually undermines it: Aunt Dafney “[doesn’t] believe a word” of the white man’s 
preaching. Another slave, Ned, opines that “‘de people dat made de Bible was great fools, 
[because] dey made such a great big book and put nuttin’ in it, but servants obey yer masters.’” 
Here the Catechism serves to suggest, not the authority of the Bible, but the stupidity of those 
who believe in it; why base an entire religion on a book that says nothing but “servants obey 
your masters” (81-82)? In this and other scenes in which African-American characters reinterpret 
white religious teachings, Brown employs a technique of double-voiced discourse (Henry Louis 
Gates’s term) described by Carla Peterson: “African-American writers constructed a productive 
discourse generated from within the community that borrows the vocabulary and categories of 
the dominant discourse only to dislocate them from their privileged position of authority” (14). 
It is the communal production of such religious discourse that makes it meaningful and 
valuable to Brown and to his African-American characters, who maintain an investment in 
Protestant doctrine even after they have heard it used to justify their enslavement. Brown is 
careful to preempt a complete dismissal of Biblical authority: the slave preacher Uncle Simon, a 
figure of religious influence in the local black community, corrects his fellow slaves’ 
misconceptions by asserting “‘Oh, thars more in de Bible den dat, only Snyder never reads any 
other part to us’” (82). As Laurie Maffly-Kipp asserts, nineteenth-century  
African-American identity was not built solely on African foundations; rather, it 
was anchored in a Protestant bedrock. Central to [communal understandings of 
African-American identity] was Protestantism as a source of belief, practice, and 
institutional structure. The Christian tradition gave birth to a worldview and a way 
of interpreting circumstances that imparted meaning and value to the incoherence 
of cultural removal and chattel slavery. (3)  
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After the “African spiritual holocaust” that colonial-era slaveowners perpetrated against their 
slaves in a concerted effort to destroy the religious traditions those slaves had brought with them 
from Africa (Jon Butler 130), the rise of a distinctly African-American Christianity in the 
nineteenth century offered a new source of communal identity for both free and enslaved 
blacks.86  
Reverend Peck, though he insists that Biblical teaching justifies slavery, gives the lie to 
his own beliefs by refusing to allow his slaves free access to the Bible; instead, they receive an 
expurgated version filtered first through Jones’s Catechism and then through Mr. Snyder. Peck 
demonstrates, by omission, not only his agreement with his daughter—that the Bible does not, in 
fact, condone slavery—but his belief in doctrinal agency: slaves exposed to the complete 
teachings of the Bible might, like Elizabeth Freeman hearing the Declaration of Independence or 
Nat Turner hearing the “Spirit that spoke to the prophets in former days” (9), decide to take 
matters into their own hands. Snyder, for his part, exemplifies the Kantian dynamic of 
professional constraints on public speech. As a missionary to the slaveholding south, Snyder is 
bound to preach only what wealthy plantation owners dictate, and his authority is undermined by 
his subordination to the will of the slaveholder. Reverend Peck’s slaves are aware that Snyder is 
merely Peck’s mouthpiece: “‘Marser Peck give dat sermon to Snyder,’” they correctly conclude 
(82). Snyder’s position as representative of Reverend Peck makes hypocrisy a job requirement.87   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Brown may have also had personal reasons for maintaining an investment in religious agency, since his 
escape from slavery had been facilitated by a devout Quaker, Wells Brown, whose antislavery convictions 
grew out of his faith. William the escaped slave was so grateful for the Quaker’s help that he added Wells 
Brown’s name to his own. (See the autobiographical narrative appended to the 1853 edition of Clotel for 
the complete story.) 
 
87
 Hailing from New York, Snyder is categorically opposed to slavery, but cannot say so without losing 
his position. But in private conversation with Mr. Carlton and the plantation’s overseer, Snyder is free to 
describe the stultifying effects of slavery on Southern society: 
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Brown drives home the uselessness of such spiritual teaching a few chapters later when 
Mr. Carlton, Reverend Peck’s guest and Georgiana’s future husband, visits one of Peck’s 
neighbors, a slaveholder who is not a Christian, and, at Georgiana’s urging, conducts a “religious 
interview” with his slaves (110). The neighbor, Mr. Jones, fearing that Carlton will think less of 
him for not educating his slaves, instructs his overseer to give them a hasty lesson in Protestant 
theology. This is what the overseer tells them: 
Now, boys and gals, your master is coming down to the quarters tomorrow with 
his visitor, who is going to give you a preach, and I want you to understand what 
he says to you…. Preaching is to tell you that you are mighty wicked and bad at 
heart. This, I suppose, you all know. But if the gentleman should ask you who 
made you, tell him the Lord; if he ask if you wish to go to heaven, tell him yes. 
Remember that you are all Christians, all love the Lord, all want to go to heaven, 
all love your masters, and all love me. Now, boys and gals, I want you to show 
yourselves smart to-morrow: be on your p’s and q’s, and, Monday morning, I will 
give you all a glass of whisky bright and early. (111) 
 
Mr. Jones clearly expects Carlton to “preach” in the manner of Mr. Snyder: to quiz the slaves 
according to the slaveholder’s catechism. Instead of “giving [them] a preach,” however, Carlton 
decides to “make it more of a conversational meeting,” and his questions immediately expose 
how shallow the slaves’ instruction has been. When he asks one slave if he knows who made 
him, the old man replies, “‘De overseer told us last night who made us, but indeed I forgot the 
gentmun’s name.’” When he asks another slave, “‘Do you serve the Lord?’” the man replies 
“‘No, sir, I don’t serve anybody but Mr. Jones; I neber belong to anybody else.’” Upon 
questioning a “mulatto woman” about John the Baptist, she replies, “‘Oh yes, marser, John de 
Baptist; I know dat nigger bery well indeed; he libs in Old Kentuck, where I come from’” (112). 
These paired scenes expose the false distinction between the “real” religious instruction Peck 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[N]o white man is respectable in these slave states who works for a living. No community can be 
prosperous, where honest labor is not honored. No society can be rightly constituted, where the intellect is 
not fed. Whatever institution reflects discredit on industry, whatever institution forbids the general culture 
of the understanding, is palpably hostile to individual rights, and to social well-being. Slavery is the 
incubus that hangs over the Southern States. (87) 
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provides his slaves and the “fake” instruction that Jones’s slaves receive: both are meant, not to 
improve the servants’ temporal or spiritual lot, but to make the master seem benevolent and 
Christian to outside observers. The various scenes of “preaching” that Brown depicts offer a 
fictional deconstruction of the proslavery argument that Christian masters who educated their 
slaves in Protestant principles did them a service by saving their souls. Brown underscores the 
uselessness of such limited doctrinal instruction by naming the atheist slaveholder (Reverend 
Peck’s non-believing neighbor) after the Reverend Charles Colcock Jones. 
Reverend Peck’s daughter Georgiana is introduced to the novel in a chapter entitled “The 
Religious Teacher,” in which her first act is to interject her antislavery views into her father’s 
conversation. Having been educated, like her father, in Connecticut, she has returned to the 
South, not to be “captivated” by the slave system, but to work against it. While Brown gives lip 
service to her “youth, beauty, and health” (74), he is far more concerned with her intellectual and 
spiritual qualifications than her physical ones. He describes the “philosophy” embraced by her 
“capacious mind”:  
It was, that all men are by nature equal; that they are wisely and justly endowed 
by the Creator with certain rights, which are irrefragable; and that, however 
human pride and avarice may depress and debase, still God is the author of good 
to man—and of evil, man is the artificer to himself and his species. Unlike Plato 
and Socrates, her mind was free from the gloom that surrounded theirs;… though 
a devoted member of her father’s church, she was not a sectarian. (136)  
 
The comparison to Plato and Socrates, both male, is cagey. Georgiana is both like and unlike 
these famous philosophers: similar to them in the “capaciousness” of her mind, but differing 
from them in her embrace of a Christian optimism and a democratic belief in the equality of all 
people. Like Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie, who “permit[s] her mind to expand beyond the contracted 
boundaries of sectarian faith,” Georgiana is “not a sectarian” (Sedgwick, Hope 128). And yet 
unlike Sedgwick, who rarely revealed her characters’ denominational commitments, Brown 
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reiterates Georgiana’s membership in her father’s Methodist church, suggesting that her sectarian 
identification is an important aspect of her role as the novel’s intellectual center.88 
 Brown’s narrator makes it clear that Georgiana’s superior piety depends on her 
willingness to see her father’s slaves as equals rather than as subordinates, and to treat them as 
such. Over and over again she encourages her father and Mr. Carlton to imagine themselves in 
the slaves’ places and to extrapolate what they would do as privileged white men should they 
find themselves threatened with enslavement and treated as property: “‘Everybody knows that 
slavery in its best and mildest form is wrong. Whoever denies this, his lips libel his heart. Try 
him! Clank the chains in his ears, and tell them they are for him; give him an hour to prepare his 
wife and children for a life of slavery… then look at his pale lips and trembling knees, and you 
have nature’s testimony against slavery’” (124). M. Giulia Fabi calls this “interpretive 
retraining,” a method of antislavery pedagogy espoused by Brown and modeled by Georgiana for 
her father and lover (and of course for the reader): 
The ethos of resistance of the slaves can be understood by outsiders who have 
dared to become aware of the interpretive blinders of race prejudice, who have 
penetrated the oxymoron of a slaveholding democracy, who have questioned the 
source of their own privilege, and who have emerged with new interpretive tools 
to reread American reality from a point of view that includes the perspective of 
the subaltern. As we have seen, Brown dramatizes this possibility in Georgiana.... 
She is paradigmatic of the process of interpretive retraining that Brown tries to 
ignite in his readers through his novel. (xix) 
 
What Fabi and most other commentators fail to note, however, is the degree to which 
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 The similarity between Sedgwick’s description of Hope Leslie and Brown’s of Georgiana is probably 
not accidental. Brown was apparently an admirer of Sedgwick’s work; as Ann duCille notes,  
in the later versions of Brown’s novel, Horatio Green becomes Henry Linwood and Clotel becomes 
Isabelle, reminiscent of Sedgwick’s characters Herbert and Isabella Linwood…. [C]ross-dressing and 
disguise play key roles in several of Sedgwick’s novels, as well as in Brown’s text, as characters escape 
literal and figurative prisons by swapping clothes, races, genders, places, and positions in pursuit of 
freedom. In The Linwoods, the heroine Isabella engineers Herbert Linwood’s escape from prison through 
a black woman servant who changes clothes and places with him, a scene Clotel reenacts in Mary’s 
heroic, self-sacrificing rescue of her beloved George. (Coupling 25). 
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Georgiana grounds this call to reciprocity in Christian doctrine. Russ Castronovo asserts that 
“[i]n both speeches and writing Brown argued against slavery and racial prejudice, not by 
appealing to religious tenets—as many white abolitionists and slave narrators did—but by 
manipulating the discourses of American politics and history” (“Radical” 526). But in Clotel 
religious arguments both for and against slavery come very much to the fore: the novel engages 
in a metacritical dissection of contemporary doctrinal debates, pitting proslavery and antislavery 
theologies against one another. With fiction increasingly providing a forum for public religious 
debate, Brown situates his early African-American novel within this new tradition and places at 
its intellectual center an educated white woman who systematically deconstructs her father’s 
proslavery rationalizations and replaces them with her own antislavery brand of Christianity. 
In contrast to her father, who forms his opinions based on self-interest and then calls 
upon the Bible to “throw its broad shield over them” (73), and to her future husband Mr. Carlton, 
an atheist who reads Rousseau, Voltaire, and Paine and, while he is “no admirer of… slavery,” 
cannot be bothered to do anything about it (74), Georgiana wields a “philosophy… founded in 
the school of Christianity” (136) that blends the best of democratic political thought with liberal-
minded Biblical exegesis: “‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’ This single passage of 
Scripture should cause us to have respect to the rights of the slave. True Christian love is of an 
enlarged, disinterested nature. It loves all who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, without 
regard to colour or condition’” (75). (Reverend Peck’s response to this sentiment is to accuse 
Georgiana of fanaticism.) Instead of carefully selecting proslavery pronouncements from the 
Bible (“Slaves, obey your masters”), Georgiana marshals antislavery arguments from the Old 
Testament, from the life of Christ, and from natural law, and points out that the church’s 
willingness to suffer slaveholders for the sake of maintaining membership numbers is repelling 
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potential believers, who are disgusted with the church’s hypocrisy. 
In the terms laid out by Kant in “What Is Enlightenment?” and explicated by Warner in 
Publics and Counterpublics, Georgiana’s speech reflects her role as a “scholar,” a public citizen 
not bound by ordination or political office and therefore free to express controversial—even 
“fanatical”—opinions. Brown stresses Georgiana’s education in a Northern school, which 
qualifies her to engage in theological and philosophical debate with her ordained father, and 
details her desire to educate her slaves as well. In contrast to her hypocritical father and the 
hamstrung Mr. Snyder, Georgiana gives the slaves a real religious education. Her first act upon 
her father’s death is to dismiss his hired mouthpiece:  
Snyder, the Dutch preacher, felt that his services would soon be dispensed with, 
for nothing was more repugnant to the feelings of Mrs. Carlton than the sermons 
preached by Snyder to the slaves. She regarded them as something intended to 
make them better satisfied with their condition, and more valuable as pieces of 
property, without preparing them for the world to come. (133) 
 
Georgiana, rather than employing a proxy, offers her own religious instruction, and because she 
plays no official role in her father’s church—she is not ordained and therefore not bound to 
preach the proslavery catechism of the Methodist Episcopal Church South—she is free to teach 
as she will. Georgiana and Mr. Carlton “read and explain… the Scriptures” to the slaves who, 
instead of sleeping as they did during Snyder’s sermons, display “very great attention” that 
shows “plainly that they appreciated the gospel when given to them in its purity” (138). 
Implementing a plan of gradual emancipation, Georgiana informs the laborers on her 
father’s plantation that they will begin earning money for their labor and that the funds will be 
set aside for use when they are free. Productivity immediately increases, particularly among the 
bricklayers, who become “temperate, moral, [and] religious” once they are allowed to work for 
themselves (136). Having already demonstrated that these same slaves were prone to 
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drunkenness, immorality, and skepticism under the false religious instruction of Mr. Snyder and 
Mr. Jones, Brown shows how the promise of emancipation and Georgiana’s true religious 
teaching work in tandem to transform the slaves into both model laborers and model Christians. 
Here Brown once again reverses a sacred proslavery assumption: that a “settled faith” makes 
good workers and contented slaves. Instead, Georgiana Peck’s ex-slaves become settled and 
sober Christians once they have been promised their liberty. Once established, this principle 
makes it impossible to argue for slavery on missionary grounds. Indeed, if true religion is a 
product of freedom and honest work rather than an inducement to it—a salutary spiritual effect 
rather than an instrumental cause—then the moral impetus for abolition becomes even more 
urgent, since slaves cannot become true Christians until they are free to labor on their own 
behalf. 
But the slaves’ new freedom carries with it the complicated burden of publicity: 
Georgiana warns her slaves that the passage from slavery to freedom will make them more 
subject to scrutiny, rather than less. Though they will no longer work under the watchful eye of 
the overseer, they will now be treated as representative of all freed slaves, and their behavior 
held up as exemplary: 
“From this hour,” said she, “you are free, and all eyes will be fixed upon you. I 
dare not predict how far your example may affect the welfare of your brethren yet 
in bondage. If you are temperate, industrious, peaceable, and pious, you will show 
to the world that slaves can be emancipated without danger. Remember what a 
singular relation you sustain to society. The necessities of the case require not 
only that you should behave as well as the whites, but better than the whites; and 
for this reason: if you behave no better than they, your example will lose a great 
portion of its influence.” (157) 
 
By freeing her slaves, Georgiana Peck places them in a “singular relation” to society: a relation 
in which their behavior is constrained by their membership in a particular community. In fact 
Georgiana confers a kind of ordination upon her now freed slaves: like the clergy and politicians 
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who can act only as mouthpieces for their congregations and constituents, the freed former slaves 
of Reverend Peck are now the representatives of an entire race. They go, in Kantian terms, from 
being “private” citizens (if only by virtue of being held as private property) to being “public” 
figures: head of the congregation of freed slaves, whose possible moral, social, and economic 
choices are necessarily constrained by that dubious honor.  
 
Clotel in Context: Women’s Religious Agency in Frederick Douglass’s Narrative and 
Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl 	  
Brown’s model of doctrinal agency, of course, is racially problematic, in that it functions 
far better for white women than for black women: Clotel, though she shares Georgiana’s 
antislavery Christianity, ends her own life while fleeing reenslavement, and so solidifies the 
figure of the tragic mulatta for generations to come. Though aware of the activities of black 
female abolitionists in the North (it was Brown, after all, who brought Ellen Craft and her 
husband William onto the Garrisonian lecture circuit),89 Brown chose to place at the center of his 
novel—interrupting the tales of Currer, Clotel, Althesa, and their children—a white woman, and 
to depict that single woman as effecting more real temporal change than any other character in 
the novel, male or female, white or black.90 For critics seeking in Clotel an authentic, 
unromanticized depiction of African-American life or a model of the politically engaged black 
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 See Anne M. Boylan’s essay in Yellin and Van Horne’s The Abolitionist Sisterhood for a description of 
black women’s antislavery activity in New York, where much of Brown’s lecturing took place. 
 
90
 M. Guilia Fabi notes in her introduction to Clotel that “visibly black” women’s antislavery activities 
play a role only in the final, 1867 edition of Clotelle, and then only briefly:  
The greater importance of Aggy and Dinah, who help Clotelle escape before she is taken to 
prison, is short-lived but significant. However, visibly black female characters do not fully escape 
their subordinate role even in the last edition of the novel…. Brown does not seem interested in 
questioning gender roles within the black community, an issue which would become central in 
the work of postwar African American women novelists. (xxiii) 
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woman, the character of Georgiana Peck—white, privileged, dying beautifully a la Eva St. 
Clare—is a disappointment. 
Here it may be instructive to place Brown in the context of other antislavery authors; just 
as white women’s doctrinal agency emerged in fiction as part of a long literary-historical 
process, black women’s doctrinal agency did not arrive fully formed within the nascent field of 
African-American literary endeavor. Comparing Brown’s depiction of black women’s doctrinal 
agency with Frederick Douglass’s 1845 Narrative and Harriet Jacobs’s 1861 Incidents in the Life 
of a Slave Girl demonstrates the incremental process by which black women also came to access 
doctrinal agency, a process enabled by the expansion of African-American literature into the 
realm of fiction. 
Consider the manner in which Frederick Douglass’s 1845 Narrative of the Life of 
Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself, treats the intersection of Protestant 
doctrine and female agency. Unlike Clotel, Douglass’s Narrative is thoroughly critical of 
Christianity—so much so that Douglass himself seems surprised by the violence of his feelings, 
admitting in his Appendix that “since reading over the foregoing Narrative” he has noticed 
“several instances” which “may possibly lead those unacquainted with my religious views to 
suppose me an opponent of all religion” (75). In the Appendix Douglass makes a distinction 
between “Christianity proper” and “slaveholding Christianity,” and critics of the Narrative have 
generally taken Douglass’s assertions at face value, striving to reconcile his critique of individual 
Christian slaveholders with his professed respect for “Christianity proper.”91 But as Thomas 
Peyser cannily concludes, Douglass’s Appendix, and his Narrative’s depiction of slaveholding 
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 See, for instance, Donald B. Gibson’s “Faith, Doubt, and Apostasy,” James A. Wohlpart’s “Privatized 
Sentiment and the Institution of Christianity,” and Lisa Zeitz’s “Biblical Allusion and Imagery in 
Frederick Douglass’s Narrative.” 
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Christians, actually serves to place the idea of an abolitionist Christianity outside the realm of 
earthly possibility: 
Even though many clergy were abolitionists, and even though an entire sect, the 
Quakers, was dedicated to emancipation, Douglass never refers to so much as a 
single priest of whom he approves. His only kind words are for a shadowy entity 
he calls “the pure, peaceable, and impartial Christianity of Christ,” which he 
elsewhere names “Christianity proper” (363). These oblique affirmations, in 
which one can hear an echo of sweeping Transcendentalist dismissals of 
Christianity, leave open the possibility that the “Christianity of Christ” is 
something quite distinct from everything the world calls Christian. (87)   
 
Though Methodist clergy and class leaders come in for particular scorn in the Narrative, 
Douglass’s dismissal of American Christianity also refuses to make distinctions between 
denominations, congregations, or individual believers. Since “the religion of the south… is, by 
communion and fellowship, the religion of the north” (78), all American Christians are guilty by 
association. Douglass’s Appendix denies the possibility that individual churches or church 
members—male or female—might be exempt from condemnation, and the “pure, peaceable, and 
impartial Christianity of Christ” becomes a Platonic ideal that can only exist separately from the 
earthly church. 
With Christianity marked out as an unremittingly proslavery space, the possibility that 
doctrine might provide the impetus for antislavery agency is effectively foreclosed. Douglass’s 
stance toward the antebellum Protestant establishment has been remarked on by a number of 
commentators, but what these critics fail to note is the way Douglass simultaneously discredits 
Protestant doctrine while also effacing the women who might find in it a justification for 
antislavery action. In a famous passage in which Douglass deconstructs the Biblical curse against 
Ham as an excuse for slavery, he associates slavery with scripture and scripture, implicitly, with 
black mothers:  
[I]t is… plain, that a very different-looking class of people are springing up at the 
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south, and are now held in slavery, from those originally brought to this country 
from Africa; and if their increase will do no other good, it will do away the force 
of the argument, that God cursed Ham, and therefore American slavery is right. If 
the linear descendants of Ham are alone to be scripturally enslaved, it is certain 
that slavery at the south must soon become unscriptural; for thousands are ushered 
into the world, annually, who, like myself, owe their existence to white fathers, 
and those fathers most frequently their own masters. (14, emphasis added) 
  
To be “scripturally enslaved” is to be descended from Ham, but these mixed-race slaves, 
including Douglass himself, are descended from Ham only on their mothers’ sides. So scripture 
is made equivalent to enslavement, which is then made equivalent to motherhood. At the same 
time, however, the passage deftly removes black mothers from the procreative process, with 
mixed-race slaves spontaneously generated by white slaveholders: slave-born children are 
“springing up at the south” and being “ushered into the world,” owing “their existence to white 
fathers” with mothers nowhere to be found. In this crucial passage, then, scripture—particularly 
the curse of Ham—is associated with black women and then both are made to disappear, 
rendering women’s religious agency invisible and impossible.92 
When religious women do appear in the Narrative it is only in the aggregate and as the 
victims of religious white men. The Narrative includes a multitude of ministers, class-leaders, 
and church members, all male, and all depraved. The women who appear in Douglass’s 
Narrative are not the myriad women, white and black, who participated in Christian antislavery 
societies—not the Angelina Grimkés and Sarah Louisa Fortens—but symbolic women whose 
abused state serves as a signifier of evil slaveholding practices. “I love the pure, peaceable, and 
impartial Christianity of Christ,” Douglass avers in the Appendix, and “I therefore hate the 	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 Sharon Carson has investigated the radical possibilities of liberation theology in the Narrative and 
argued that Douglass, rather than dismissing religion altogether, actually relocates true Christianity in the 
black community. Even if this is the case, however, Douglass only locates religious agency in the black 
male community: the slaves who meet secretly to teach one another to read are all male, and the conjurer 
who gives Douglass “the root” to help him defy Covey is also male. If Douglass “reasserts his own 
spirituality and his will toward freedom” (Carson 27), he simultaneously denies that will to the women 
who are victimized by slavery. 
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corrupt, slaveholding, women-whipping, cradle-plundering, partial and hypocritical Christianity 
of this land…. We have men-stealers for ministers, women-whippers for missionaries, and 
cradle-plunderers for church members…. He who sells my sister, for purposes of prostitution, 
stands forth as the pious advocate of purity” (75, emphasis added). The repeated invocation of 
nameless whipped and prostituted women recalls (without naming) the tale of Aunt Hester—the 
woman whipped for daring to prefer a black lover to her master—with which Douglass had 
begun the Narrative.93 The bound and whipped woman thus becomes the emblem of 
essentialized victimhood, and her reappearance here, in the Appendix that categorically 
condemns American Christianity North and South, fixes black women as the perpetual victims of 
a violent and patriarchal Protestantism that offers no possible avenues for female expression and 
agency.94 
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 Winifred Morgan notes the gender differences in slave narratives by women and men: “Black men 
combated the stereotype that they were ‘boys’ while black women contested the idea that they were either 
helpless victims or whores” (75). Douglass’s Narrative tells the tale of his own journey from “boy” to 
“man” while at the same time affirming black women’s object position as “helpless victims or whores.” 
 
94
 In a useful discussion of Douglass’s Narrative Gordon Cunningham notes that understanding how 
African American texts construct gender is a complex process because the hierarchy of racial domination 
between master and slave must be triangulated with the gendered dominance of the masculine over the 
feminine. According to Cunningham, gender “as a discursively constructed difference creates places in 
the symbolic order that can be and are denied to slaves. Being biologically female or male does not allow 
the slave to claim or speak from the culturally defined position of man or woman” (116). While 
Cunningham recognizes that, at the symbolic level, “[w]ithin the domain of slavery, gender or culturally 
derived notions of man- and womanhood do not exist… [because] both male and female slave are other to 
the master’s male identity,” he overlooks how, at a textual level, this situation enables Douglass to 
subordinate the experiences of female slaves to his own narrative of subjectivity successfully achieved. If 
male and female positions are essentially the same under slavery, both the Narrative and Cunningham 
suggest, then the female experience of slavery can be successfully subsumed under the male, and under 
one particular male: Douglass. 
Maurice Wallace’s psychoanalytical reading of the Narrative, instead of dismissing female slave experience as 
effectively synonymous with male experience, notes how Douglass’s struggle toward black manhood necessitates 
that he sever himself rhetorically from the realm of black womanhood: 
The mature Douglass’s preoccupation with the masculine ideal in Narrative is coterminous with his fear 
of the feminine, of being regarded, in other words, as also woman. Perhaps he knows the risk of being 
classed with the sentimental subject of nineteenth-century white women’s writing by virtue of his 
powerlessness to resist sexual assault. To concede a feminine division of consciousness in the public 
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The denial of religious agency to women does not apply only to black women in the 
Narrative: even Sophia Auld, the kind white woman who is chastised by her husband for 
teaching young Frederick to read, can only be presented as a helpless victim denied access to 
agency. Douglass’s initial description of Auld presents her in Christ-like terms: “When I went 
there, she was a pious, warm, and tender-hearted woman. There was no sorrow or suffering for 
which she had not a tear. She had bread for the hungry, clothes for the naked, and comfort for 
every mourner that came within her reach” (31). This description echoes Christ’s commendation 
to the “good and faithful servant” in Matthew 25: 35-36 (King James Version): “For I was an 
hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took 
me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came 
unto me.” Rather than drawing abolitionist agency from her faith, however, as Georgiana Peck 
does, Auld is robbed of her religious agency by the power of slavery: “Slavery soon proved its 
ability to divest her of these heavenly qualities. Under its influence, the tender heart became 
stone, and the lamblike disposition gave way to one of tiger-like fierceness” (31). Slavery, not 
Sophia Auld, is granted all of the agency in this passage: it “proves its ability” to “divest” her of 
her initial kindness, and she is helpless to resist its encroachments, as her heart passively 
“becomes” stone and her disposition resistlessly “gives way.” Instead of offering an avenue to 
antislavery action, Sophia Auld’s Christianity is simply a dangerous trap she fails to avoid, 
leading her in the “simplicity of her soul… to treat [Douglass] as she supposed one human being 
ought to treat another” until she is disabused of this notion by her husband (31). While 
Douglass’s Narrative, unlike Clotel, is autobiographical and reflects the actual conditions of his 
sojourn with the Aulds, his semantic framing of Sophia Auld’s transformation from loving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
medium of literature is for Douglass to jeopardize his claim in Narrative to the virile perfectibility of 
black men. (245) 
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Christian to angry tigress suggests his doubtful opinion of the possibilities for women’s religious 
agency. 
M. Clay Hooper notes that Douglass’s various autobiographies instantiate a tradition of 
African-American autobiography that relies on an “identificatory logic of black autobiography… 
that sought to authorize black protest by demonstrating the moral independence of representative 
black individuals” (31). Douglass’s autobiographies depict him progressively liberating himself 
from illiteracy, from the overseer’s control, from slavery, from economic dependence, from 
Garrisonian paternalism, and so forth, until he stands alone and independent, the archetypal self-
made man. In this narrative, religion and religious leaders are among the many oppressive forces 
from which Douglass must free himself in his journey to manhood.95 By contrast, the “pastiche-
like dissonance” that surfaces in Brown’s multiple autobiographies enables a “declaration of 
moral interdependence rather than moral independence” (30) that in turn makes possible “a type 
of relational complexity that allows for progressive reorganization but not idealist reduction” 
(31). According to Hooper, Brown’s ethos is not the tale of the self-made man who frees himself 
from dependence on others through honest labor or physical violence, but the tale of the trickster 
who maneuvers between and manipulates (often competing) value systems and whose identity 
and progression are based, not on independence from others, but on interdependence with them.  
In other words, the forms of agency that Brown’s writings describe and recommend are 
cooperative and collaborative. Recognizing distinctions between sects and even between 
individual believers—proslavery and antislavery Methodists, most notably—and the complex 
interplay of public and private responsibilities that makes agency possible for those not bound by 
official duties, Brown offers models of collaborative action performed by those who share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95
 Hooper observes that this trajectory provides an African-American version of Sacvan Bercovitch’s 
“institutionalization of consensus.” 
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antislavery beliefs grounded in the Bible. These models are made possible by the imaginative 
space that fiction provides; Douglass and other escaped slaves, writing of their own experiences 
in nonfiction form, were necessarily limited in their depictions of slaves’—particularly female 
slaves’—agency. But even Brown’s fictional model of interdependence, as I have noted, leaves 
little room for black women’s doctrinal agency; black women, for Brown, are sacrificial lambs 
rather than doctrinal agents. And here it is instructive to look to another of Brown’s 
contemporaries: Harriet Jacobs. Merging the sentimental conventions of the fictional Clotel with 
the daring tales of concealment and escape characteristic of Douglass’s and other nonfiction 
narratives,96 Incidents constructs a tale in which a black heroine takes advantage of the confusion 
of public and private spaces under slavery and puts doctrinal agency to her own use.  
Like Douglass’s Narrative, Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl confines 
many of her observations on the relationship between religion and slavery to a single chapter. 
But rather than relegating the “slaveholding Christianity” of America to an afterthought, Jacobs’s 
text demonstrates Linda Brent’s doctrinal agency while subtly pointing out its revolutionary 
potential. Jacobs situates her religious reflections at the center of her story, just after her accounts 
of a watershed personal event—the birth of Linda’s first child—and a well-known political 
uprising: Nat Turner’s Rebellion. Jacobs thus places her doctrinal assertions in implicit dialogue 
with her own status as an independent agent—in this case a woman who has chosen her own 
sexual partner and the father of her child rather than succumbing to her master’s harassment—
and with Turner’s particular brand of violent, religiously-inspired action.  
Jacobs’s chapter on “The Church and Slavery” begins by noting that Turner’s rebellion 	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 I use the terms “fiction” and “nonfiction” advisedly, knowing that neither Brown’s Clotel, which 
borrows heavily from newspaper and lecture accounts of plantation abuses, nor Douglass’s Narrative, 
which draws on the narrative conventions established by other escaped slaves, fits neatly into the 
categories of fiction and nonfiction. 
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had led to increased religious instruction among slaves in her native Edenton, North Carolina. 
Since Turner had combined prophetic verses from the Bible with his own creative form of 
natural mysticism and transformed this unique belief system into a justification for antislavery 
violence,97 the slaveholders in Edenton “[come] to the conclusion that it would be well to give 
the slaves enough of religious instruction to keep them from murdering their masters” (57). In 
other words, having seen how undirected religious belief has led to violent collective action 
among slaves, wary slaveowners have decided that the best way to head off the most dangerous 
effects of doctrinal agency is to control the amount and kind of doctrine made available to slaves. 
Accordingly, at the first Sunday school meeting Linda attends—an Episcopal gathering to which 
only the more “respectable” and literate blacks have been invited—Reverend Pike takes as his 
text Ephesians 6:5: “Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, 
with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ.” Here one hears echoes of the 
fictional Mr. Snyder’s “Slaves, obey your masters” sermons and, behind him, of the real Charles 
Colcock Jones’s Catechism of Scripture Doctrine and Practice (published in Georgia in 1837, no 
doubt at least in part as a response to Turner’s rebellion), with its admonition to give slaves just 
enough religious instruction to “settle their faith.”  
But as in the case of Mr. Snyder’s fictional hearers, Linda and her fellow students reject 
the pacifying interpretations imposed on them by Reverend Pike—“‘You are rebellious sinners. 
Your hearts are filled with all manner of evil’”— and laugh at him behind his back. “[H]ighly 	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 In his Confessions Turner does not mention reading the Bible, but he knew how to read, and his 
confessor, Thomas Gray, records him reciting Bible verses from memory. Turner claimed to have 
received signs from God that convinced him that the Day of Judgment depicted in Revelations was at 
hand: “I discovered drops of blood on the corn as though it were dew from heaven—and I communicated 
it to many, both white and black, in the neighborhood—and I then found on the leaves in the woods 
hieroglyphic characters, and numbers, with the forms of men in different attitudes, portrayed in blood, 
and representing the figures I had seen before in the heavens” (10). When a solar eclipse occurred in 
February 1831 Turner took this as a sign that the apocalypse was at hand. 
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amused” with Pike’s preaching, his audience returns a few more times to hear “pretty much a 
repetition of the last discourse” and then, tiring of these harangues, opts to attend a “Methodist 
shout” instead (58). At the “shout” and at Methodist class meetings (small group gatherings led 
by whites) the slaves note the hypocrisy of the white Christians (one “class leader” 
unsuccessfully attempts to hide his amusement at the sorrow of a slave woman whose last child 
has been sold away from her) even as they recognize the liberatory potential of Christian 
teaching and their own capacity to practice a piety superior to that of white Christians. “Many of 
them [African-American Christians] are sincere,” Jacobs’s narrator notes, “and nearer to the gate 
of heaven than sanctimonious Mr. Pike, and other long-faced Christians, who see wounded 
Samaritans, and pass by on the other side.” Like Reverend Peck’s fictional slaves, who sing 
gleeful songs about Reverend Peck’s death, Jacobs’s free and enslaved blacks voice their 
awareness of white Christian hypocrisy through slyly coded songs: “Ole Satan’s church is here 
below./Up to God’s free church I hope to go./Cry Amen, cry Amen, cry Amen to God!” (60). 
Such ironic reinterpretations of proslavery Christian teaching were characteristic, not only of 
Brown’s and Jacobs’s fictional characters, but of African-American authors themselves.   
In contrast with Douglass’s synthesizing tactics, in which all white Christians are 
interchangeable and equally culpable in the miseries endured by slaves, Jacobs is careful to 
distinguish good white Christians from bad, and to depict ways that white and black Christians 
working in concert can better their condition. When Reverend Pike leaves town he is replaced by 
another Episcopal priest who insists on holding a weekly service for the slaves and who 
preaches, not “Slaves, obey your masters,” but “simple” sermons that acknowledge the slaves’ 
lack of previous instruction. Jacobs does not transcribe the text of these sermons; instead, she 
records their most salient feature: “it was the first time [the slaves] had ever been addressed as 
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human beings” (60). While the priest preaches to the local slave population, his wife takes in five 
slaves and teaches them to read, write, and support themselves. Together this Christian couple 
occupy the same position in Jacobs’s narrative that Georgiana Peck and Mr. Carlton occupy in 
Brown’s Clotel, and the death of the priest’s wife parallels Georgiana’s death scene: 
Her slaves gathered round her dying bed in great sorrow. She said, “I have tried to 
do you good and promote your happiness; and if I have failed, it has not been for 
want of interest in your welfare. Do not weep for me; but prepare for the new 
duties that lie before you. I leave you all free. May we meet in a better world.” 
Her liberated slaves were sent away, with funds to establish them comfortably. 
The colored people will long bless the memory of that truly Christian woman. 
(60) 
 
After his wife’s death the Episcopal priest leaves the parish, offering his African-American 
congregants this last advice: “‘Try to live according to the word of God, my friends. Your skin is 
darker than mine; but God judges men by their hearts, not by the color of their skins.’” Jacobs’s 
narrator notes that this “was strange doctrine from a southern pulpit. It was very offensive to 
slaveholders. They said he and his wife had made fools of their slaves, and that he preached like 
a fool to the negroes” (61). 
It is at this point that Jacobs’s depiction of doctrinal agency differs most clearly from 
Brown’s. In Clotel, when Georgiana Peck dies, female doctrinal agency seems to die with her. 
The plot shifts back to the tale of Clotel, who fails in her purpose to rescue her daughter and 
flings herself from Washington’s Long Bridge, only to be replaced in the narrative by the would-
be revolutionary George Green. Brown seems incapable of envisioning black women 
successfully wielding religious power; only white women and black men have that faculty. 
Jacobs, on the other hand, uses the tale of the kind white Episcopal priest and his wife as 
the backdrop for Linda Brent’s own accession of doctrinal agency. After bidding farewell to the 
priest and his wife, Linda agrees to teach a fellow slave, a Baptist, to read and write despite the 
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fact that it is “contrary to law” and that “slaves were whipped and imprisoned for teaching each 
other to read” (61). Long before she enters her own “loophole of retreat,” Linda selects “a quiet 
nook, where no intruder was likely to penetrate” and teaches “uncle Fred” to read through the 
New Testament in just a few months (61). After noting his rapid progress under her tutelage, 
Jacobs shifts from a didactic to an exhortatory mode, addressing readers directly in a textual 
sermon on the hypocrisy of proselytizing abroad while ignoring the spiritual welfare of slaves:  
Talk to American slaveholders as you talk to savages in Africa. Tell them it is 
wrong to traffic in men. Tell them it is sinful to sell their own children, and 
atrocious to violate their own daughters. Tell them that all men are brethren, and 
that man has no right to shut out the light of knowledge from his brother…. Are 
doctors of divinity blind, or are they hypocrites? (61-62) 
 
This sermon builds to a rousing climax that, like revivalists’ depictions of hell and damnation, is 
rife with bloody images and pointed accusations:  
What does he [the blind doctor of divinity] know of the half-starved wretches 
toiling from dawn till dark on the plantations? of mothers shrieking for their 
children, torn from their arms by slave traders? of young girls dragged down into 
moral filth? of pools of blood around the whipping post? of hounds trained to tear 
human flesh? of men screwed into cotton gins to die? The slaveholder showed 
him none of these things, and the slaves dared not tell of them if he had asked 
them. (62) 
 
Claiming first-hand knowledge of slavery’s horrors and the moral authority of one who has read 
the Bible and taught others to do so as well, Linda adopts the “sermonic mode” (to use Dawn 
Coleman’s term), stepping into the vacant narrative space left by the departure of the white 
Episcopal priest and his wife and becoming the novel’s primary homiletic voice.  
Having claimed this authority, Jacobs deftly returns to the level of plot, depicting how 
Linda Brent employs her spiritual assurance in her ongoing power struggle with Dr. Flint. When 
Flint renews his lecherous advances to her on the day after his confirmation in the Episcopal 
church, Linda rebuffs his suggestions with the rejoinder that “‘[i]f [she] could be allowed to live 
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like a Christian, [she] should be glad’” (63). Flint takes it upon himself to instruct Linda in the 
ways of Christian virtue: “‘You can do what I require; and if you are faithful to me, you will be 
as virtuous as my wife’” (63). When Linda replies that “‘the Bible [doesn’t] say so,’” Flint’s 
angry reaction reveals how unprecedented her accession of scriptural and pseudo-clerical 
authority is: “How dare you preach to me about your infernal Bible!” he exclaimed. “What right 
have you, who are my negro, to talk to me about what you would like, and what you wouldn’t 
like? I am your master, and you shall obey me” (63). By contradicting Flint’s definition of virtue 
with a Biblical one—Flint explicitly calls it “preaching”—Linda declares herself the servant of 
another master, one whose commands she is perfectly capable of reading and interpreting on her 
own.98    
While Brown located women’s doctrinal agency outside of the clergy but still within the 
church—Georgiana Peck is “a devoted member of her father’s church” but “not a sectarian” 
(156)—Jacobs places women’s religious independence outside of denominational structures. 
When Dr. Flint recommends that Linda join the church into which he has just been confirmed 
(presumably so he can control yet another of the spaces in which she spends her time), Linda’s 
response implicitly positions “liv[ing] like a Christian” as a task that, for the slave girl at least, 
can best be accomplished outside of the church, where she can practice her religion without 
fearing the mixed motives of male church leaders.  
Critics of Jacobs’s work have noted how Incidents plays with the sentimental literary 
tradition, simultaneously acknowledging and undermining the demand that “true women” 
maintain their sexual purity at all costs. Franny Nudelman notes that “[w]hile Jacobs must 	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 Ann Taves notes that, in addition to the strength offered Linda by her religion, her Christianity carries 
with it an enormous pressure to remain sexually pure—an expectation that the legal and social conditions 
of slavery rendered practically impossible. As Taves notes, “In the conflict between Jacobs and her 
master, Jacobs’s ideas about purity allowed her to fight, but they did not allow her to win” (67). 
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grapple with a cult of sexual purity that cannot account for, let alone tolerate, her experience, she 
is, at the same time, writing within an abolitionist tradition that relies on the revelation of the 
slave woman’s sexual degradation” (940). But Jacobs is also writing within a nineteenth-century 
Protestant tradition that increasingly embraced women’s religious agency as an effective medium 
for social change. By proclaiming her right to read and interpret the Bible’s commandments 
while refusing to declare loyalty to any particular preacher or denomination, Jacobs found a 
loophole of spiritual retreat based in her own religious authority. 
 
Conclusion: The White Christian Woman as Narrative Construct 
Much of the criticism that has been published on Clotel has bemoaned Brown’s adoption 
of the “tragic mulatta” trope inaugurated in the antislavery writings of Lydia Maria Child. Noting 
the various forms of imprisonment that Clotel endures over the course of the novel and her 
tendency to speak only in the clichéd and “idealized rhetoric of the private and true woman” 
(Berthold 25), critics of African-American literature have long registered discomfort with 
Brown’s choice to invoke “the politically conservative seduction plot, which features a weak, 
gullible woman, deceived and abandoned by a depraved seducer” (Greeson 292). Nancy Bentley 
reads Clotel as “a willing sacrificial victim” (507) and M. Giulia Fabi asserts that Clotel’s 
unhappy end “ultimately reinforce[s] the viability of the separation between blacks and whites 
that the mulatta’s existence had temporarily called into question” (xii). But as Teresa Zackodnik 
notes, the history of criticism on the “tragic mulatta” is at least as fraught as the critical 
genealogy of the sentimental and can benefit from a similar reappraisal.99 A closer look at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Zackodnik notes that early formulations (always written by white men) of “tragic mulatta” fiction 
characterized the genre as “clichéd, unrealistic, and unoriginal” and claimed that it ignored “serious 
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role of the mulatta in African-American fiction reveals that “[f]ar from being a ‘whitened’ ideal, 
the mulatta [is] a liminal figure who transgresses racial distinctions and racialized notions of 
womanhood…. The mulatta is a highly ambivalent figure who enables a double-voiced address 
and a black feminist use of parodic performance or ‘passing’” (Zackodnik xii).100 But even as 
recent critics have come to recognize Brown’s complex depiction of the mulatta figure, they 
have continued to overlook his similarly canny interrogations of the sainted white woman who 
appears throughout abolitionist fiction. 
“[D]ouble-voiced address,” parodic performance, and passing, the acts that Zackodnik 
rightly attributes to Brown’s mulatta figures, are precisely those that are not available to the 
white female heroines of black abolitionist fiction. While Brown’s educated Georgiana Peck and 
Jacobs’s kindhearted minister’s wife occupy positions of privilege in southern society that enable 
their antislavery acts, they are also flat figures meant to display certain abolitionist traits, and 
they fall away from the narratives as soon as their purpose is fulfilled. Georgiana Peck is an 
improvement on Stowe’s Little Eva (and her father Augustine St. Clare) in that she manages to 
free her slaves before her death, but once she has achieved this feat she quickly wastes away as 
the narrative returns to the more emotionally affecting history of Clotel and her daughter Mary. 
In Incidents Jacobs briefly describes the sanctified death of the Episcopal minister’s wife before 
refocusing narrative attention on Linda Brent’s increasing religious authority and her daring and 
clever machinations against her heartless master. Even Sarah Louisa Forten’s “Appeal to 
Women” spends the last of its three short verses symbolically burying the very white woman to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
issues” while perpetuating pleasing stereotypes—the same criticisms long leveled at white sentimental 
fiction (xv). 
 
100
 Zackodnik’s reconceptualization of the mulatta figure is based in part on a study of the public 
performances of William Wells Brown’s abolitionist colleague Ellen Crafts. Eva Allegra Raimon has also 
published a recent study that challenges readings of the tragic mulatta as emblematic of passive 
victimhood. 
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whom it appeals: the “roses and lilies” of her white cheeks “soon must wither in their kindred 
earth,” to be memorialized only by a “lustre, that shall live when thou art dead” (61).  
The sainted white woman in these black abolitionist fictions, then, is static, public, and 
marked for death. Whereas the mixed-race woman employs disguise, trickery, and concealment 
in an effort to effect her own and others’ emancipation, the abolitionist white woman is always 
on display, always in the public eye, and serves only one purpose in the narrative: to demonstrate 
true Christian duty by freeing her slaves. The saintly abolitionist white woman, Clotel reveals, is 
as much a necessary narrative fiction as the tragic mulatta.  
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CHAPTER 3: “Unsheathe the Sword of a Strong, Unbending Will”: 
Protestant Doctrine and Female Agency in the 1850s Sentimental Novel 
 
In her 1859 novel Beulah the Alabama author Augusta Jane Evans includes a long 
rumination on the persistence of human will:  
There is a mysterious yet resistless power given, which winds up and sets again in 
motion that marvelous bit of mechanism, the human will; that curiously intricate 
combination of wheels; that mainspring of action, which has baffled the ingenuity 
of philosophers, and remains yet undiscovered, behind the cloudy shrine of the 
unknown. (204-205) 
 
Beulah, like other sentimental novels published in the 1850s, evinces a protracted concern with 
the workings of the human will and its relationship to female religious agency. This chapter 
compares Evans’s Beulah with Susan Warner’s 1850 bestseller The Wide, Wide World to 
demonstrate how these two novels, so similar in their plots and in their invocation of the central 
concerns of sentimental fiction—the simultaneous celebration and sundering of family ties, the 
concern with how women’s self-determination is curtailed by legal, political, social, and 
biological factors—employ different theological models that result in widely divergent 
depictions of women’s religious agency. It demonstrates that the theological debate that took 
place between Warner’s The Wide, Wide World and Evans’s Beulah was both inseparable from a 
larger public discussion about human will and agency and also served as a vehicle for that 
discussion. While theologians and divines wrangled thorny doctrinal questions about human 
volition and moral responsibility on the pages of denominational and scholarly journals, the 
laboratory in which these theories were put to the test before the eyes of the public was the 
sentimental novel. The Wide, Wide World and Beulah imagine and depict the consequences of 
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predestinarian and free will theologies for the real lives of young girls and women, and in the 
pages of these popular novels Warner and Evans explored, by means of both content and form, 
the same problems that occupied ordained ministers on the pages of the Christian Advocate, the 
Princeton Review, and the hundreds of other sectarian journals that circulated in mid-nineteenth-
century America. What is more, these authors moved beyond the concerns of their clerical 
contemporaries by envisioning the practical consequences of theology for those who would 
attempt to live their lives in sincere devotion to particular theological principles. 
The Calvinist-Arminian debate that took place between The Wide, Wide World and 
Beulah was a crucial node in the larger discussions in mid-century Protestant U.S. culture about 
the role of religion in enabling or inhibiting women’s agency.101 Critics who have recovered and 
studied sentimental literature since the 1970s have recognized sentimental texts as “an important 
form of literary agency” that explores the consequences of unequal power relations for (most 
often) white middle-class women’s lives (Noble 6), but these critical accounts underplay or 
ignore altogether the crucial ways in which questions of doctrine animated and informed debates 
about women’s agency. While Ann Douglas’s The Feminization of American Culture (1977), for 
instance, characterized sentimental fiction as having little or no doctrinal content—indeed, of 
bringing about “The Loss of Theology”—Jane Tompkins’s Sensational Designs (1985) sought to 
rehabilitate the religious language of sentimental fiction without engaging very deeply with the 
particular doctrines held by sentimental writers, instead characterizing all sentimental fiction as 
vaguely “evangelical.” These works have continued to shape the critical discourse about 	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 While The Wide, Wide World has received significant critical attention since it was recovered by Baym 
and Douglas and then used by Tompkins to anchor her study of sentimental culture, Evans’s novels have 
received little critical attention, in part because Southern fiction, despite the nationwide popularity of 
novels like Beulah (and Evans’s later bestsellers Macaria and St. Elmo), is still read as “regional,” and in 
part because Evans’s proslavery, pro-Confederacy politics are often difficult for critics to abide. At the 
end of this chapter I offer a third theory as to why Evans’s work has been so neglected by critics. 
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sentimental literature in the decades since their original publication, and their religious 
assumptions, as I will show, have obscured the theological work performed by sentimental texts. 
This chapter argues that to understand how sentimental fiction enabled women’s agency 
in the nineteenth century critics must bring to these novels a more sophisticated theological 
toolset: one that recognizes women’s full and complete engagement with religion on every 
level—emotional, physical, and intellectual. Bringing questions of doctrine and theology to bear 
on sentimental fiction is essential, I argue, because doing so reveals that there is in fact no single 
model of “sentimental power,” but that different sentimental texts envision women’s agency in 
different ways, and that the models of religious agency they present have not always been 
comprehensible by twentieth- and twenty-first-century critics. Since the exact nature of 
“sentimental power” remains a primary concern for scholars who study sentimental texts,102 it is 
crucial that the doctrinal structures that helped nineteenth-century women writers to envision and 
embody in fiction their own ideas of agency become part of this ongoing critical discussion.  
This chapter, then, is not a rehearsal of or a rebuttal to critical arguments about whether 
the sentimental is “good” or “bad.” Rather, it argues that the critical discourse of sentimental 
power that engenders such arguments has obscured the multiple models of agency at work in 
sentimental texts by ignoring or oversimplifying the theological underpinnings of sentimental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 The nature of sentimental power has continued to occupy critics long after the original Douglas-
Tompkins “debate.” Dan McKanan’s Identifying the Image of God: Radical Christians and Nonviolent 
Power in the Antebellum United States (2002) concerns itself with the relationship between violence and 
sentimental power in the nineteenth-century United States, as do many of the essays in Shirley Samuels’s 
collection The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America 
(1992). Marianne Noble’s The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature (2000) argues that 
sentimental texts model a “complicitous use of power” that turns white women’s agency against 
themselves (11). Julie Ellison’s Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion (1999) traces 
the sentimental tradition to eighteenth-century English political discourse and argues that women’s 
sentimental writing thus represents an attempt to access male power through the language of liberal 
politics. This small sampling indicates how deeply concerned critical discourse on sentimentalism 
remains with the question of agency and power in sentimental texts. 
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fiction. The sentimental, as a wide-ranging literary and cultural mode, offers multiple models of 
female agency, each of them informed by the particular doctrinal positions that coexisted in the 
nineteenth-century United States. Reading Augusta Jane Evans’s Arminian sentimental novel 
Beulah alongside the Calvinist sentimental novel The Wide, Wide World illuminates how the 
nineteenth-century sentimental mode could accommodate and depict different models of female 
agency based on different theological premises. 
While this chapter investigates female religious agency as modeled in the sentimental 
novel, it is not concerned with demonstrating that the authors and protagonists of nineteenth-
century fiction displayed the same kind of agency, or to the same ends, that twenty-first-century 
Western women might seek to inhabit. The kinds of agency displayed in the sentimental novel 
have often seemed foreign or even unrecognizable to twentieth- and twenty-first-century critics 
who, adhering to the Western liberal model of agency that I discussed in the introduction to this 
dissertation, equate agency with individual acts of independence or even rebellion. When viewed 
through this lens the forms of agency engaged in by the heroines of sentimental novels—agency 
that can sometimes take the form of passivity or submission—will inevitably seem corrupt or 
damaged, making sentimental fiction easy to dismiss by critics seeking in the genre evidence of 
women’s (or of America’s) increasing self-determination.  
I begin this chapter by detailing the limitations of our current model of sentimental 
power, particularly the way in which this model denigrates nineteenth-century women’s 
intellectual commitments by classing all sentimental texts as similarly “evangelical.” I then 
outline the crucial theological points that underlie the Calvinist-Arminian debate about the 
problem of free will; this debate, I then show, animates the mid-century sentimental novel and 
informs the models of female agency offered in The Wide, Wide World and Beulah. I conclude 
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the chapter by arguing that an increased awareness of the role of particular religious doctrines in 
nineteenth-century sentimental literature—one that does not treat religious belief as 
“epiphenomenal” (to use Tracy Fessenden’s term) or measure its usefulness according to its 
compliance with what anthropologist Saba Mahmood calls “the progressive-secular 
imaginary”—offers a new understanding of the importance of sentimental literature in 
nineteenth-century American fiction.  
 
The Douglas-Tompkins “Debate” and the Problem of Evangelicalism 
Since the 1970s, when sentimental fiction, long left out of histories of nineteenth-century 
U.S. literature, was recovered and reintroduced in scholarly circles, critical treatments of this 
genre have been shaped by the terms of the Douglas-Tompkins “debate,” and particularly by its 
framing of sentimental literature as a form that propagates a feminized evangelical Protestantism. 
The problem with characterizing sentimental fiction as “evangelical” is that “evangelical” is a 
term that collapses a wide field of nineteenth-century Protestant beliefs under a single heading 
while simultaneously importing twentieth-century secular assumptions into a nineteenth-century 
religious context. As such it obscures the very real doctrinal distinctions between different 
Protestant sects—distinctions that have consequences for how individual authors envisioned 
possibilities for women’s religious agency. In this section I offer a brief history of 
“evangelicalism” in order to reveal how constructions of sentimental religious feeling grounded 
in this problematic term have obscured the multiple forms of religious agency at work in 
sentimental texts. 
In her field changing book Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 
1790-1860, Tompkins called for serious critical attention to the role of sentimental fiction in 
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nineteenth-century culture. Sensational Designs emphasizes the necessity of assuming a certain 
cultural mindset when approaching sentimental novels: 
The power of a sentimental novel to move its audience depends upon the 
audience’s being in possession of the conceptual categories that constitute 
character and event. That storehouse of assumptions includes attitudes 
toward the family and toward social institutions; a definition of power and 
its relation to individual human feeling; notions of political and social 
equality; and above all, a set of religious beliefs that organizes and 
sustains the rest. (126-27) 
 
Tompkins refers to this cultural mindset as “evangelical” and lays out the premises on which an 
evangelical worldview and, thus, all sentimental literature is putatively based: “a theory of power 
that stipulates that all true action is not material, but spiritual; that one obtains spiritual power 
through prayer; and that those who know how, in the privacy of their closets, to struggle for 
possession of their souls will one day possess the world through the power given to them by 
God” (Sensational 151). Tompkins’s model of sentimental power thus posits that sentimental 
power is by definition religious, and that the religion it exemplifies is “evangelical Christianity.”  
The problem with defining the sentimental novel as “evangelical” is that “evangelical” is 
a religious-historical term with connotations that differed considerably in the 1850s from those it 
had obtained by the 1980s, when Tompkins’s text was published. While in the mid-nineteenth 
century “evangelical” described a wide range of Protestant sects embracing distinct theological 
viewpoints, ecclesiastical structures, and political identities, by the late-twentieth century it had 
come to represent a small group of Christian adherents known primarily for a commitment to 
emotional revivalism and conservative political causes and a tendency to eschew the details of 
doctrine. By imposing a twentieth-century model of evangelical culture onto texts published in 
the 1850s, Douglas, Tompkins, and the critics who followed them flattened the theological 
distinctions between individual sentimental texts and imported these twentieth-century 
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connotations into their readings of sentimental culture.  
The term “evangelical” became a prominent feature of Western European religious 
identity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when it was adopted by those churches that 
identified themselves with the Protestant reformation (the Evangelical Lutheran Church, for 
instance).103 It maintained this relatively simple definition until the nineteenth century, when 
early religious historians including Robert Baird and Philip Schaff began using it to classify 
particular Christian sects as having either “right” or “wrong” theological ideas.104 For Baird and 
his mid-nineteenth-century contemporaries, including the authors of sentimental fiction, 
“evangelical” was both an insider label for those with the “right” religion and an umbrella term 
that grouped together denominations and sects, like the Quakers and Presbyterians, with widely 
divergent doctrines and practices. But the term underwent another series of semantic shifts in the 
twentieth century as Christian fundamentalist movements rose to prominence, particularly in the 
United States. Randall Balmer, one of the foremost chroniclers of twentieth-century Protestant 
culture, notes that many of the Protestant movements now most closely associated with 
“evangelicalism” did not exist in the nineteenth century, when sentimental authors ostensibly 
propagated “evangelical” culture; these movements, including Pentecostalism and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 These churches used the word “evangelical” to mark their dissent from the Catholic tradition and their 
embrace of the “good news” of salvation by grace rather than by the intercession of church, priest, or 
saints. “Evangelium” is the Greek for “good tidings.” 
 
104 Baird’s Religion in America, for instance, one of the earliest works to attempt to taxonomize the welter 
of sects and denominations coexisting in the early U.S., drew a line between “evangelical” sects—
Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, Moravians and Quakers—and 
“unevangelical” ones, under which were grouped “for convenience’ sake… all those sects that either 
renounce, or fail faithfully to exhibit, the fundamental and saving truths of the gospel” (269). Baird’s 
“unfaithful” sects included a motley assortment of religious and reformist societies—Unitarians, 
Universalists, Shakers, Mormons, Swedenborgians and Tunkers, Rappists, Deists, Atheists, Fourierists, 
Catholics and Jews—many of which would have considered themselves every bit as Protestant—as 
“faithful,” in Baird’s terms—as his preferred “evangelicals.”  
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charismatic movement, first arose in the twentieth century.105 Martin Marty has similarly 
observed the alterations in the term “evangelical” over the course of the last 100 years: whereas 
in the nineteenth century it applied to groups “in the Protestant mainstream… [i]n recent decades 
one conservative party in almost all the most notable denominations has taken the adjective 
‘evangelical’ to apply to itself” (vii). In the twentieth century, then, “evangelical” came to be 
associated with a Christian fringe and with political conservatism, connotations that have often 
been problematically enfolded into criticism founded on the Douglas-Tompkins model.   
The rise in religious revivalism that coincided with the urge to taxonomize nineteenth-
century religious culture led to another development in “evangelical” history that has had 
implications for the study of sentimental literature: the association of evangelicalism with 
excessive, emotional bodies. As R. Laurence Moore notes, Robert Baird and other nineteenth-
century Protestant historians favored settled, unemotional forms of Christianity, particularly 
those “that eschewed the revivalistic ‘excesses’ that had inflamed passions in many churches 
during the period of the Second Great Awakening” (5). To Baird’s chagrin, however, it was the 
revivalist churches, not the decorous ones, that were experiencing rapid growth, such that 
“evangelicalism” eventually came to be associated with the “excesses” and “inflamed passions” 
attributed to revivalist religion. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this 
trend continued, such that an “evangelical Christian” came to be defined by a non-evangelical 
public sphere as one who engages in particular—and particularly outré—forms of religious 
behavior rather than one who subscribes to a set of identifiable Protestant doctrines.106 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Grant Wacker’s work on early Pentecostalism and its influence on the twentieth-century evangelical 
movement is also germane. 
 
106
 By the 1970s and 1980s, when feminist critics were recovering and reappraising sentimental literature 
in light of its centrality to nineteenth-century culture, the term “evangelical” had become largely an 
outsider designation for a group of Protestant sects that subscribe to divergent doctrines but engage in 
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By the time Ann Douglas published The Feminization of American Culture in 1977 this 
association between evangelicalism and anti-intellectual excess had been solidified:  
Feminization defines non-evangelical sects as those that “appreciated distinction and tradition,” 
that “stood for a settled ministry, for intellectual elitism,” and that “if they supported revivals at 
all… wished to see them cautiously conducted in orderly fashion by ministers within their own 
congregations” (28). The evangelicals were everyone else—those who abjured tradition and 
intellectualism, embraced revivalist “excesses,” and wrote sentimental fiction. In both 
Feminization and Sensational Designs, these excessive evangelical bodies belong to women; in 
fact Douglas and Tompkins are in agreement about the power of women’s bodies. For Douglas, 
the writers of sentimental fiction were offensively embodied—the minister and the lady “spent 
much of their middle-class [child]hoods prostrate on chaise longues” reading trashy fiction in a 
“comfortable posture” against a “domestic backdrop”—and the effect of their writing on readers 
was soporific: their light poetry and domestic novels were “an occupation for the unemployed” 
or “narcissistic self-education for those excluded from the harsh school of practical competition” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
similar behaviors toward non-adherents. “Evangelical” has come to function primarily as a label that 
describes a particular person’s or denomination’s interaction with American culture (as in “most 
evangelicals vote Republican,” or “many evangelicals don’t drink alcohol”) but gives little information 
about the theological premises to which that person or denomination subscribes—premises that are most 
salient, not in interactions between the believer and the larger culture, but in interactions between 
believers. (Evangelicals who agree on the importance of baptizing church members, for instance, will 
argue vehemently amongst themselves about the theological validity of baptizing infants rather than 
adults.) The result is that, from an outsider perspective, evangelicalism can seem devoid of theological 
content—like a group of behaviors with no intellectual or doctrinal basis. 
Indeed, so confused are the prevailing definitions of the term “evangelical” that even Balmer, its 
foremost cultural chronicler, can define it only in the most circular of language, employing “the word 
evangelical as an umbrella term to refer broadly to conservative Protestants—including fundamentalists, 
evangelicals, pentecostals, and charismatics—who insist on some sort of spiritual rebirth as a criterion for 
entering the kingdom of heaven, who often impose exacting behavioral standards on the faithful, and 
whose beliefs, institutions, and folkways comprise the evangelical subculture in America” (xvi). Since 
there are plenty of non-evangelical situations that entail some kind of ritual of renewal as well as the 
imposition of new behavioral standards, the best way to judge whether someone is an “evangelical” is to 
see whether they belong to the “evangelical subculture.” 
	   141 
(10).107 For Tompkins, the bodily emanations depicted in and produced by sentimental literature 
were efficacious rather than mere effluvium: the sentimental’s fountains of tears “are the sign of 
redemption…; not words, but the emotions of the heart bespeak a state of grace, and these are 
known by the sound of a voice, the touch of a hand, but chiefly… by tears” (Sensational 131). In 
both of these formulations it is women’s bodies, not their minds, that have the power to impose 
an evangelical ethos on American culture and to alter it for better or for worse.108 
The religious-historical assumptions that undergirded the Douglas-Tompkins debate, 
then, were never up for debate at all: The Feminization of American Culture and Sensational 
Designs both posit that the religious ground of nineteenth-century sentimental fiction was 
Christian evangelicalism, that evangelical religiosity consists in emotional excess rather than 
doctrinal commitment, and that this embodied evangelicalism is the province of women. Both 
critics align this emotionally excessive and doctrinally vague “evangelicalism” with female 
writers while associating male writers with a theologically rigorous “Calvinist” tradition. In 
Feminization this alignment is explicit: the book positions sentimental authors as introducing 
“formerly denounced heresy” into a society once grounded in the Calvinist orthodoxy of 
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 Douglas’s insistence that nineteenth-century purveyors of sentimental literature be thought of 
primarily as consumers rather than as producers of culture requires considerable backbending. One 
example: “[Women] comprised the bulk of educated churchgoers and the vast majority of the dependable 
reading public; in ever greater numbers, they edited magazines and wrote books for other women like 
themselves. They were becoming the prime consumers of American culture” (8). Whereas going to 
church and reading could conceivably be defined as consumer activities, writing books and editing 
magazines should make women producers of culture rather than consumers. 
 
108 Douglas’s and Tompkins’s formulation of sentimental power was a necessary corrective to generations 
of literary critics and religious historians who had aligned the entire intellectual life of antebellum 
America with Calvinist theological discourse and then, because women could neither attend universities 
nor become ordained ministers, assumed that women’s influence on nineteenth-century intellectual 
culture was negligible. But Douglas’s and Tompkins’s response was not to look for signs of women 
writers’ engagement with theological questions, but to locate women’s cultural agency in their feeling 
bodies rather than in their thinking minds. 
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theologians like Jonathan Edwards (24).109 In Sensational Designs the distinction is made only 
implicitly: when discussing works by Herman Melville and Charles Brockden Brown Tompkins 
identifies them as “Calvinist.” When analyzing Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World (1850) 
and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852)—the texts she holds up as best 
exemplifying the workings of “sentimental power”—Tompkins identifies them as “evangelical” 
despite the fact that the women who wrote them were members of Calvinist sects. The 
implications are clear: in both The Feminization of American Culture and Sensational Designs, 
male authors have thinking, Calvinist minds while female authors have feeling, evangelical 
bodies.110 	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 In this respect Tompkins capitulates to both the “declensionist” and the “feminization” models of 
American religious history that form the basis for Douglas’s argument and that, as Ann Braude 
demonstrates, are based on a long-standing critical tendency to ignore the crucial role of women in 
American religious life (“Women’s History” 92-3). 
 
110 This alignment of men with Calvinism and women with evangelicalism is particularly puzzling in light 
of Tompkins’s invocation of a specifically Calvinist theological concept to describe the literary form of 
the sentimental novel. For Tompkins, sentimental novels perform their cultural work by telling and 
retelling “the culture’s favorite story about itself—the story of salvation through motherly love” (125), 
and she identifies this repeated matriarchal myth as a “typological narrative” that follows the outlines of 
the “American jeremiad” famously identified by Sacvan Bercovitch. 
 As Perry Miller, Bercovitch, and other scholars of the “New England mind” made clear, the rhetorical 
form of the jeremiad relies on a specifically Calvinist theological concept called typology. Bercovitch 
traces typology, or figuralism, from Augustine to Aquinas to Luther to Calvin, who “reinforced” it “with 
legal severity,” but credits New England Puritanism with extending scriptural typology from the “realm 
of the spirit,” where those earlier thinkers had firmly placed it, to the material and temporal ground of 
New England, where “redemptive merged with secular history” (Puritan Origins xii-xiii). Typology 
assumes a Calvinist understanding of cosmic time: that events (including but not limited to the 
predestination of human souls) have been determined before time began, that they correspond to certain 
patterns, and that those patterns can be recognized in the Old Testament, in the New Testament, and in the 
unfolding of human history. 
Though Tompkins begins by describing the role of typological narrative in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, she 
soon extends the model to the entire genre of sentimental literature, calling it a jeremiad that represents, 
not the interests of a Puritan theocracy, but those of middle-class women (140-41). As Jordan Stein and 
Justine Murison point out, “Bercovitch’s arguments… treat religion instrumentally, and they comply with 
a secularization thesis that imagines that rituals hold their power despite being denuded of their 
theological content” (11). In invoking the jeremiad, then, Sensational Designs reads sentimental fiction, 
not as reflecting the individual beliefs of those authors that produced it, but as simply borrowing and 
recapitulating an existing rhetorical model that, according to the critic who theorized it, can function only 
to produce religious and political consensus among its hearers/readers. Since this mid-century jeremiad is 
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In the years since the publication of Feminization and Sensational Designs critics 
frustrated with the parameters of the Douglas-Tompkins debate have sometimes attempted to 
step outside of them by adopting the terms “anti-sentimental” or “unsentimental” to describe 
nineteenth-century texts that display deep intellectual engagement or ironic distance. Nina Baym, 
for instance, has identified the sentimental as a cultural mode dedicated to “the cultivation of 
sympathetic relation and ready emotionality” and argued that a female character’s “pursuit of her 
own well-furnished mental space can be plausibly interpreted as a gesture of anti-sentimental 
disengagement” (“Women’s Novels” 337). Under this rubric Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide 
World, rather than being the “ur-text” of the nineteenth-century sentimental (Tompkins’s term), 
is actually anti-sentimental because the heroine strives to “perfor[m] herself to others as an 
intellectual, even a scholarly, being” (“Women’s Novels” 336). Similarly, Dawn Coleman’s 
work on Uncle Tom’s Cabin identifies the narrator of that novel as an “unsentimental woman 
preacher” whose rhetoric shifts over the course of the novel from a feminine voice that 
recommends sympathy with the slave to a masculine one that questions the tenets of Protestant 
theology and even the existence of God. Both of these articles are valiant attempts to rescue the 
sentimental novel from accusations that it is vapid or brainless, but both represent, in June 
Howard’s phrase, “a maneuver within received perspectives” (64). Baym, assuming the Douglas-
Tompkins position that the sentimental is empty-headed and anti-intellectual, posits that a text 
displaying clear intellectual and theological ambitions must be “anti-sentimental.” Coleman, 
accepting the Douglas-Tompkins association of the sentimental with the evangelical, 
demonstrates how a text can become “unsentimental” by ridding itself of its feminine qualities 
and taking up difficult theological problems: when the narrator of Uncle Tom’s Cabin employs a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
emptied of theological content, there is no need to examine the specific beliefs of those who embrace it. 
“Sectarian diversity,” Bercovitch assures his readers, “did not weaken the consensus” (American 
Jeremiad 165). 
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sympathetic female voice Coleman identifies it as “evangelical”; when it assumes an intellectual 
male voice this new voice is “Calvinist.” The Douglas-Tompkins model of the evangelical 
sentimental —a model that divorces emotion from intellect and assumes that sentimental fiction 
is concerned only with the former—has been so influential and far-reaching that critics who wish 
to engage seriously with the diverse intellectual and theological concerns of nineteenth-century 
sentimental fiction have thought themselves obliged to abandon the sentimental category 
completely and to insist that the sentimental writer who wants to think hard about religion must 
either “disconnect” herself emotionally from those around her (according to Baym) or pretend to 
be a man (according to Coleman). 
But it is not necessary to eschew the sentimental category in order to think critically 
about the intellectual investments of nineteenth-century women’s fiction; it is only necessary to 
abandon the troubled category of the “evangelical” and to address nineteenth-century sentimental 
authors according to the religious terms in which they described themselves—terms that were as 
much intellectual as emotional, as much theological as behavioral. Uncle Tom’s Cabin, The 
Wide, Wide World, and the rest of the sentimental texts that belonged to the “other American 
Renaissance” were not written by committees of evangelicals but by individual persons (often, 
but not always, women)111 with individual beliefs that are reflected in their narrative choices. An 
attention to the specificity of those beliefs, and to the theological debates within which 
sentimental novelists situated their texts, can deepen our understanding, both of the novels 	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 Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler’s edited collection Sentimental Men: Masculinity and the Politics 
of Affect in American Culture provides ample evidence that “canonical male writers, such as Brockden 
Brown, Cooper, Melville, Hawthorne, Whitman, Holmes, Norris, and Dreiser, all deploy[ed] the 
discourse of sentiment in their works” (7). But Dana Nelson notes that male sentimentalism carried 
different cultural valences in the mid-nineteenth century: “Quite differently from practices of female 
sentiment in the antebellum era, which worked to interiorize and individuate women, male sentimentalism 
worked to relieve men of the requirements of individuality that professionalism demanded. Instead, 
practices of male sentiment afforded men moments of (carefully guarded) communalization” (32). 
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themselves, and of the critical category of the sentimental to which they belonged.112 
Approaching sentimental fiction in theological terms reveals how the religious 
underpinnings of particular novels shaped those novels’ depictions of female agency—a subject 
related to, but different from, the question of female power. Critics of sentimental fiction, 
reading sentimental religiosity as a strategy for accruing cultural power, have often limited their 
discussions of sentimental fiction to analyses of whether such strategies were successful and, if 
so, whether the cultural consequences they brought about were desirable. They have thus exalted 
or denigrated sentimental fiction precisely in proportion to the ways in which they have read it as 
supporting or undermining a feminist politics of liberation; the religious language that permeates 
women’s sentimental novels is usually read either as a mark of subjection to religious authority 
or a repudiation of it. But women’s agency—particularly their religious agency—sometimes 
defies liberal ideals of self-determination, individual action, and rational choice that prioritize the 
accession of power over possibilities for individual and collective expression. To read the 
Protestant Christianity on display in the sentimental novel in utilitarian terms—as a means of 
acquiring cultural power—is to overlook the multiple forms of religious agency modeled in 
sentimental texts. 
Sentimental religious agency can best be understood outside the terms of the “secular-
progressive imaginary” defined by anthropologist Saba Mahmood. According to Mahmood, 
Western feminist models of human agency reflect philosophically liberal assumptions that place 	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 Michael Warner’s recent work on the evangelical public sphere seeks to move away from the doctrinal 
understandings of evangelicalism that have long dominated religious studies approaches to the 
phenomenon and toward an understanding of the “discourse culture” of evangelicalism (“Printing and 
Preaching”). While such an approach is useful for refining historical understandings of the phenomenon 
of evangelicalism, it can be counterproductive when applied to nineteenth-century women writers. Since 
critics of the sentimental novel—even those favorably disposed toward the genre—have assumed that the 
form carries little or no doctrinal content, applying an “evangelical” label that disregards theological 
difference serves to reinforce this (mis)categorization. 
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individual autonomy at the center of discussions about human liberty and free will. These liberal 
philosophies “link the notion of self-fulfillment with individual autonomy [so that] the process of 
realizing oneself comes to signify the ability to realize the desires of one’s ‘true will’” 
(“Agency” 184). Equating agency with self-will, independence, and the freedom from seemingly 
arbitrary structures of temporal or celestial authority, secular-liberal and progressive feminism 
“tend[s] to translate religious truth as force, a play of power that can be traced back to the 
machinations of economic and geopolitical interests.” Influenced by such ideas, liberal 
feminists—even those who have displayed a sensitivity to the role of religion in women’s lives—
have found it nearly impossible to imagine forms of female agency, like those sometimes 
exemplified in the sentimental novel, that operate by inhabiting norms of religious obedience and 
piety rather than by subverting them (Mahmood, Politics xi). 
Tracing a particular strain of poststructuralist thought that productively questions these 
rationalist assumptions about the nature of individual will, Mahmood pushes against “the 
overwhelming tendency within poststructuralist feminist scholarship to conceptualize agency in 
terms of subversion or resignification of social norms” (“Agency” 186). Noting that “the ability 
to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific (both in terms 
of what constitutes ‘change’ and the means by which it is effected),” Mahmood insists on the 
“parochialization” of understandings of female agency, particularly in examinations of women’s 
agency within religious communities: 
To analyze the participation of women in religious movements... I want to suggest 
we think of agency not as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination but 
as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of subordination enable 
and create…. As I will argue, if we want to parochialize the normative liberatory 
subject of feminist theory, then we must detach the concept of agency from the 
trope of resistance so as to be able to explore other structures of desire, political 
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imaginaries, social authority, and personhood. (“Agency” 179-180)113 
 
Mahmood’s work is germane to discussions of nineteenth-century sentimental fiction, not 
because it explains (or explains away) the peculiarities of pious women,114 but because it 
provides both a philosophical justification and an intellectual model for the serious study of 
women’s religious ideas—one that does not try to squeeze women’s experiences into ill-fitting 	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 Mahmood’s work particularizes the religious experience of Muslim women in increasingly secularized 
but still majority-Muslim communities through a study of “mosque movements” that encourage women to 
study the Quran and to practice traditional Muslim virtues in their daily lives. Particularly revealing is 
Mahmood’s discussion of al-haya, or modesty, and its relationship to the wearing of the veil or hijab. 
Whereas Western commentators have been inclined to read the hijab according to an individualist binary 
that assigns to it the meaning of either oppression (i.e., men force women to wear the veil) or self-
determination (i.e., women choose to wear the veil as an expression of their identity), the women that 
Mahmood observes approach the veil and the accompanying virtue of modesty, not as an ontological sign 
signifying whether they are “oppressed” or “liberated” but as a part of their process of becoming. What is 
more, they learn to exert agency within and through the religious and social norms that mark modesty as a 
virtue: a woman who is habitually outspoken can learn, not to stop speaking, but “to be outspoken in a 
way that [is] in keeping with Islamic standards of reserve, restraint and modesty required of pious Muslim 
women” (“Agency” 194). For these pious women, the act of becoming modest is both facilitated and 
signified by the wearing of the veil—wearing the veil becomes a form of agency that, rather than being “a 
synonym for resistance to social norms,” becomes instead “a modality of action” contingent on the 
particular “structures of desire, political imaginaries, social authority, and personhood” within which 
these women understand themselves (“Agency” 195). 
The “structure of desire” that Mahmood identifies in her subjects has much in common with the 
“mechanical model” of human emotion that Robyn Warhol outlines in her article “‘As You Stand, So 
You Feel and Are’: The Crying Body and the Nineteenth-Century Text.” According to Warhol, twentieth- 
and twenty-first-century notions of identity are based on a “reservoir model” of emotional existence 
according to which emotions felt by the individual are expressed through the body in an act of catharsis 
that drains the “reservoir.” Critics of sentimental literature implicitly invoke this model of identity and 
emotion when they assume that the reactions evoked by sentimental literature are expended through tears 
instead of through social engagement. Warhol draws on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century drama theory 
to demonstrate that this “reservoir model” is anachronistic, and that nineteenth-century audiences were 
just as likely to employ a “mechanical model” of emotional life according to which the display of an 
emotion helped to generate that emotion and, in many cases, the forms of political action that followed. 
Like Mahmood, Warhol notes how anachronistic models of autonomy and mind-body relations make it 
difficult to recognize various models of female agency. For both Mahmood’s twentieth-century Egyptian 
Muslim women and Warhol’s nineteenth-century Protestant women, “it is the sequence of practices and 
actions one is engaged in that determines one’s desires and emotions. In other words, action does not 
issue forth from natural feelings but creates them” (Mahmood, “Agency” 195). 
 
114
 And I certainly do not mean to suggest that we read nineteenth-century American women writers’ 
religious commitments as somehow indistinguishable from those of twentieth-century Egyptian Muslim 
women. To attempt to read these women as somehow “the same” because of their mutual interest in 
personal piety and spiritual growth would be to fly in the face of the very particularization that Mahmood 
advocates. 
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conceptual boxes (like “evangelical”) or plot them on a continuum from “oppressed” to 
“liberated” but instead engages them on their own terms. As with the women that Mahmood 
studies, an attention to the processes of becoming that nineteenth-century women authors depict 
in their novels enables critics to recognize the complex forms of agency at work in sentimental 
fiction—forms that often have little to do with acquiring and wielding temporal power.  
 
Susan Warner, Augusta Jane Evans, and the Calvinist-Arminian Divide 
The most salient theological question at issue in Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World 
and Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah is the problem of human will and its relationship to divine 
will. As nodes in an ongoing intra-Protestant debate between Calvinist and Arminian believers, 
The Wide, Wide World and Beulah interrogate the consequences of predestinarian and free will 
theologies for women in particular, offering divergent models of female agency based in 
distinctive theological worldviews. The Wide, Wide World embraces a predestinarian model of 
human will in which salvation is predetermined by God and human agency consists in 
submission and reconciliation to divine ordinances. Beulah, by contrast, exemplifies an Arminian 
worldview in which individuals determine their own salvation by exercising freedom of choice. 
In order to recognize the different models of agency at work in these seemingly similar texts, it is 
necessary to understand the theological questions that drive their depictions of sentimental 
agency. 
The plot outlines of The Wide, Wide World and Beulah are roughly similar: both belong 
to that class of novels identified by Nina Baym as “woman’s fiction” that tells “the story of a 
young girl who is deprived of the supports she had rightly or wrongly depended on to sustain her 
throughout life and [who] is faced with the necessity of winning her own way in the world” 
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(Woman’s Fiction 11).115 The heroines are separated from their families, thrown into lives of 
hardship and toil from which they are rescued by kind but demanding benefactors, separated 
from those benefactors, and endure challenges to their faith before being reunited with their 
benefactors in marriage. Both Beulah and The Wide, Wide World are sentimental: both concern 
themselves with those “moment[s] when the discursive processes that construct emotion become 
visible” (Howard 76) and both offer models of spiritual and temporal agency based on a 
specifically feminine investment in Protestant Christianity.116 But the models of female agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World is well known to critics of nineteenth-century sentimental 
fiction since it is the text that, along with Uncle Tom’s Cabin, forms the basis for Jane Tompkins’s 
theorization of sentimental power. It is the story of Ellen Montgomery, a girl of about 10 years old who is 
separated from her ailing, compassionate mother and sent to live with her father’s cold and unloving sister 
in upstate New York. While suffering under her aunt’s imperious rule Ellen is befriended by the pious 
Alice and John Humphreys, who eventually take her to live with them and who educate her until Alice 
dies of consumption. When Ellen’s father dies at sea while returning to claim her Ellen must leave the 
Humphreys and join her mother’s relatives in Scotland, the Lindsays, who object to her religiosity but 
love her jealously and tyrannically. Through acts of prayer and Christian submission Ellen manages to 
maintain her faith while also obeying the Lindsays’ wishes until John Humphreys, now a minister, comes 
to Scotland to rescue and marry her. (The original edition of The Wide, Wide World only hinted at John 
and Ellen’s eventual marriage, but in her 1987 Feminist Press edition of the novel Jane Tompkins restored 
Warner’s missing final chapter, drafted but never previously published, that depicts John and Ellen 
returning to America as a married couple.) 
 
Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah is less well known than The Wide, Wide World. It begins with the 
eponymous heroine’s residence in an orphan asylum with her sister Lilly. When Lilly is adopted by a 
wealthy family that does not want Beulah, Beulah takes a job as a nurse. A few weeks later Lilly dies of 
scarlet fever and Beulah, fainting over her coffin, is taken in by Lilly’s doctor, Guy Hartwell. They form 
an arrangement whereby Hartwell will provide Beulah’s lodging and education until she is old enough to 
work as a teacher, at which time she will repay him for his expense. Beulah graduates at the top of her 
class and secures a teaching position, but when Hartwell asks her to give up her “foolish” plans and let 
him adopt her she refuses and they fall out, though she continues borrowing books of philosophy and 
psychology from his library while residing in a boarding-house with her friend and fellow teacher Clara. 
As she builds a career for herself as a teacher and, later, a writer, Beulah experiences a crisis of faith 
brought on largely by her voracious and promiscuous reading; when she appeals to the religiously 
skeptical Hartwell for help he recommends that she stop thinking and marry him instead. When Clara, 
realizing that her own love for Hartwell will never be requited, takes a position as governess on a 
plantation, Beulah rents a house with another friend and rebuffs Hartwell’s offers of marriage until after 
she has reclaimed her Christian faith, at which point she agrees to marry him and sets herself the task of 
quieting his skepticism and converting him to Christianity. 
 
116
 I am drawing on June Howard’s helpful summation of what critics mean when they discuss “the 
sentimental.” It bears more extensive quotation: 
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that they construct are different in their theological premises—one is Calvinist and one is 
Arminian—and thus in their fictional manifestations. While both novels seek to “educate their 
readers in Christian perfection and to move the nation as a whole closer to the city of God” 
(Tompkins, Sensational 149), their recommendations for how to reach that city are radically 
different.117  
Calvinism and Arminianism are theological systems that arose out of the Protestant 
Reformation, each named for the sixteenth-century European intellectual (John Calvin of Geneva 
and Jacobus Arminius—the Latinized name of Jakob Hermanszoon—of Leiden) most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
We can organize answers to the question “what is sentimentality?” like this. Most broadly—when 
we call an artifact or gesture sentimental, we are pointing to its use of some established 
convention to evoke emotion; we mark a moment when the discursive processes that construct 
emotion become visible. Most commonly—we are recognizing that a trope from the immense 
repertory of sympathy and domesticity has been deployed; we recognize the presence of at least 
some fragmentary element of an intellectual and literary tradition. Most narrowly—we are 
asserting that literary works belong to a genre in which those conventions and tropes are central. 
But that does not undermine the importance of the recognition that sentimental works consistently 
engage us in the intricate impasse of the public and private, proclaiming their separation and at 
the same time demonstrating their inseparability. As emotion, embodied thought that animates 
cognition with the recognition of the self’s engagement; as sympathy, firmly based in the 
observer’s body and imaginatively linking it to another’s; as domestic culture, in the peculiar 
intimacy of the print commodity; sentimentality at the same time locates us in our embodied and 
particular selves and takes us out of them. (Howard 76-77) 
117
 In asserting that The Wide, Wide World is a Calvinist sentimental novel I am not simply affirming 
Tompkins’s figuration of the sentimental. For Tompkins, the typological structure of The Wide, Wide 
World is both an unconscious ideological remnant of a declining Puritan tradition and the marker of a 
generic “evangelicalism.” By this definition, all sentimental literature must function in the same way, 
regardless of its author’s beliefs or intentions; any specific theological content must be incidental and will 
have little bearing either on the predetermined form of the novel or on its effects for the reader. By 
contrast, I am asserting that The Wide, Wide World is intentionally, theologically, and particularly 
Calvinist: that Warner, rather than mindlessly adopting an existing ideological form, intentionally 
embraced Calvinist theological principles and used them to structure her novel in ways that would 
illustrate what she perceived as their universal truth. Since the two texts that Tompkins relies on most 
heavily to theorize the sentimental—Warner’s The Wide, Wide World and Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin—
were written, respectively, by a devout Presbyterian and the daughter of one of nineteenth-century 
America’s most famous and outspoken Presbyterian divines, it is hardly surprising that the model of 
religious power that emerges should be a specifically Calvinist one: Presbyterianism is the denomination 
that grew out of Scottish Calvinist religious thought. 
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responsible for its articulation.118 Both Calvinism and Arminianism are “evangelical” in the 
original sense of the word—they insist on God’s free grace as the true means of human 
salvation—and they share some basic theological premises.119 But they diverge most clearly in 
their understandings of God’s grace and its relationship to human will. The Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination posits that God has chosen, or predestined, particular human souls to salvation or 
damnation. Those he has saved are the “elect,” and their election is unconditional, irresistible, 
and irrevocable: they cannot choose to be saved, they cannot reject salvation, and they cannot 
lose their salvation through any fault of their own.120 Arminian theology, by contrast, rejects the 
doctrines of predestination and unconditional election, positing instead that God gives individual 
persons the freedom to choose salvation or damnation. The difference between predestination 
and “free grace” (the doctrine claimed by Arminians, who insist that God’s grace is offered to all 
humans and not just to the elect) has direct bearing on the question of human will: if, as 
Calvinists posit, God’s grace is extended only to the elect and only for reasons unknown and 
mysterious to men, and if human beings can exert no influence whatsoever over their own 
salvation, then the question of human will and human agency becomes fraught with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118
 The quickest way to learn the distinctions between Calvinism and Arminianism is to go to John 
Wesley, the founder of Methodism, the sect most responsible for the spread of Arminian ideas. Wesley’s 
1798 pamphlet The Question, What is an Arminian? Answered. By a Lover of Free Grace is clear and to 
the point (if polemical). 
 
119
 Both Calvinism and Arminianism accept the doctrine of total depravity: that human nature is 
thoroughly and inherently sinful, while the divine nature is pure and sinless. Both also accept the doctrine 
of the atonement: that Christ’s death and resurrection were offered in expiation of human sin, that this gift 
of expiation is given through God’s free grace (and not because mankind had somehow earned or 
deserved Christ’s sacrifice), and that it is this atoning gift that enables God to forgive mankind’s inherent 
sinfulness and to save some men and women from their deserved damnation. (As I noted in my chapter on 
Catharine Maria Sedgwick, debates about the mechanism and efficacy of the atonement preoccupied 
liberal and orthodox theologians of the early nineteenth century and played a major role in Sedgwick’s 
own evolving theological views.) 
 
120 God displays his gracious nature by saving these elect from damnation when all humankind deserve to 
be damned; thus only those who are among the elect are the recipients of grace, and only these benefit 
from Christ’s sacrifice—a doctrine known as “limited atonement.” 
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difficulties.121 
In the early nineteenth century most Calvinist commentary on the subject of 
predestination and free will was grounded in the theology of Jonathan Edwards and his 
intellectual descendants, and particularly on Edwards’s 1754 treatise, Freedom of the Will.122 
Edwards’s lucid treatment of predestinarian theology depicts an ordered universe in which events 
are predetermined by God in a long sequence of cause and effect stretching backward to the 
moment of creation. Edwards insisted that human beings have free will because they are “at 
liberty to act from their own inclinations. What they cannot control, and what does not enter into 
the equation of their freedom, is how their inclination got to be the way it is and why they 
apprehend as they do. That was set at creation” (Gura 193-194, emphasis in original). Humans 
are at liberty to act according to their wills, but at the same time, as the “moral cause” of human 
existence and human history, God determines what all of their choices will be. Under this 
system, the task of the Calvinist believer is one of reconciliation and submission: since God’s 
will is fixed and unchangeable, attempting to defy it can cause only frustration and self-harm.  
As recent scholars of Edwards’s legacy have detailed, it was not only Edwards’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 As the religious historian Sydney Ahlstrom has noted, the revivalist movements that began in the late-
eighteenth century and extended well into the twentieth relied implicitly on a doctrine of free grace—on 
man’s ability to “choose” salvation for himself—and eventually contributed to the downfall of 
predestinarian theology. By the end of the nineteenth century, Ahlstrom contends, even the strictest and 
most theologically conservative denominations had adopted doctrinal principles and membership 
practices that were de facto Arminian (Ahlstrom 844-45). But debates over predestination and free grace 
were alive and well in the 1850s as the aftershocks of the Second Great Awakening continued to spread 
through the antebellum public sphere and theologians and ordinary believers alike wrestled with the 
problem of human will. 
Strict Calvinist theology has experienced something of a resurgence lately among conservative 
theologians (including William Lane Craig) and ministers (including Mark Driscoll). But even amidst this 
revival of interest one is unlikely to find many Protestant believers who will subscribe wholeheartedly to 
the doctrine of unconditional election. 
 
122
 The full title: A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of 
Will, Which Is Supposed to Be Essential to Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, 
Praise and Blame. 
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theological achievements that influenced nineteenth-century culture, but his emphasis on the 
intersection of doctrine and emotion: his insistence that the foundations of religious experience 
rested as much on the personal experience of religious affections as on the right apprehension of 
theological concepts. A recent biography of Edwards’s intellectual inheritor Nathaniel Taylor 
notes that Edwardsean theology “flourished during the first four decades of the nineteenth 
century, forming America’s first indigenous theological movement” (Sweeney 142). This 
Protestant theological movement based its religious and social ambitions on Edwards’s doctrine 
of religious affections: his Life of David Brainerd and selections from his “Personal Narrative” 
were excerpted and circulated by the American Tract Society in the early antebellum period and 
helped to form the pillars of sentimental Protestantism. These works “indelibly marked 
antebellum culture” by virtue of their emphasis on “the necessity for an individual experience of 
conversion, emotion as a central component to this experience and thus to the religious life, and 
disinterested benevolence as the sign of true spirituality” (Gura 235). It was Edwards’s persistent 
theological influence, then, that gave rise to the powerful combination of doctrine and emotion 
that marked antebellum sentimental culture.  
But while Edwards’s influence undergirded sentimentalism’s insistence that true religion 
must involve emotion as well as intellect, there remained considerable theological differences 
among both his clerical and his literary inheritors. Sectarian distinctions, particularly those 
between Calvinist and Arminian denominations, remained central to nineteenth-century religious 
discourse and to religiously inflected literary genres including woman’s fiction. Arminian 
theology apprehends the relationship between human and divine will in ways distinctly different 
from the Edwardsean Calvinist model, and these differences have consequences for the models 
of agency offered in sentimental texts. 
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In his treatise on the will Edwards had rebutted the arguments of an anonymous and 
influential book, published in 1732 in London, called An Essay on the Freedom of Will in God 
and in Creatures, that laid out in some detail the basis of an Arminian view of human will.123 In 
the unknown author’s formulation, the understanding and the will work together (or against one 
another) to choose or refuse salvation. Any interference from God in determining human will—
as Calvinist theology posited—would nullify the very concept of free will and make human 
existence meaningless: free will implies “a Power to chuse or to refuse, to chuse one thing or the 
contrary among several things which are proposed, without any inward or outward restraint, 
force or constraining byass or influence...” (8-9). Man, fallen and faulty by nature, must navigate 
a minefield of choice on the way to salvation or damnation:  
When the Christian Revelation is proposed to Man as a rational Creature to 
consider the Proofs and Evidences brought to confirm it… it is the Will which 
must employ and determine the Mind to dwell upon these Enquiries diligently and 
faithfully, in proportion to the Merits of the Cause.... ‘[T]is the Will of Man which 
hath the chief hand in Infidelity: It is the Will that indulges Prejudices against the 
Gospel…; it indulges an Aversion to it without reason, and thereby becomes 
culpable, and is justly punishable. He that believeth not, shall be damned. (58-60, 
emphasis in original)  
 
The author of the Essay insisted that human will, so far from being predetermined by God, was 
self-determining and could choose arbitrarily, even perversely, simply for the pleasure of willing. 
John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, writing in 1798, noted how human will might actually 
be exercised in contradiction of divine will: “The Arminians hold, that, altho’ there may be some 
moments wherein the Grace of God acts irresistibly, yet in general, any man may resist, and that 
to his eternal ruin, the Grace whereby it was the Will of God, he should have been eternally 
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 This book was widely attributed to Isaac Watts, a respected Puritan minister, hymnodist and 
theologian. Edwards’s preface to his Careful and Strict Enquiry expressed disbelief at this attribution, 
since he had trouble ascribing the Arminian doctrines outlined in the Essay to such an eminent Calvinist 
divine. 
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saved (6).124 So far from being predetermined by God’s will, human will, in the Arminian 
formulation, is so independent that it can actually defy the desires of an all-powerful God. 
These debates, far from being merely academic or the sole province of eighteenth-century 
thinkers, were the subject of vociferous discussion in the periodical literature of the nineteenth-
century U.S. Throughout the 1850s, as the genre of woman’s fiction was reaching the apex of its 
popularity, the theological organs of the various Calvinist and Arminian denominations engaged 
in ongoing and heated exchanges about the validity of predestinarian and free will doctrines—
exchanges that informed the doctrinal ideas put forth in sentimental fiction.125 Debates about 
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 The sticking point in many debates about predestination and free will was the question of whether the 
will was or could ever be self-determining. Edwards, for his part, found the idea of a self-determining will 
manifestly absurd, for “if the Will determines its own free Acts, then every free Act of Choice is 
determined by a preceding Act of Choice, chusing that Act…. Which brings us directly to a 
Contradiction: for it supposes an Act of the Will preceeding the first Act in the whole train, directing and 
determining the rest; or a free Act of the Will, before the first free Act of the Will” (33). For Arminians 
this objection was easily surmounted: the act that made the Will self-determining was God’s choice to 
grant free will to mankind. Calvinist and Arminian doctrine, then, place the sovereign power of choice at 
opposing ends of the chain of being linking man and God. In the Calvinist formulation God’s will is all-
powerful and all-determining, with God’s choice of whom to damn and whom to save determining all 
later human events and choices. Arminian doctrine places the power of choice firmly in human hands 
(though placed there by God): God, acting according to God’s perfect nature, always wills what is right, 
but in man the schism between the will and the understanding makes it possible to choose what is wrong, 
sometimes simply for the sake of choosing it. 
 
125 These debates were not always conducted calmly or in a spirit of generosity. To offer some 
representative examples: in January of 1856, the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, an eminent 
Presbyterian journal edited by the Reverend Charles Hodge, professor at Princeton Theological Seminary 
and one of the era’s most respected and conservative Calvinist divines, published a scathing article on the 
errors of Arminian theology based on a reading of recent publications of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 
“the palladium of Arminianism in this country” (39). Claiming that it was “not our desire to wound the 
feelings of our Arminian brethren” (38), the article nevertheless accused Arminians of impugning God’s 
justice and mocking the doctrine of grace. In April of that same year the Methodist Quarterly Review 
published a reply insisting that “no man, with even a tolerable knowledge of the history of theology, 
could have honestly written” such a spurious attack on Arminianism, and laying out proofs to 
demonstrate that only Arminian theology could claim to offer a true representation of God’s grace.125 
Similarly, in September of 1850 the Puritan Recorder, commenting on recent changes to the structure of 
authority in the English Methodist church, suggested that if “the Methodist reformers in England hope to 
do more than correct a few of the grosser abuses of their system, they must begin by reforming their 
creed; they must introduce the doctrines of grace” (142). A month later a commentator in the Zion’s 
Herald and Wesleyan Journal replied that, though the Puritan Record article had been short, a “greater 
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human will and its consequences took place not only on the pages of theological journals, but in 
the chapters of sentimental novels including Warner’s The Wide, Wide World and Evans’s 
Beulah. Warner depicts a heroine whose primary struggle is not toward self-determination or 
independence but toward the submissive acceptance of God’s will. Evans, by contrast, offers a 
heroine who considers it her God-given right to strike out on her own, to throw off patriarchal 
domination, and to seek for spiritual truth. While each text depicts an adolescent woman seeking 
the correct balance between intellect and emotion and between following her own will and 
fulfilling divine will, the paths to agency that the novels present are wholly distinct: while Ellen 
Montgomery subordinates her will to God’s will by submitting to godly mentors, Beulah Benton 
asserts her will as a means to independence and, eventually, to salvation. 
 
“Not my will, but thine be done”: Calvinist Agency in The Wide, Wide World 
Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World is a Calvinist-inflected sentimental novel that 
depicts at length the proper relationship between human will and divine will. In The Wide Wide 
worldview, the godly woman must submit herself to the guidance of Christian friends who will 
help her to discover and enact God’s will for her life. Since God’s will, in the Calvinist universe 
of Warner’s novel, is fixed and unchangeable, it is the task of the Christian believer to conform 
her will to the will of God and to submit to His decrees, and it is through such acts that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mass of false propositions and dogmatic assumptions, could not well be crowded into so small a 
compass” (1). 
When the Presbyterian minister William B. Sprague warned his daughter, in an 1831 series of letters 
later published as a conduct manual, to avoid “the din and clashing of religious combatants,” it was this 
kind of debate to which he alluded (142). 
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believer accesses agency.126 
Learning how to properly access agency in light of God’s decrees is a lifelong task, and it 
is Ellen Montgomery’s process of conforming her will to God’s will that The Wide, Wide World 
depicts. When Ellen’s mother breaks the news that she and her daughter will soon be parted, she 
assures Ellen that “God sends no trouble upon his children but in love; and though we cannot see 
how, he will no doubt make all this work for our good” (12). Mrs. Montgomery’s assertion that 
there is “no doubt” about the efficacy of divinely ordained suffering and its salutary effects 
reflects her belief that Ellen is among the elect and therefore cannot come to eternal grief; it is 
God’s will that Ellen should be saved, and Ellen must arrange her actions and emotions in 
accordance with that eternal fate. Everyone who meets Ellen is convinced at once of her election; 
she exists in a Calvinist universe of foregone conclusions. When she meets a kind man on the 
deck of the boat on which she is traveling to her aunt’s house, his advice presents in gentle, 
child-friendly terms the essentially deterministic doctrine of election: “‘You can do nothing 
without help, but you are sure the help will come; and from this good day you will seek to know 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Susan Warner, daughter of a once wealthy and later bankrupt New York lawyer and businessman, 
began her writing career in 1848 as a way of bolstering her father’s meagre income. Henry Whiting 
Warner had bought a pew at the fashionable Mercer Street Presbyterian Church in New York City in 
1836, where his daughters frequently attended with him, but it wasn’t until after their father’s financial 
downfall (and, Susan’s sister Anna reported, a particularly brutal snub from a former acquaintance) that 
Susan and her younger sister decided to join as well. The decision was not solely an emotional one. Susan 
was inclined toward the doctrinal and intellectual aspects of her new faith: while Anna was relieved that 
the ceremony by which they were accepted into the church required them to be “put through no strict 
formula” in describing their conversion experience, Susan remarked afterwards “that she could not see 
how we were admitted, having so little to say” (A. Warner 202). 
While the Warners’ biographer Edward Halsey Foster labels the “New School” Presbyterianism of 
the Mercer Street Church “anti-intellectual” (Susan 30), the split between Old School and New School 
Presbyterianism in the early- to mid-nineteenth century was as much about questions of ecclesiastical 
polity as about revivalism and doctrine. Neither side abandoned basic Calvinist principles, and both saw 
themselves as guardians of an American intellectual inheritance: “The degree to which Congregationalists 
and Presbyterians considered themselves the chosen means for bringing learning, culture, and religious 
sophistication… is difficult to exaggerate” (Ahlstrom 464, n. 4). 
Biographical information on Warner can be found in the biography her sister Anna published after 
Susan’s death, in Edward Halsey Foster’s Susan and Anna Warner, and in Jane Tompkins’s afterword to 
the Feminist Press edition of The Wide, Wide World.	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and to do the will of God, trusting in his dear Son to perfect that which concerneth you’” (74). 
The stranger’s admonition leaves no doubt about whose will is guiding Ellen’s fate: “you can do 
nothing,” “you are sure,” “you will seek,” he insists. The “will of God” has determined Ellen’s 
path, and her agency consists in following the road laid out before her.127 
Cosmologically, as an elected member of God’s chosen people, predestined to salvation, 
Ellen can have no independent will of her own. Temporally, as the female child of absent 
parents, Ellen has little choice in her bodily fate: she must submit to the wills of fathers, aunts, 
and uncles. Ellen’s major dilemma is that the latter duty must always be subordinated to the 
former: she must submit to the wills of those adults who have charge of her, but only when their 
wills do not contradict the will of God. This bifurcated calling—this lifelong requirement, not to 
conflate the will of God with the will of men but to distinguish between them—is, far more than 
the Bible and writing desk she buys, the matrilineal legacy that Mrs. Montgomery bequeaths to 
Ellen. 
Throughout The Wide, Wide World Ellen’s will is represented entirely in the negative, 
and the discipline of resignation to divine will is modeled by Ellen’s mother, then by Alice and 
John Humphreys and Mrs. Vawse, and is finally internalized by Ellen herself. Ellen’s mother, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Anna’s biography of Susan records her sister’s lifelong struggle with “self-will,” an ongoing attempt to 
align herself with Calvinist doctrine by accepting the will of God as fixed and perfect while suppressing 
her own desires. In a letter that Anna quotes at length, Susan excoriates herself thus:  
Not long ago my self-will took fast hold of a matter with which it had, lawfully, no manner of 
concern; inasmuch as it was no more in my power to control it than it was to make one hair white 
or black. What had self-will to do? But you know mine: it took hold of this matter with so firm a 
clasp that it has needed a long time to unloose it…. You know well enough what my self-will is, 
to be well convinced that it needs checking. (quoted in A. Warner 249-250) 
Susan Warner showed no shortage of what one might call will power: she had uncomplainingly accepted 
her father’s financial ruin and set herself the task of financially supporting the family, famously rising at 4 
a.m. to write by candlelight before turning to the domestic duties of keeping her father’s house. Warner 
understood such will, however—the will to support others through hard work and devotion to duty—as 
God-given; to perform these tasks was to submit to the will of God in true Calvinist fashion. Warner 
credited God with giving her the will to support herself and her family by writing fiction that, she hoped, 
would do the work of Christian conversion. Will itself was not the enemy; it was self-will—a compulsive 
turning of the mind to things over which it had no control—that was to be avoided.	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mourning the impending separation from her daughter, falls to her knees and prays “‘Not my 
will, but thine be done’” (30), the same words that Alice uses when informing Ellen that she 
(Alice) is terminally ill. Like Mrs. Montgomery’s, Alice’s act of submitting herself to the lord’s 
will requires superhuman self-renunciation: in order to fulfill the divine will she must surrender 
her very life. As Alice dies in John’s embrace “her arms [fall] languidly down; the will and the 
power that had sustained them were gone. Alice was gone” (441). John, likewise, echoes the 
admonishments to resignation that are Mrs. Montgomery’s legacy to her daughter: when Ellen 
receives no news from her absent father and mother John advises that she try “‘to love [God] 
more, and to be patient under his will’” (344); when Aunt Fortune’s illness keeps Ellen from 
visiting the Humphreys John insists that “‘the good Husbandman knows what his plants want… 
so there come clouds and rains, and ‘stormy wind fulfilling his will’” (368). John’s invocation of 
the “good Husbandman” recalls Mrs. Montgomery’s God who “‘sends no trouble upon his 
children but in love,’” and when Alice dies John comforts himself and Ellen with the assurance 
that “‘Dear Alice is well—she is well,—and if we are made to suffer, we know and we love the 
hand that has done it,—do we not Ellie?… We must weep, because we are left alone; but for 
her—‘I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord!’” 
(443-444). John’s “we must weep” echoes Mrs. Montgomery’s admonition to Ellen that “we 
must sorrow,” but John’s “we must weep” is unifying: Ellen and John will suffer mutually under 
the will of a benevolent God, and if John and Ellen are “left alone,” they are at least left alone 
together. Alice, John, and Ellen, as the elect chosen by God, have their fates determined for 
them, and exercise a collective cosmological agency through the surrender of their wills to God. 
Temporally, however, Alice, Ellen, and Mrs. Montgomery are not equal to John: John, as 
a man and a minister, has immensely more power than any of these disenfranchised women, and 
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his will, far from being always represented in the negative, has earthly power that persists even 
in his absence. When John is away from home Alice and Ellen continue to behave in accordance 
with his unspoken dictates: in her letters Alice writes him that “his will seem[s] to carry all 
before it, present or absent” (353). When Ellen’s father’s will, reaching out from the grave, 
dictates that Ellen must be sent to Scotland, John takes the first opportunity to visit and then 
retrieve her. Though Ellen remains her father’s property even after his death, she is comforted in 
the knowledge that “whatever [John] pleased, nothing could hinder him from accomplishing” 
(500), and within months of Ellen’s arrival in Scotland John appears and promises to bring her 
back to America to live with him. Ellen can then rest in perfect ease because, as she tells him, “‘I 
know you will if you say so’” (563). Just as God’s will guides Ellen’s cosmological path, John’s 
will comes to guide her temporal one. 
When John finally does bring Ellen back to America it is as his wife rather than his sister, 
a resolution that, in the Calvinist universe of the novel, provides the perfect solution to the 
conundrum that Mrs. Montgomery had set before Ellen: the difficulty of discerning human will 
from God’s will and submitting to the former only when it conforms to the latter. John has so far 
aligned his own decisions with the will of God that for Ellen, to obey John is to obey God. John 
makes Ellen “do every thing that [he has] a mind” to, but he “always [has] a reason” (562), and 
she is relieved that marriage to him will allow her to “enjoy [her]self in perfect security that [he] 
will see the beginning of mischief and put a stop to it” (576).128 Aligning her will with John’s 	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 Jane Tompkins’s 1987 Feminist Press edition of The Wide, Wide World reprints this final chapter 
despite the fact that no previous edition of the novel included it. According to Tompkins, “An unsigned 
note in the papers of The Constitution Island Association suggests that the manuscript had gone to 
Putnam without the last chapter and that Putnam urged omitting it since the book had run longer in 
galleys than he had expected and the last chapter, in his opinion, did not contribute substantially to the 
novel” (“Afterword” 8). Jana Argersinger reads Warner’s refusal to publish this chapter in later editions 
of the novel, despite her readers’ demands for further details about Ellen’s life, as a mark of Warner’s 
“authorial seductiveness” (278). I include my observations on it here because I believe Warner’s 
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becomes a temporal method by which Ellen can assume her place in God’s cosmological plan; 
rather than suppressing her will to unredeemed guardians like Aunt Fortune or the Lindsays, 
Ellen can safely conform her will to John’s. Within the Calvinist universe of The Wide, Wide 
World, the alignment of one’s will with those of godly companions and of God himself is the 
highest and best form of agency, one that ensures both temporal happiness and eternal salvation. 
Agency that consists in aligning one’s will with God and with godly men can be difficult 
for modern critics to recognize, but as Jonathan Edwards and his theological inheritors insisted, 
seeking God’s will is not the same as having no will at all. Nor does Ellen’s alignment of her will 
with John’s “cancel out” John’s worldly authority, as Jane Tompkins would have it (Sensational 
163); rather, it enables Ellen to access John’s temporal power (and protection) in a political, legal 
and social milieu in which her own temporal will is neither acknowledged nor respected. As 
Tompkins rightly points out, sentimental power is no less real for its reliance on spiritual 
authority; to correctly read nineteenth-century sentimental literature critics must accept that for 
the authors of such fiction the spiritual realm was often more real and immediate than the 
temporal. But by focusing on power rather than agency, Tompkins reduces the religiosity of The 
Wide, Wide World and other sentimental novels to a cultural power grab and religious feeling to 
a cynical tool for stripping away male domination.129 Such readings obscure the particular form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imagined ending to the story speaks to the novel’s Calvinist worldview, even if contemporary readers 
were never privy to it. 
 
129
 In her article on the role of typology in The Wide, Wide World, Sharon Kim effectively rebuts 
Tompkins’s implicit claim that Warner’s novel is devoid of intentional theological content. Kim traces a 
line of literary and doctrinal relationship (I am purposely avoiding the declensionist connotations of the 
word “descent”) from Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe to Warner’s novel, arguing that both belong to a 
genre she calls “Puritan realism” that “unites, first, a realistic physical world with Puritan typology, and 
second, a realistic character development with the paradigms of spiritual biography” (784). For Kim, this 
structure reflects Warner’s particular religious beliefs and represents Warner’s conscious choice to align 
herself with Calvinist doctrine: regarding herself and her sister as “Puritans by faith and Pilgrims by 
descent” (789), Warner deliberately set out to write a novel that expressed, not vague evangelical beliefs, 
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of Calvinist agency at work in the novel: one in which the agency available to the elect is 
exercised across the gender divide and in collaboration with an all-powerful God whose will is 
fixed and unchanging but always for the good. 
 
“What was my will given to me for?”: Beulah and the Arminian Sentimental 
Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah, like Warner’s The Wide, Wide World, is primarily 
concerned with the role of the will in human—and particularly middle-class female—life. Like 
The Wide, Wide World it is the story of an orphan thrust into a cruel world who must learn to 
exercise her will within the constraints imposed on nineteenth-century women. But the model of 
female will depicted in Beulah is entirely different from—if not diametrically opposed to—that 
found in The Wide, Wide World, and it is a model based on a particularly Arminian theology in 
which human beings actively choose their own spiritual and temporal destinies rather than 
reconciling themselves to God’s predetermined will.130 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
but specifically Calvinist ones. While Kim’s reading of The Wide, Wide World helps to correct Tompkins 
by restoring intentionality and specificity to Warner’s invocation of Calvinist typology, it does not 
address the role of human will in the novel—another of The Wide, Wide World’s most recognizably 
Calvinist features. Indeed, instead of responding to those critics who, in following Douglas and 
Tompkins, have rightly identified sentimental literature as being “preoccupied, even obsessed, with the 
nature of power” (Tompkins, Sensational 160), Kim tables that discussion and returns instead to formal 
considerations: “religion,” she insists, “comprises more in The Wide, Wide World than its often 
paradoxical role in relationships of power” (784). But these discourses, I argue, should not—indeed 
cannot—be separated in this way. Since religion provided nineteenth-century women with unprecedented 
access to agency, and since literature offered one of the only available avenues to public influence and 
intervention for the disenfranchised, we cannot approach religion and power as unrelated discourses in 
this or any sentimental novel. 
 
130 Augusta Jane Evans’s motivations for writing were similar to Susan Warner’s, though she began 
earlier: born in Columbus, Georgia, in 1835, her father’s financial troubles and the family’s frequent 
relocations led her to begin composing her first novel, Inez: A Tale of the Alamo, as a teenager. When the 
family settled in Mobile, Alabama, Evans joined the St. Francis Street Methodist Church along with her 
parents and remained a member there until her death. Inez, an anti-Catholic novel full of theological 
argumentation, was overlooked by critics and the public alike, but Evans’s second novel, the orphan tale 
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The two central conflicts at the heart of Beulah are the eponymous heroine’s attempts to 
free herself from infantilizing social structures that insist that she can exist only as a child or a 
wife rather than as a self-supporting woman and her struggle to develop a system of religious 
belief by which she can reconcile her thirst for philosophical and scientific knowledge with the 
revelations of the Bible. These two plot trajectories are inextricable from one another, as Beulah 
Benton finds that the forces that would keep her economically dependent are also those that 
frown upon her intellectual and spiritual explorations.131 Throughout the novel these oppressive 
forces are identified explicitly with patriarchal economic structures—Beulah rails against the 
fashionable devaluation of labor that keeps women idle and dependent—and implicitly with 
predestinarian Calvinism, as those who challenge Beulah Benton’s self-determination invoke 
fate, god, or the Christian duty of submission as moral ballast for their advice. Beulah counters 
these attempted persuasions by insisting on the value of her own free will and her right to choose 
where and with whom she will live. In doing so she lives out the doctrinal tenets of Arminian 
Protestantism and provides a counterexample to the Calvinist sentimental heroine: instead of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Beulah, found a wide audience and critical approbation, though there were those who objected to its 
ostentatious intellectualism. 
Evans was a lifelong Methodist, a member of the most numerous Arminian sect in nineteenth-century 
America. According to Sara Frear, “The register of St. Francis Street Methodist Church [in Mobile, 
Alabama] shows that Augusta originally joined the church on December 8, 1848, at the age of thirteen, 
together with her father Matthew Ryan Evans and her mother Sarah Skrine Evans. She remained a 
member of this church until her death on May 9, 1909” (117). In a letter written (probably in 1858 or 
1859) to her friend Walter Clopton Harriss (a Methodist minister), Evans informs him that she has 
decided to “join the church again,” suggesting that at some point she had left St. Francis Street Methodist. 
But in examining the church’s records Frear finds no evidence that Evans’s membership was ever 
withdrawn; it is, of course, possible that Evans stopped attending the church for a time without officially 
ending her membership. 	  
131
 Beulah is the crown jewel in Baym’s anti-sentimental argument: its heroine’s educational ambitions 
and fierce insistence on her own spiritual and economic independence strike Baym as so far removed 
from the “meshes of human connection” exemplified in sentimental writing that she places the novel 
beyond the pale of sentimental literature. And yet, as a story that details the heroine’s lifelong mourning 
for her dead sister and her growing attachment to her surrogate father, it certainly seems to embrace the 
affective and familial concerns of sentimental culture. 
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aligning her will with the wills of those around her, as Ellen Montgomery must, Beulah finds 
salvation and happiness by repeatedly asserting her free will.132  
The first thing the reader learns about Beulah Benton is that she has a “warm, hopeful 
heart” defended by “the sword of a strong, unfaltering will” (14). In contrast to Ellen 
Montgomery’s plot trajectory, Beulah’s earliest object lessons are not that submitting to the will 
of others will lead to happiness and peace, but that surrendering one’s will results in moral and 
even physical death. When a wealthy couple adopts Beulah’s sister from the orphan asylum 
where she lives but refuses to take Beulah as well (because, the narrator flatly reveals, she is too 
ugly), Beulah resolves “to bear with fortitude what she could not avert”—the asylum’s Board 
have decreed that it is necessary to separate the sisters—and convinces Lilly to go with her new 
parents (19). But when Lilly dies within weeks of this separation Beulah decides never again to 
bend her will to that of tyrants, and when the wealthy doctor Guy Hartwell takes her into his 
home she becomes embroiled in a decades-long battle of wills with her benevolent but 
demanding benefactor. When Hartwell questions Beulah about her origins during their first 
meeting, her reply to him is, “‘No more. You have not the right to question, nor I the will to 
answer’” (36). Beulah refuses Hartwell’s offers to adopt her and then to marry her, not because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Arminian belief is an intellectual outgrowth of Calvinism, and in nineteenth-century America, despite 
the rapid growth of Arminian sects like Methodism, it remained a largely oppositional theological 
position—a situation exacerbated by Methodism’s association with revivalism, with the poor and laboring 
classes, and with slaves.132 It is this oppositional position that Evans’s novel assumes; it can be read as a 
direct rebuttal to Calvinist sentimental novels, particularly The Wide, Wide World. For this reason it is 
both the best example with which to illustrate the wide range of theological positions that sentimental 
literature could espouse—it wears its Arminian attachments almost on its sleeve—and a text that should 
be approached with caution, since the Calvinist theological position against which Evans situates her text 
is as much a caricature as a characterization.  
In this respect Evans’s position can seem similar to that of Douglas or Tompkins—she has a tendency 
to position Calvinist belief as mindless—but these similarities do not so much demonstrate the 
correctness of Douglas’s and Tompkins’s formulation of the sentimental as they reveal what Cindy 
Weinstein has noted in her study of the role of consanguinity in sentimental fiction: that “the 
extraordinarily rich and ideologically diverse debate about sympathy that was taking place in the 
antebellum period… anticipate[d] the substance of current critiques,” and that this debate took place, not 
just among those who repudiated sentimental novels, but within sentimental fiction itself (Weinstein 3).	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she doesn’t care for him, but because she recognizes the power imbalance only thinly masked by 
his offers of protection and love: “‘He wants to rule me with a rod of iron,’” she infers, “‘because 
I am indebted to him for an education and support for several years’” (174). Beulah has a model 
for such tyranny in the fate of her friend Pauline Chilton: when the “strong-willed” Pauline 
marries an equally obstinate minister she finds him “‘tyrannical; and because I do not humor all 
his whims, and have some will of my own, he treats me with insulting indifference’” (302). In 
Beulah fathers and husbands are more likely to prove themselves tyrants than helpful guides, and 
the repeated lesson offered by the novel is that a woman is better off consulting her own will 
than conforming to the wills of those who love her. 
When Beulah refuses to become either Hartwell’s daughter or his wife, other characters 
accuse her of heartlessness, stubbornness, or pride. But the narrator makes clear that Beulah’s 
ostensible obstinacy reflects her adherence to a moral and theological system that values 
individual will over unquestioning submission. When Clara Sanders advises Beulah to give up 
her plan of teaching and to let Guy Hartwell adopt her—to align her will with someone else’s—
Beulah brushes off the advice with the question, “‘What was my will given to me for, if to 
remain passive and suffer others to minister to its needs?’” (116). When Clara later insists that 
she herself cannot stop loving Guy Hartwell despite his rejection of her, Beulah’s martial advice 
is that “‘there is nothing a woman cannot do, provided she puts on the armor of duty and 
unsheathes the sword of a strong, unbending will. Of course, you can do it, if you will’” (190). 
This insistence on her own self-determining will guides Beulah’s interactions, not only with 
other human beings, but with God himself: in her years-long battle with religious skepticism, as 
Clara advises her to return to the childlike, unquestioning faith of her youth and Hartwell informs 
her that a heartless skepticism and a brainless pantheism are her only legitimate religious 
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options, Beulah rejects these binaries—child versus adult, brain versus heart—and maintains her 
search through the force, once again, of her own self-determination: “Still her indomitable will 
maintained the conflict,” the narrator asserts (289).  
The ability to remain suspended in a state of constant questioning and vigilance is a 
hallmark of the Arminian religious experience exemplified in Beulah: Arminian Methodism’s 
“unique doctrines made the self a work always in progress. As the founding myths [of 
Methodism] so dearly emphasized, spiritual decline was ever possible in a corrupt world…. Each 
convert also had to wage war with the self” (Lyerly 26). Beulah’s personal war is not with an 
overbearing father, or even with Guy Hartwell, but with her own insatiable desire for knowledge: 
in the climactic scene of the novel Beulah, having sought answers to her spiritual quandaries in 
works of psychology and speculative philosophy, finally decides that the “ashes” of earthly 
knowledge cannot effect salvation, and falls to her knees in prayer. In this scene Beulah’s “proud 
intellect [is] humbled,” but in appealing to God for guidance she is not surrendering her own will 
(371). Likewise in the scene in which she finally consents to marry Guy Hartwell, Beulah 
accepts his offer of marriage but makes it clear that she considers it her duty, not to bend to his 
will, but to convert him to her faith. 
The literary trope that emblematizes the independence of Beulah’s will is that of 
adoption—a device that, as Cindy Weinstein has demonstrated, “constitute[s] the foundational 
plot mechanism upon which so many sentimental texts depend” (29). In the Calvinist cosmology 
of The Wide, Wide World adoption functions as an earthly type of divine election: Ellen’s 
extralegal adoption by the Humphreys siblings both provides her with a loving surrogate family 
and also paves the way for her eventual marriage to John, the act that enables her to fulfill both 
her temporal and her spiritual destinies. Ellen’s adoption by the Humphreyses, like her election 
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by God, is final and irrevocable; John and Alice’s affective claim to her is as “irresistible” as the 
Calvinist convert’s unconditional election. When Ellen’s uncle insists that she change her last 
name from Montgomery to Lindsay, she reminds herself that, whatever her last name, she “can’t 
be adopted twice” (490). In Beulah, by contrast, earthly adoption is treated, not as the type of 
God’s heavenly election of the heroine—as an expression of God’s will—but as a failure of self-
determining human will, a refusal to exercise agency on one’s own behalf. When Guy Hartwell 
retrieves Beulah Benton from the orphan asylum where she resides she agrees to live with him 
on one condition: “‘I am not going to be adopted’” (106).133 Evans makes the connection 
between adoption and spiritual failure explicit when Beulah asserts that her friend Eugene’s 
“‘adoption was his ruin’” (296): “‘In lieu of his gold and influence,’” Beulah accuses Eugene, 
“‘Mr. Graham has your will, your conscience. How can you bear to be a mere tool in his 
hands?’” (187). When Clara Sanders, who loves Hartwell unrequitedly, advises Beulah to accept 
his repeated offers of adoption, Beulah demands to know whether Clara would be “‘willing to 
change places with me, and indolently wait for others to maintain you?’” Clara replies, “‘gladly, 
if I had been selected as you were’” (115). Beulah’s repeated refusals to be s/elected by Hartwell 
indicate her commitment to an Arminian theological worldview in which the individual believer 
chooses his or her spiritual fate rather than submitting to a predestined election.134 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 He repeats his offers throughout the novel: when she graduates high school and takes a teaching job, 
when she begins a successful career as a writer, and when she rents a home with a friend and lives 
independently. When he alters his tactics slightly and proposes marriage instead of adoption Beulah 
continues to refuse, knowing that the shift is merely semantic. 
 
134
 Weinstein considers the centrality of the adoption motif in sentimental fiction to be a reflection of 
nineteenth-century medical and social realities: frequent disease, the dangers of childbirth, the economic 
model of apprenticeship, and the separation of families on the slave market. And she notes that “much of 
the recent debate about sympathy produces a monolithic… account of sympathy” because it “fails to take 
into account the extraordinarily rich and ideologically diverse debate about sympathy that was taking 
place in the antebellum period… within sentimental fiction itself” (3). In contextualizing the sentimental 
novel, however, Weinstein makes the common critical mistake of ignoring religion despite the centrality 
	   168 
In its Arminian engagement with the question of human will Beulah touches on those 
“maladies of the will” examined in Jennifer Fleissner’s work on nineteenth-century 
psychological, medical, and theological categories.135 But it is not Beulah who suffers from these 
maladies but her friend Eugene, who succumbs to an alcoholism that the novel frames, not as 
illness or inherent evil, but as moral laziness—a failure to assert one’s self-will forcefully 
enough to overcome temptation. Eugene fails to recognize that his “own will must govern him” 
in his choice of a profession (111), instead letting his adopted father choose his path for him, and 
like the young men portrayed in the era’s advice manuals for urban youth, he half-heartedly 
slides into a life of dissipation and a marriage to a heartless social climber.136 Despite the fact 
that she has been his best friend since childhood, Beulah cannot save Eugene from these 
mistakes because in the Arminian worldview of the novel human will is sacrosanct and, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of religious discourse to the novels she studies and the inextricable imbrication of religion with questions 
of racial, regional and political identity in nineteenth-century America. The “specific context from which 
the critique of consanguinity is launched” in nineteenth-century sentimental fiction must always include 
the religious worldview embraced by the author and/or characters (Weinstein 10).  
Carol Singley’s Adopting America: Childhood, Kinship, and National Identity in Literature does a 
better job than Weinstein’s book of taking into account the religious context of nineteenth-century 
adoption plots. Her chapter on The Wide, Wide World, for instance, invokes Horace Bushnell’s 1847 
Discourses On Christian Nurture in discussing mid-century formulations of born and created families. 
While Warner was no fan of Bushnell (like many strict Calvinist thinkers she believed he had “rather an 
erratic mind,” in part because, unlike herself, he did not believe that wives owed obedience to their 
husbands [A. Warner 248]), his influence was so ubiquitous that Singley is most likely correct in finding 
connections between his works and Warner’s. 
 
135
 Though Fleissner’s ongoing work on the question of the will in nineteenth-century intellectual 
discourse (and in contemporary theories of the novel) has not yet been published, I have been fortunate to 
hear work-in-progress presentations in two talks that I cite in my bibliography. 
 
136
 The characteristics that Eugene finds attractive in his wife Antoinette—wealth, beauty, and charm—
are precisely those that, according to Timothy Shay Arthur (best known as the author of Ten Nights in a 
Bar-Room but also a writer of advice manuals for young men, among other things) warned his readers 
against falling prey to: “Let him disregard, totally, all considerations of wealth, beauty, external 
accomplishments, fashion, connections in society, and every other mere selfish and worldly end, and look 
into the mind and the heart of the woman he thinks of marrying. If he cannot love her for herself alone… 
let him disregard every external inducement, and shun a marriage with her as the greatest evil to which he 
could be subjected” (147). 
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words of the anonymous Arminian essayist, “self-determining.” When Eugene’s sister Cornelia 
begs Beulah to save Eugene from his alcoholism (by marrying him), Beulah insists that 
“‘[m]an’s will, like woman’s, is stronger than his affection, and, once subjugated by vice, all 
external influences will be futile’” (222). In the Calvinist universe of The Wide, Wide World, 
aligning one’s will with that of others is rewarded with temporal protection and spiritual 
guidance: “‘I often launch out upon a sea where I dare not trust my own navigation,’” Ellen 
Montgomery tells her new husband, “‘but now I will take the pilot along… and sail every 
whither’” (577). In the Arminian universe of Beulah surrendering one’s will to others is both the 
sign and the cause of spiritual failure. 
Given the insistence on self-determination in Beulah, the novel’s eventual capitulation to 
the exigencies of the marriage plot—Beulah’s assent to marry Guy Hartwell after she has spent 
her entire adolescent and adult life rejecting his offers—can seem like a betrayal of the novel’s 
doctrinal purpose. But read in comparison with The Wide, Wide World, the novel’s denouement 
once again illustrates the distinction between Ellen Montgomery’s acceptance of her “election” 
by John Humphreys and Beulah Benton’s choice to marry Guy Hartwell. Beulah has the option 
of marrying her own “John Humphreys”: Reginald Lindsay, the man who leads her to God and 
who embodies qualities of father, brother, and lover. But after Reginald has helped Beulah to 
overcome her skepticism Beulah marries not him but Guy Hartwell, choosing the man who 
enabled her self-actualization (by introducing her to music, art, philosophy, and literature) rather 
than the man who answers all of her spiritual questions. In choosing the skeptical Guy over the 
pious Reginald Lindsay, Beulah makes the choice that affirms her own spiritual freedom and 
gives her a task to complete: having resolved her own doubts, she can now set to work resolving 
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Guy’s.137 
In the Arminian novel Beulah, then, Beulah Benton achieves spiritual salvation and 
temporal happiness by placing the dictates of her own will above the demands of others. 
Conformity to the will of others, as in Eugene’s case, leads to moral corruption and spiritual 
downfall because it involves the denial of human agency: those who submit their wills to others 
abdicate responsibility for their own salvation. The model of female agency at work in Beulah is 
thus entirely different from that put forth in The Wide, Wide World: whereas Ellen Montgomery 
exercises agency by aligning her will with that of God and God’s servants, Beulah Benton 
exercises agency by imposing her will on the world around her. Both models are based in 
Protestant theological principles, but their outcomes are hardly the same. 
 
The Sentimental Novel and the Politics of Female Will 
Beulah and The Wide, Wide World thus took up the same questions about human will that 
occupied the most prominent theologians and philosophers of their day and put them to the test, 
exploring both the doctrinal underpinnings of human agency and the practical problem of how 
female will might be expressed within social structures that enable certain kinds of agency while 
limiting others. Uniting the emotional vocabulary and concern with power that mark the 
sentimental novel with the vocabulary of doctrinal debate, Warner and Evans offered practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137
 Feminist critics of Beulah are generally reluctant to praise the heroine’s choice to marry the man who 
has spent the whole novel trying to rob her of her independence, and indeed it does smack of romance 
novel fantasies of domination and surrender. (See Anne Goodwyn Jones’s Tomorrow is Another Day for 
an example of this critical reluctance.) Evans was clearly aware of Guy’s faults, and while he may be the 
perfect man for Beulah, Evans apparently did not intend him to represent the perfect man in general. In a 
letter to a friend, the Southern statesman J.L.M. Curry, Evans wrote: “I regret that I cannot furnish your 
enthusiastic Virginia friend, with the real Guy Hartwell, she has done me the honor to admire. Tell her 
she only has to look into the ranks of our matchless armies, to find hundreds who are nobler than my 
carping, self-indulgent, cynical, sceptical Guy” (Letter to J.L.M. Curry, July 15, 1863, reproduced in A 
Southern Woman of Letters 68). 
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depictions of how human will and agency were triangulated within an ever-shifting complex of 
independence and relationality. The call to Christian resignation enshrined in the Lord’s prayer 
and in the sentimental novels of the antebellum era—“Thy will be done”—leaves unspecified the 
proper response of human will: resignation to events as they occur? Concerted action performed 
with the goal of bringing about the kingdom of God? Sentimental novels like The Wide, Wide 
World and Beulah offered a practical theology that involved the reader, emotionally and 
intellectually, in an extended exploration of the question of how one is to live out the command 
to let God’s will be done.  
This question had implications both for the private lives of individual women and for the 
public debates that surrounded women’s rights and women’s agency. The fact that much of the 
context and subtext of Beulah and The Wide, Wide World is theological does not mean that these 
novels’ concerns were private and restricted to domestic subjects. By involving themselves in 
theological debates Warner and Evans engaged in a public discourse about human agency in 
general and female agency in particular—a discourse that took place within the public space of 
sentimental fiction. As June Howard notes, sentimentality always engages with “the 
development of modern subjectivities in their intricate imbrication with belief systems and social 
structures” (72). By exploring Protestant belief through the medium of fiction, Evans and Warner 
took part in a larger debate about the role of women in the public sphere.  
In keeping with this larger social question of women’s public agency, part of Ellen 
Montgomery’s and Beulah Benton’s tasks (as well as the task of their readers) is to reconcile 
their theological beliefs with their legal and political status as citizens and subjects who cannot 
elect their own leaders or claim equal protection under the law.138 As with their spiritual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138
 As a number of critics have demonstrated, this commentary on white women’s limited right to legal 
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maturation, their political educations are shaped by the theological systems to which they 
subscribe. Ellen’s spiritual and temporal training under the Humphreys, for instance, includes 
lessons in recognizing legitimate temporal authority as well as irresistible spiritual authority: in 
addition to the Bible that Ellen’s mother gives her and the copy of Pilgrim’s Progress she 
receives from John, Ellen also receives a copy of Mason Weems’s Life of Washington, which she 
absorbs with at least as much attention as she devotes to the other two. When Ellen arrives in 
Scotland the name of Washington comes to stand in for the name of John Humphreys: though 
she “disliked to speak the loved names [of Alice and John] in the hearing of ears to which she 
knew they would be unlovely” (509), Ellen has no trouble invoking the name of Washington at 
every turn. When her Uncle Lindsay asks whether she is “‘one of those that make a saint of 
George Washington,’” Ellen replies that “‘he was a great deal better than some saints’” (506). 
When Mr. Lindsay brings up the “murder” of John André, Ellen insists that this act must have 
been right because if it were not, “‘Washington would not have done it.’” When Mr. Lindsay 
accuses Ellen of circular reasoning she explains herself by insisting that “‘when a person always 
does right, if he happen to do something that I don’t know enough to understand, I have good 
reason to think it is right, even though I cannot understand it’” (515).139 This is the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and political self-determination cannot responsibly be read outside of the context of slavery; sectional 
debates about slavery had come to a head by the 1850s, when Warner and Evans wrote their novels. See 
in particular Ann duCille’s The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women’s Fiction. 
Cindy Weinstein’s Family, Kinship and Sympathy in Nineteenth-Century American Literature also does a 
fine job of illuminating the parallels between the slave narrative and the sentimental novel, reading The 
Wide, Wide World alongside Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Caroline Lee Hentz’s 
proslavery novel The Planter’s Northern Bride, Mary Hayden Green Pike’s Ida May, and Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin. 
 
139
 Mr. Lindsay’s word choice is revealing: having captured John André behind the Continental Army’s 
lines with incriminating papers on his person, Washington’s choice to try and hang him as a spy and 
traitor could only be termed “murder” by someone, like Mr. Lindsay, who does not acknowledge the 
validity of the colonists’ cause. Mr. Lindsay’s refusal to recognize America’s right to rebel against 
England parallels his refusal to acknowledge Ellen’s friendship with the Humphreys or even her real 
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reasoning that Alice had earlier applied to John: when Ellen wonders whether John was right in 
whipping an obstinate horse, Alice replies that “‘it is sometimes necessary to do such things…. 
You and I know John, do we not?’” (377). John, like Washington, cannot be guilty of a wrong 
act—like the Calvinist God that Alice and Ellen worship, John’s justice is unquestionable, 
though his behavior sometimes seems unfathomable. John is both God and Washington to Ellen: 
he embodies both spiritual and temporal authority, such that Ellen need no longer consult her 
own will.  
The Wide, Wide World, then, would seem to envision America as a representative 
republic in which women access temporal power by choosing Christian husbands who act in 
accordance with their properly regulated consciences. But in accordance with the novel’s 
Calvinist worldview, Ellen’s act of “choosing” John is predetermined by John himself and, 
presumably, by God. Ellen never actually chooses John: she is chosen by Alice, then given to 
John, then chosen by Mr. Lindsay, and then reclaimed by John in a series of “elections” over 
which she has little control. When John visits Ellen in Scotland in the book’s final published 
chapter Ellen protests that “‘long before I was [Mr. Lindsay’s] daughter I was [John’s] sister—I 
can’t undo that… and I don’t want to—it doesn’t make a bit of difference that we were not born 
so!’” (563). Likewise, Ellen’s Americanness, so repugnant to the Lindsays, is also out of her 
control: when Mr. Lindsay commands Ellen to “‘forget that [she was] American,’” Ellen’s silent 
rejoinder that “‘there are some things he cannot command…. Forget, indeed!’” represents one of 
the only times in the novel when she does not rebuke herself for pride or rebelliousness. Ellen’s 
Americanness, like her Calvinist election and her adoption by the Humphreys family, is 
irrevocable—“irresistible,” in Calvinist parlance; it is not a matter of her own will or choosing, 
and she could not change it if she wished to. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
name, Montgomery. 
	   174 
Beulah, by contrast, sets forth an alternative model of male-female relations in which the 
narrator and protagonist urge the women of America, not to submit themselves to godly men, but 
to accept independence and intellectual pursuits as their God-given duty. When Beulah gives the 
commencement address at the public school where she has been educated she takes as her theme 
“Female Heroism” and sets out to demonstrate “that female intellect was capable of the most 
exalted attainments, and that the elements of her character would enable woman to cope 
successfully with difficulties of every class” (140). Beulah concludes her address by encouraging 
her classmates to make themselves “true women of America,” not by displaying piety, purity, 
submissiveness, and domesticity, but by proving themselves “angel guardians of the sacred 
hearthstone, ministering spirits where suffering and want deman[d] succor,” and women 
“qualified to assist in a council of statesmen, if dire necessity ever requir[e] it” (140). 
Americanness, for “true women” at least, is not a state into which one is born, but a distinction to 
which one aspires. 
As she does with her Arminianism, Evans positions her model of independent and 
intellectual womanhood in opposition to prevailing cultural values, particularly those of the 
North. Evans saw herself as the torchbearer for a new brand of Southern literature that would 
challenge the intellectual and political hegemony of the Boston and New York elite; the 
Arminian free will doctrines that Beulah embraces would undergird a new era of Southern 
supremacy based on states’ rights and individual (white) self-determination. Evans signals her 
ambitions in her choice to name her eponymous heroine “Beulah”: while Anne Goodwyn Jones 
rightly points out that the Hebrew word “Beulah” means “married woman,” foreshadowing the 
romantic denouement of the novel (90), the Biblical passage in which the word “Beulah” figures 
does not refer to an actual woman, but to the land of Israel. Predicting a future time of glory for 
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the Hebrew people, the prophet Isaiah asserts that “Thou shalt no more be termed Forsaken; 
neither shall thy land any more be termed Desolate: but thou shalt be called Hephzibah, and thy 
land Beulah: for the Lord delighteth in thee, and thy land shall be married.”140 In associating her 
Southern heroine with an idealized vision of an agriculturally productive Israel, Evans intimates 
that the South, not the North, is that region of the country truly chosen and blessed by God. 
Meanwhile the association of the Southern heroine with bridal imagery invokes the tradition of 
the church as the bridegroom of Christ, making Southern Arminian churches the true inheritors 
of the American Christian mission. 
 
Conclusion: Reevaluating Religious Agency in the Sentimental Novel 
Though the sentimental novel is always concerned with power—celestial, temporal, 
political, domestic—it is not, at bottom, about accruing it. It is, however, deeply concerned with 
agency, and with how agency might be enabled by and exercised in accordance with particular 
theological principles and under particular social conditions. But the models of religious agency 
offered by the sentimental novel have been difficult for critics to apprehend because they do not 
conform to the narrative that the anthropologist Saba Mahmood calls the “secular-progressive 
imaginary.” Mahmood finds in the work of “secular-liberal and progressive” scholars who turn 
their lenses on religion “a deep self-assurance about the truth of the progressive-secular 
imaginary, one that assumes that the life forms it offers are the best way out for… unenlightened 
souls, mired as they are in the spectral hopes that gods and prophets hold out to them” (Politics 
xi). Under these terms, in which religion can function only as a delusion from which the subjects 
of critical discourse must be freed, it becomes difficult for scholars to recognize and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140
 Isaiah 62:4, King James Version. 
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acknowledge forms of agency enabled by religious belief and practice. 
In the discipline of anthropology in which Mahmood works, the application of Western 
liberal philosophical assumptions to the lives of non-Western and non-liberal subjects leads to 
the suggestion that women who do not feel the need or desire to subvert cultural and religious 
norms—or, more fundamentally, do not recognize individual autonomy as the only legitimate 
ground of human action—must be reeducated in the ways of enlightened liberal thought before 
they can engage in acts of agency. In the case of literary criticism, particularly with regard to 
sentimental literature, the “progressive-secular imaginary” by which Western culture becomes 
increasingly enlightened/secularized hampers serious critique of nineteenth-century women 
writers: religious women authors of the nineteenth century take on the anthropological role of 
Other in the writings of twenty-first-century critics, their religion representing a primitive residue 
of nineteenth-century culture to be left behind on the journey toward feminist enlightenment.141 
But as the anthropologist and legal theorist Leti Volpp notes, when “culture and feminism are 
believed to be opponents in a zero-sum game, women will be presumed to be emancipated when 
they have abandoned their cultures” (106). Since the authors of nineteenth-century sentimental 
fiction, now long since dead, can no longer abandon their religious cultures but have left 
evidence of them in their novels, critics have done the abandoning for them, writing around the 
question of religion or assuming that it exists only to mask other concerns—gender, race, class—
more interesting to latter-day scholars. 
Paradoxically, in arguing for the forms of female power modeled and enabled by 
sentimental literature, it has been easiest for critics to identify female power in texts that embrace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141
 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese notes that “it almost appears as if faith is so foreign to modern sensibilities as 
to be safely assigned to the realm of the exotic. Nor does it apparently occur to critics who adopt that 
attitude that their practice has so much in common with the Orientalism that Said and others reprove” (16-
17). 
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religious beliefs, like the strict Calvinism of Susan Warner, that seem especially foreign to a 
secularized critical stance. Critics exalt those texts whose models of self-sacrificing female 
power seem most opposed to the progressive-secular imaginary by which individual autonomy 
and self-will are the only mark of personal agency, and the very foreignness of the texts’ 
religiosity makes it easy to dismiss that religiosity as a cultural accretion. If women like Susan 
Warner and her protagonist Ellen Montgomery are able to exercise agency (as critics of the 
sentimental insist, quite correctly, that they do) even while embracing a religion that ostensibly 
demonizes individual self-determination, then that religion must not be effective and can thus be 
dismissed as an historical artifact with little bearing on the real problem of power. Thus the 
critical formulations of sentimental power that have claimed to treat the religiosity of nineteenth-
century women’s literature with respect have actually undergirded the secularization narrative 
that enables the dismissal of religion from serious critical discussion. 
According to this critical formulation novels like Augusta Jane Evans’s Beulah have no 
place in the sentimental canon precisely because they offer a model of religious agency that 
aligns with liberal assumptions about autonomy and self-determination while rejecting a 
secularization narrative by which enlightened scientific rationalism leads to the death of religion. 
Beulah Benton’s quest for scientific and philosophical knowledge leads her toward rather than 
away from religious enlightenment, and her religious beliefs bolster rather than undermining her 
feminist agency. She finds in her Arminian Christianity a warrant for, rather than a 
condemnation of, statements like this one: 
“You are opening your lips to repeat that senseless simile of [male] oaks and 
[female] vines; I don’t want to hear it; there are no creeping tendencies about me. 
You can wind, and lean, and hang on somebody else if you like; but I feel more 
like one of those old pine trees yonder. I can stand up. Very slim, if you will, but 
straight and high. Stand by myself; battle with wind and rain and tempest roar; be 
swayed and bent, perhaps, in the storm, but stand unaided, nevertheless. I feel 
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humbled when I hear a woman bemoaning the weakness of her sex, instead of 
showing that she has a soul and mind of her own inferior to none.” (116) 
 
Because the progressive-secular imaginary that undergirds feminist criticism assumes that 
feminist enlightenment and religious adherence are incompatible, critics of nineteenth-century 
women’s fiction have found no place in their narratives for a text like Beulah that combines 
fierce religiosity with feminist sentiment.142  
Criticism of sentimental literature has often overlooked those nineteenth-century 
sentimental texts in which religious agency functions in a manner closer to the liberatory model 
because these novels do not conform to a critical narrative in which a repressive religion is 
superseded by a presumably more progressive skepticism. Such narratives assume that agency 
can inhere only in acts of rebellion or resistance. But as Mahmood’s work has shown, agency is 
not an either-or proposition, even and perhaps especially when that agency is felt to be mandated 
by doctrinal considerations. If critics are to continue to assert the important role of nineteenth-
century women authors in literary history and to understand the complex models of agency at 
work in their texts, they must adjust the critical models with which they approach these texts to 
include all possible avenues to female agency, liberal and nonliberal, conservative and 
progressive, religious and secular. 
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 There are other reasons, of course, that contribute to Evans’s having been overlooked by critics of 
nineteenth-century women writers. One is the fact that despite decades of critical complaint about the 
overemphasis on New England authors in studies of nineteenth-century American literature, Southern 
authors are still read most often through a regional lens rather than a national one. Another is Evans’s 
objectionable politics: Evans was pro-slavery and pro-secession, and maintained friendships with 
prominent Southern politicians and military leaders like P.G.T. Beauregard and J.L.M. Curry. But since 
being Southern, or sympathetic to the South, or pro-slavery, or silent on the question of slavery has not 
led to a diminution of interest in writers like Edgar Allan Poe or Nathaniel Hawthorne, there must be 
more to the story in Evans’s case. 
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CHAPTER 4: “I Have No Disbelief”: Spiritualism and Secular Agency in The 
Morgesons 
 
In the preface to the 1901 reissue of her three novels (The Morgesons, Two Men, and 
Temple House), Elizabeth Drew Barstow Stoddard laid out the origin story of her writing career: 
“One day when my husband was sitting at the receipt of customs… I sat by a little desk, where 
my portfolio lay open. A pen was near, which I took up, and it began to write, wildly like 
‘Planchette’ upon her board” (“Preface” 262).143 Describing the process of composition that led 
to each of her novels, Stoddard recalls how “the shadow of a man passed before me, and I built a 
visionary fabric round him” (“Preface” 263). Like the narrator of The Morgesons, who is 
frequently accused of demonic possession, Stoddard obscures the agencies at work in her 
writing: her “stories and novels were never in touch with my actual life” and “seem now as if 
they were written by a ghost of their time” (“Preface” 263). Stoddard also quotes her distant 
cousin Nathaniel Hawthorne’s assessment of her debut novel, written in a letter to her shortly 
after publication: “There are very few books of which I take the trouble to have any opinion at 
all, or of which I could retain any memory so long after reading them as I could do of ‘The 
Morgesons’” (“Preface” 264). The Morgesons was published in 1862; Hawthorne had died in 	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 The planchette is  
a small platform used in Spiritualism as a tool to communicate with spirits. It is usually about 
three inches wide and four inches long, resting on three small legs. There are many different 
designs but an early, popular, design was heart shaped; the point of the heart was working as a 
pointer. On a Ouija Board, or similar talking board, the planchette slides about the surface of the 
board, pointing at letters to spell out messages. One, two, or more people lightly rest their finger 
tips on the top edges of the device, to channel into it the power to make it move. Three legs are 
either tipped with felt so that they will slide easily on a polished surface, or have small castor 
wheels on them. Sometimes, if automatic writing is to be done, one of the legs is replaced by a 
pencil, the point of which traces letters onto a sheet of paper over which the planchette moves. 
This is known as a ‘pencil planchette.’ (Spirit Book, 310) 
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1864. Thus he could not have retained his living memory of the novel very long at all. And yet 
Stoddard’s invocation of his words suggests the eerie possibility that Hawthorne may have 
retained his memory of The Morgesons even in death, and that he might yet endorse his cousin’s 
novels from beyond the grave.  
The theory that Hawthorne might continue to exist in all of his individuality, and to hold 
and express literary preferences forty years after his death, can be read as a mere flight of fancy 
on Stoddard’s part or as a cynical attempt to cash in on her family relationship with the man who 
was well on his way to becoming the major figure in American literary history.144 But Stoddard’s 
mention of her dead relative, together with her discussion of “planchette,” of the “visionary” 
origins and “ghost”-like qualities of her novels, also frames the composition of The Morgesons 
as a tale of Spiritualist mediumship recognized and harnessed for literary purposes. This chapter 
examines the religious imagery of Spiritualist practice that runs throughout Stoddard’s first novel 
and argues that Stoddard employs the phenomena associated with Spiritualist religion, including 
clairvoyance and spirit communication, to explore socially disruptive circulations of agency and 
the cross-gender and cross-class connections they enable.145 While Stoddard’s critics have most 	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 See Jane Tompkins’s “Masterpiece Theater: The Politics of Hawthorne’s Literary Reputation” for the 
historical trajectory of Hawthorne’s canonization. 
 
145 American Spiritualist practices, though emerging from European religious ideas that had circulated for 
centuries, began in earnest in the United States in 1848 with the “spirit rappings” in Rochester, New 
York. The movement, spawned by the clairvoyant gifts of precocious teenagers like Margaret and Kate 
Fox and the Davenport brothers, spread rapidly across the country, and the widespread acceptance of its 
tenets was enabled in part by the liberalization of American theology that arose during the Second Great 
Awakening. But the Spiritualist movement, far from being merely reactionary, was also theologically 
innovative, and it profoundly changed the religious landscape of nineteenth-century America.  
Growing out of the dual traditions of Swedenborgian religion and mesmeric practice,  
many of Spiritualism’s doctrines flew in the face of traditional Protestant theology. Spiritualism’s 
Swedenborgian roots provided one of the most basic tenets of the movement’s theology: the doctrine that 
man ascends (or “develops” or “progresses”) after death through “spheres” of increasing enlightenment, 
with some souls taking longer to ascend (Kerr 10). This doctrine was by no means acceptable to 
Protestant theologians, whether Calvinist or Arminian, because it removed the need for repentance by 
defanging divine wrath: without “an apocalyptic worldview based on duality and damnation, the gates of 
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often read The Morgesons as indexing the decline of New England orthodoxy or the 
secularization of American culture, I argue that the novel reflects the conditions of secularism 
that characterized mid-nineteenth-century American culture, conditions in which religious 
authority and its attendant agentive possibilities were not in decline but rather were set free to 
circulate in new and non-hierarchical ways. The agencies enabled in The Morgesons by 
Spiritualist forms of communion and communication have the potential to disrupt and defy 
entrenched structures of power. By allowing spiritual agencies to circulate between them, rather 
than ceding agency to those who would dominate them, characters in the novel maintain a unique 
but precarious in(ter)dependence, circumventing social narratives that enforce women’s 
economic, romantic, and spiritual dependence on men (fathers, lovers, clergy) to forge 
relationships in which dominance and subordination are ever shifting and always at play—in 
which power does not flow downward from God to men and from men to women but instead 
moves unpredictably between the spiritual realm and the material and between members of both 
sexes.   
This chapter argues that The Morgesons is best read as a Spiritualist novel, by which I 
mean not only that it is a novel about Spiritualism, in which particular characters engage in acts 
of clairvoyance, trance-speaking, and spirit-traveling, but that it enacts a literary form of 
Spiritualist practice at the level of the text.146 It does so, I argue, as a means of exploring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
heaven were opened to all. As the late-coming child of the Second Great Awakening, Spiritualism took 
the awakening’s main tenet—salvation is universally possible—to its logical extreme: salvation is 
universally guaranteed” (Gutierrez 4). Besides a refusal to assign the dead to heaven or hell for all 
eternity, Spiritualist teaching differed most starkly from traditional Protestant beliefs about death in its 
insistence that human souls retain the unique characteristics they once displayed on earth—including an 
attachment to family and friends and a concern about ongoing political and social events—and that the 
dead are capable of communicating with those who remain among the living. (See Cox and Gutierrez for 
more thorough descriptions of the history of Spiritualism in America.) 
 
146 The question of literary genre has perplexed Stoddard’s critics since her recovery in the 1970s. Though 
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possibilities for female self-expression and self-determination in a secular milieu in which 
agency inheres in sympathetic relations between persons more than in clerical ordination or 
doctrinal correctness. The Morgesons invokes the practices associated with Spiritualism in order 
to envision forms of female agency that might operate outside the bounds of commerce, 
competition, conversion, and domination represented by the various patriarchs who feature in the 
Morgeson sisters’ lives. These practices are premised on the acceptance of certain doctrines that 
can be loosely defined as religious: the persistence of individual human personalities beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the plot of The Morgesons follows the basic outlines of domestic and romantic drama, critics have found 
it nearly impossible to come to agreement on how the novel should be classified within the usual 
taxonomies of nineteenth-century literary history. In their collection of critical essays on Stoddard, Ellen 
Weinauer and Robert McClure Smith remark that the author has been “variously identified as a domestic 
novelist, an antisentimentalist, a local-color precursor of realism, a Brontë-inspired gothicist, a provincial 
gothicist, and a proto-modernist” and that her writing “continually abjures the definitions critics seek to 
impose upon it” (6-7). Sandra Zagarell similarly notes that although “commentators have pointed to 
several traditions that illuminate aspects of her writing, including domestic woman’s fiction, feminist 
bildungsroman, female gothic, and New England gothic, no single tradition can account for it fully” 
(“Biographical Foreword” 32). 
Critics have been particularly puzzled by the differences between Stoddard’s novels and the 
sentimental, didactic fiction of many of her female contemporaries. Julia Stern reads The Morgesons as 
offering “a dialectical rebuttal to the women’s tradition inaugurated by [Susan] Warner, [Harriet Beecher] 
Stowe, [Maria Susanna] Cummins, et al. whose works constitute its literary milieu” (“I Am Cruel” 108). 
Elizabeth Stockton notes that the plot of The Morgesons reads like a sentimental novel set on rewind: “In 
portraying a character who rejects self-sacrifice and duty as unfulfilling and pointlessly restraining… 
Stoddard reverses the trajectory of the typical sentimental novel” (426). Christopher Hager invents an 
entirely new subgenre for The Morgesons, remarking that it “stands at odds with the prevailing 
conventions of the sentimental” (705) and classifying it as an “industrial-sentimental novel,” one in which 
“Stoddard constructs a domestic tale of womanhood and marriage on the skeleton of a much more 
masculine narrative—the story of eastern Massachusetts’s industrial transformation in the late 1850s” 
(699).  
Sabine Matter-Seibel notes the effect that this categorization problem has had on the critical reception 
of Stoddard’s work: “Since she could neither be comfortably claimed for realism nor for regionalism nor 
for romanticism nor for the domestic novel nor hailed as a modernist, Elizabeth Barstow Stoddard has 
either not been claimed at all or has been treated as an aberration” (20). While this statement is perhaps a 
bit exaggerated—the critics listed above have, after all, given Stoddard considerable attention—it is true 
that Stoddard’s critics have spilt much ink writing about what her novels are not rather than what they are. 
While this chapter does not directly adjudicate the question of genre, it has implications for the 
discussion, since attempts to classify The Morgesons (and its characters) according to recognizable 
critical terms have become part and parcel of the “monopolization of knowledge” that I discuss in the 
chapter’s final section. The critical need to clarify exactly where The Morgesons belongs in a taxonomy 
of nineteenth-century fiction parallels the critical obsession with classifying the Morgeson sisters, and 
particularly Veronica, as good or bad, sick or well, liberated or oppressed. 
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death, the ability of the living to speak with the dead, the “magnetic” or mesmeric influence of 
certain spiritually gifted persons, and the possibility of clairvoyant communication between 
people of great emotional sensibility.147 Even as it implicitly embraces these premises and 
practices, however, the novel avoids the ritualized (and often commercialized) trappings of the 
séance and the trance lecture, scenes that would subject Veronica’s and Cassandra’s mysterious 
powers to public scrutiny at the hands of scientific and religious authorities—some of them, 
perhaps, among the novel’s readers and critics—who could then pronounce judgment upon the 
sisters’ spirituality in the same way that various patriarchs pronounce judgment on their beauty, 
piety, and intelligence.148  
Spiritualism is not the only symbolic force at work in The Morgesons; as the girls’ names 
suggest, ancient mythology and Catholic hagiography also offer resources for imagining possible 
ways of being in the world, and the welter of available spiritualities that the novel depicts is part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Religious historians are quick to point out that Spiritualist practitioners saw dogma as anathema, and 
that they required no test of belief or proof of conversion for those who would take part in séances or 
attend trance lectures. This, combined with Spiritualism’s empiricist ambitions—its leaders’ assertions 
that spiritual phenomena could be verified by experience and even according to the scientific method—
often spurs scholars to claim that Spiritualism had no doctrines or articles of belief at all. But the refusal 
to enforce adherence to doctrine by means of public shaming or excommunication does not necessarily 
imply the absence of doctrinal content. Ann Braude insists that, despite its lack of a centralized 
ecclesiastical organization, “Spiritualism should be taken seriously as a religion making a legitimate 
response to nineteenth-century theological challenges” (Radical xv). Though Spiritualism could not be 
defined as a “church” in the way that Baptist or Anglican congregations could be, those who engaged 
seriously with Spiritualism accepted certain principles about God, the afterlife, and the fate of human 
souls—principles that can reasonably be called doctrines. 
 
148 The nineteenth-century text most often characterized as a Spiritualist novel is Elizabeth Stuart Phelps’s 
The Gates Ajar (1868), another work that eschews the particular details of Spiritualist practice—there are 
no séances and no audible conversations with the dead—while nevertheless accepting the basic 
Spiritualist premises that individual personalities persist after death and that loved ones will recognize one 
another in their spiritual forms. The Gates Ajar differs from The Morgesons, however, in its generic 
recognizability—Nina Baym calls it a “curious transmogrification of the woman’s fiction into a novel of 
heaven” (Woman’s Fiction 297)—and its straightforward dialogue. It is less a meditation on Spiritualist 
agency than an extended exegesis of Spiritualist beliefs as reconcilable with liberal Christian religion: 
Aunt Winifred, the novel’s primary proponent of Spiritualism, spends much of her narrative time 
explaining how the Spiritualist vision of heaven accords with a Biblical one. The Gates Ajar is a novel, 
not about exploring mystery, but about clarifying doctrine and explaining away difference. 
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and parcel of the secular milieu that makes agency available to the Morgeson sisters. Examining 
the role of Spiritualism in the novel does not offer a legend or key that will make the path of 
interpretation suddenly straight and narrow; The Morgesons is a text that embodies mystery in its 
form and its plot, seeking not to explain away or unmask the ineffable, but to channel it. The 
Morgesons steers a course between overt supernaturalism and sterile scientism that invokes the 
indeterminacy of secular agency in the tumultuous middle decades of the nineteenth century. The 
ethic of The Morgesons is not an ethic of explication or uncovering, but of obfuscation; like the 
saint from whom Veronica takes her name, its guiding symbol is the veil. But readings of The 
Morgesons—and of Veronica’s character in particular—have too often hinged on the unmasking 
or unveiling of narrative mystery, on a secularized tradition of diagnostic reading that reduces 
the Morgeson sisters and the novel as a whole to the status of problems to be solved. This 
chapter concludes by revealing the ways in which secularized reading practices have limited the 
available methods for approaching and interpreting The Morgesons and other Spiritualist fictions 
by obscuring the nature and possibilities of secular forms of agency.  
 
Secularization and Secularism in The Morgesons 
An early scene in The Morgesons finds Cassandra, at about sixteen years old, standing on 
the sofa in her Massachusetts home giving a mock sermon “after the manner of Mr. Boold, of 
Barmouth, taking… for my text, ‘Like David’s Harp of solemn sound’” (67).149 Cassandra’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 The now-standard scholarly edition of The Morgesons, edited by Buell and Zagarell and published in 
1984, reprints the revised text of The Morgesons that Stoddard’s publishers issued in 1889. For her 1889 
edition, Zagarell notes, Stoddard “made no major structural changes, but she did make extensive minor 
revisions, mostly for the sake of greater conciseness but sometimes leading to a marked change of effect.” 
For instance, Stoddard altered a key piece of dialogue from “‘are you possessed?’” to “‘are you mad?’”, 
“thereby effacing the link between this passage and the motif of… possession introduced in the very first 
line of the book” (“Introduction” 4). Because I am interested in how The Morgesons reflects the changing 
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parody of the local clergyman brings several members of the household to hysterical laughter, as 
she imitates his expressive gestures and pompous tone. When her father, Locke Morgeson, enters 
the room with a strange man, Cassy is neither abashed nor ashamed: she “wave[s her] hand… a 
la Boold” and descends from her perch to greet the newcomer who will one day become her 
lover (67).  
Cassy’s Boold-ness—her willingness to ridicule and disregard the pronouncements of 
New England’s orthodox clergy—has led critics to read The Morgesons as a depiction of 
secularization and religious decline. Seeking signs of the novel’s religious commitments in 
details of character and setting rather than in innovations of narrative structure and form, critics 
have read The Morgesons’s satirical portrayal of orthodox Protestantism and its ordained 
representatives as a dismissal of or an attack on religion. Lawrence Buell, for instance, noting 
how Stoddard’s text eschews theological discussion in favor of an extended attention to 
relationships between people, discounts any religious contribution the novel might make:  
Stoddard… portrays a setting in which theology is reduced to parlor conversation 
and the supernatural resolves itself into… offbeat bohemian charm…. The 
ecclesiastical politics of Cassandra’s hometown parish are also intermittently 
detailed. Yet such details are treated as interesting only to pious elders against 
whom she has defined herself.... (364-365) 
 
Buell reads The Morgesons as marking the decline of New England theological rigor; the 
Morgeson women’s engagement with religion amounts to mere dabbling, since anyone who is 
not interested in orthodox Calvinist theology and “ecclesiastical politics” is not “doing” religion 
at all. Sandra Zagarell builds on Buell’s argument, reading Stoddard’s text as not simply 
recording but actively hastening the decline of religion in America. According to Zagarell The 
Morgesons’s “attacks on religion correspond with Stoddard’s critique of the Bible for assigning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious atmosphere of antebellum New England—particularly the mid-century prominence of 
Spiritualist possession—I have used the 1862 text rather than the 1889 as my source. 
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women inferior status” and contribute to the increasing secularization of American literary 
culture in the mid-nineteenth century (“Repossession” 56).150 Reading “religion” as primarily the 
domain of ordained Protestant clergy, Buell and Zagarell assume that because the clerics who 
appear in The Morgesons are ridiculed or relegated to diegetic obscurity, religion is not a central 
concern of the text.  
There are two unspoken—and incorrect—assumptions that undergird such readings of 
The Morgesons: first, that “religion” and “New England Protestantism” are one and the same; 
second, that Protestant ministers and theologians, as the putative arbiters of doctrine, are the 
primary representatives of religious activity in America, and that by ridiculing these authority 
figures Stoddard is attacking and discrediting religion as such. Both assumptions conform to the 
secularization narrative laid out by Max Weber and taken up by other prominent twentieth-
century historians and sociologists.151 According to the secularization narrative, Western 
societies are moving inexorably away from superstitious and primitive religious beliefs and 
toward an enlightened rationalism that replaces faith with evidence and belief with fact. In the 
particularly American version of the secularization narrative, “the public influence of the 
Protestant clergy is [considered] the most important measure of the role of religion in American 
society” (Braude, “Women’s History” 93), so that any text that questions the authority of 
Protestant ministers—as The Morgesons does—will seem to be attacking religion as an aspect of 
human experience and reflecting or even contributing to the secularization of American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 For Buell this narrative is one of declension: the intellectual rigor of New England orthodoxy is lost, 
leaving a vague “bohemianism” in its wake. (Critics familiar with scholarship on the sentimental will 
recognize this narrative as the same one that undergirds Ann Douglas’s The Feminization of American 
Culture.) For Zagarell the story is one of progress: religion is successfully done away with, leaving 
women unencumbered by its patriarchal pronouncements.  
 
151 I discussed the provenance of the secularization narrative and its effects for literary criticism in the 
introduction to this dissertation.  
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culture.152 
Critical treatments of The Morgesons that equate the fracturing of Calvinist orthodoxy 
with a decline in the cultural authority of a Protestant theological worldview reveal the persistent 
power of the secularization narrative. In these interpretations, New England is left a spiritual 
wasteland once the authority of the clergy is questioned and interdenominational wrangling is no 
longer the norm.153 But the secularization narrative is factually incorrect—at least in the United 
States, where surveys, census data, and historical research show relatively consistent levels of 
religious adherence among Americans since at least the early nineteenth century154—and, as I 
have argued throughout this dissertation, its influence has produced misreadings of texts like The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152
 As Tracy Fessenden has shown, our current, putatively “secularized” American public sphere is 
actually structured by a set of beliefs and assumptions about human experience that are drawn directly 
from Protestant history and practice. The systematic identification of “religion” with “New England 
Protestantism” is not so much a historical fact as an ideological superstructure that assumes that attitudes, 
values, and institutions that do not align with mainstream Protestant assumptions are alien, not only to 
Protestant Christianity, but to America itself. According to Fessenden, the historical processes by which 
church and state have come to be increasingly separated in American civic life have paradoxically 
strengthened the unspoken bond between “American” values and Protestant values: “religion comes to be 
defined as ‘Christian’ by default, and an implicit association between ‘American’ and ‘Christian’ is 
upheld even by those who have, one imagines, very little invested in its maintenance” (3). 
 
153 Very few critics have examined the intimations of Spiritualist and other occult religiosity that permeate 
The Morgesons. Christopher Felker, whose work I discuss later in this chapter, has written the most 
thorough analysis I have found of the subject. Michelle Ann Abate, though not addressing Spiritualism 
specifically, details the resemblance between Veronica Morgeson’s odd behaviors and those that 
characterized the confessed witches executed at Salem in 1692. Abate demonstrates how Veronica’s 
strange eating habits, her fits of temper, her alternations between physical strength and weakness, her 
potions and concoctions, her ability to predict the weather, her aversion to water, and her prophetic 
dreams all align her with the Salem witches. 
 
154 See Ann Braude’s “Women’s History Is American Religious History” for a battery of research 
supporting this assertion. The most recent survey of religious identification and adherence in America, the 
Pew Research Center’s 2012 Religion and Politics Survey, found that while the number of Americans 
claiming no religious affiliation (the so-called “nones”) has risen by 5% in the past 5 years (from 15% to 
20%), of those who were unaffiliated with a particular religious organization: 
Two-thirds of them say they believe in God (68%). More than half say they often feel a deep 
connection with nature and the earth (58%), while more than a third classify themselves as 
“spiritual” but not “religious” (37%), and one-in-five (21%) say they pray every day. (“Nones”) 
The secularization narrative, then, is difficult to apply even to those claiming no religious affiliation, since 
many of these “nones” engage in behaviors and hold beliefs in common with the religiously affiliated. 
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Morgesons, in which religious belief and practice are neither ignored nor attacked but rather are 
taken up as a rich narrative ground in which to explore questions of belief and agency.  
Critics preoccupied with the declining prestige of the New England Calvinist establishment 
overlook the fact that there is another religious discourse at work in the scene in which Cassy 
mocks Mr. Boold: the discourse of Spiritualism, in which minds separated by death and distance 
are nevertheless sympathetically connected and past and future are legible texts to those with the 
gifts to read them. When Charles Morgeson enters the room, Veronica Morgeson, whose 
religiosity and uncanny spiritual gifts form a major motif of the novel, solemnly predicts his 
approaching death—“‘There are six Charles Morgesons buried in our grave yard’” (67)—and her 
clairvoyant powers signal the centrality of secular concerns to Stoddard’s text. The difference 
between reading The Morgesons as a “secularized” text and a “secular” one is crucial: it is the 
difference between a “singular… sensual landscape” in which agency is attributed 
unproblematically to individuals acting consciously and independently of one another and of 
purportedly supernatural forces, and “a much more complex world, one in which there are 
multiple agencies possible,” including forms of agency exercised nonrationally or in 
collaboration with other realms (Jaudon 731). The Morgesons adopts this latter, more complex 
model, and in order to properly recognize the forms of religious agency available to the 
Morgeson women, we must accurately assess the secular (rather than secularized) conditions that 
characterize the novel’s milieu.  
Eschewing inaccurate models of religious history that prematurely proclaim the death of 
religion by pointing to a decline in clerical prestige, religious historian John Modern, building on 
the work of Charles Taylor, Talal Asad, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and other social theorists, has 
characterized contemporary Western societies as defined, not by secularization, but by the 
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conditions of secularism. The term “secularism” describes, not the absence or decline of religion, 
or even the rise of pluralism, but a set of historical, intellectual, and cultural conditions that make 
“religion” into a category available for analysis and deconstruction rather than an unquestioned 
set of assumptions about the nature of the universe: 
Rather than signal a decreasing influence of the religious, secularism names a 
conceptual environment—emergent since at least the Protestant Reformation and 
early Enlightenment—that has made ‘religion’ a recognizable and vital thing in 
the world. To make inquiries into secularism is to ask how certain concepts of 
religion (and the social formations that revolve around them) became consonant 
with the way things were—in essence—as portrayed by a secular political order. 
Such inquiry… directs attention to the styles of reasoning that determine the truth 
of religion and/or its falsity, that enable a person to know the world and objects 
within it along a religious-secular continuum. (Modern, Secularism 7-8)  
 
Rather than providing evidence of the death of religion in America, The Morgesons dramatizes 
precisely the conditions of secularism that Modern and other religious historians have described 
as bursting into being in the early- to mid-nineteenth-century United States. For one thing, the 
novel is far more pluralistic than its critics have made note of: in addition to its ongoing concern 
with the condition of the Congregational church in mid-nineteenth-century Massachusetts, the 
narrative events of the tale also reflect other aspects of nineteenth-century religious change, 
including the increasing influence of revivalist sects like the Methodists as well as the 
imaginative and devotional possibilities offered by the spread of non-Protestant movements like 
Catholicism and Spiritualism.155  
But secularism and pluralism are not identical; rather, secularism describes the set of 
conditions within which pluralism becomes possible and new configurations of religious agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Individual nineteenth-century Americans often combined an interest in Spiritualist belief and practice 
with regular attendance at Protestant services; indeed, this is precisely what Cassandra and Veronica 
Morgeson do. So in this sense it is perhaps somewhat reductionist to refer to Spiritualism as a “non-
Protestant” religious movement. Institutionally and philosophically, however, Spiritualism defined itself 
as a counter-movement to Protestant orthodoxy, destined to enlighten the dogmatism of entrenched 
ecclesiastical authorities. 
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are born. To read the role of religion in The Morgesons properly, critics must attend, not only to 
the static pronouncements of the clergy at the margins of the story, but to the fluid spiritual 
power of the women at its center.156 The “styles of reasoning” modeled in and by The Morgesons 
can best be recognized, not by homing in on scenes that denigrate orthodox clergy and church 
rituals, but by examining tableaux that depict the intermingling of different spiritual modes and 
the sympathetic connections enabled by the interpenetration of coexisting systems of belief. By 
attending to the secular registers of the novel, I argue, we are able to discern that The Morgesons 
is a text, not about the decline of male clerical power, but about the circulation of women’s 
religious agency; as such, it employs Spiritualism as a symbolic force and a set of discursive 
practices that together enabled new visions of agency at the level of plot and character and new 
generic possibilities for female authorship. The Morgesons models a style of secular reasoning 
by way of a literary form that elevates indeterminacy above certainty and locates possibilities for 
agency in the mysterious interactions between persons. As such it offers a kind of tutorial on 
how to exist and act in a secular world in which agency can be grasped but not held, wielded but 
not owned. To recognize such styles of reasoning critics must amend their reading practices to do 
justice to the mysteries of a secular world rather than the certainties of a secularized one. 
The Morgesons begins with a scene in which orthodox and Spiritualist modes of belief 
circulate between generations of Morgeson women in a domestic setting, demonstrating how the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 It is true that The Morgesons reflects a New England milieu undergoing tectonic shifts in religious 
adherence within the context of the unprecedented economic, demographic, and technological changes 
that marked the early- to mid-nineteenth century: 
The spiritual hothouse [of the antebellum United States] was in some sense a product of an 
unusual conjunction of social stresses, ranging from the increasing pace of geographic and social 
mobility and the fallout of industrialization, urbanization, immigration, ‘modernization,’ and 
democratization to the extension of market relations, religious diversity, and the sinuous careers 
of religion and science and of class, race, and gender relations…. (Cox 16-17) 
The social and political role of mainline Protestant denominations was certainly under revision in 
nineteenth-century America, but to read The Morgesons as little more than a record of that revision is to 
misunderstand the creative force that religion represents in the novel. 
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secular spirit of the nineteenth century, rather than indicating an inexorable religious decline, 
could engender new forms of spiritual connection and female agency. Invoking the sentimental 
fiction of Laurence Sterne, the Puritan piety of Richard Baxter, and the Spiritualist writings of 
the 1860s, the scene positions The Morgesons at the center of a literary tradition that reaches 
back to eighteenth-century sentimentalism and an austere spiritual tradition characterized by both 
theological rigor and visionary devotionalism. Detailing the reading practices of the “possessed” 
child Cassandra Morgeson—the semi-autobiographical avatar of the author—the scene entwines 
secular reading and writing practices with the markers of sentimental domesticity and female 
piety to paint a tableau of trans-temporal devotion in which the scene itself becomes the medium 
of spiritual connection between character, author, and reader.  
The scene takes place in Mary Morgeson’s “winter room,” where the reading materials 
chosen by the Morgeson women signify the welter of religious modalities that circulate through 
the novel, including orthodox theological debate, clairvoyant communication with the dead, and 
glimpses of the afterlife. At the same time, it draws cross-temporal links between The 
Morgesons’s 1830s setting and its 1862 publication—links that disrupt narratives of 
secularization and religious decline. Cassandra Morgeson, ten years old and outspoken, climbs a 
piece of furniture to reach a shelf full of books, among them Northern Regions (1827) and The 
Saints’ Everlasting Rest (1658). The two books seemingly could not have less in common: 
Richard Baxter’s The Saints’ Rest is a Protestant devotional manual and meditation on death that 
describes the afterlife in symbolic terms that would later be adopted by Spiritualists and liberal 
Protestants. Northern Regions is an adventure book for children that tells the sensational stories 
of Arctic explorers Richard Parry and John Franklin; in the 1830s, when the earliest scenes of 
The Morgesons take place, Parry and Franklin were alive and well, but by the 1860s, when 
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Stoddard published the novel, the late Sir John Franklin had achieved posthumous fame as a 
frequent otherworldly attendant at Spiritualist séances and performances (Lehman 104-105).157 
The juxtaposition of the two texts allows the scene to face, Janus-like, both backward and 
forward, as it invokes both a long-standing tradition of liberal Christian devotionalism and the 
modern, exploratory impulse of the nineteenth century as they met on the common ground of 
Spiritualist belief and practice. 
Cassandra’s expedition to the top of the bookshelf also yields a copy of Laurence 
Sterne’s Sentimental Journey, the font of much nineteenth-century sentimental literature; by 
invoking Sterne alongside the Saints’ Rest and the Northern Regions, Stoddard both situates her 
novel within an ongoing sentimental literary tradition and indicates the centrality of Spiritualist 
relations to her tale. According to Robert Cox, in the antebellum period “Spiritualist writings 
were suffused with the language of sentiment expressed through a peculiarly physical 
emotionality in which affect and sensation were integrated and extended beyond the boundaries 
of the individual” (3). Meanwhile, as Cassandra is climbing shelves and reading about far-off 
places, her mother Mary Warren Morgeson and Mary’s sister Mercy are reading aloud from the 
Boston Recorder an article that describes a doctrinal debate between warring ministers of the 
Congregationalist church.158 Though Cassandra’s narrating voice mocks the terms of the debate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 The well-known Spiritualist medium Emma Hardinge Britten was particularly famous for her 
clairvoyant conversations with Franklin, including her ability to accurately describe Arctic landscapes she 
had never visited. 
 
158 The article that Mary is reading aloud is an account of (unsuccessful) ecumenical outreach among the 
Congregationalist clergy: by questioning which baptismal rite (sprinkling from a font versus complete 
immersion in water) is salvifically efficacious and making friendly overtures toward the local Baptist 
minister, Thaddeus Turner has invoked the wrath of the conservative Congregationalist hierarchy. While 
Turner loses the debate, the discussion itself signifies the increasing liberalism of New England 
Calvinism in the 1830s, when the scene takes place.  
At the metatextual level the specific reference to the Boston Recorder may be an “in joke” intended for 
Stoddard’s friends. The editor of the Recorder was Nathaniel Willis, father of Nathaniel Parker Willis, the 
influential New York writer, editor, and literary colleague of Richard and Elizabeth Stoddard. 
	   193 
(she remembers the principal antagonists as “Brother Boanerges” and the “Church of Hyena”), 
Mary and Mercy approach it with theological seriousness, and their immersion in New England 
religious discourse is enmeshed, in the narrating Cassandra’s mind, with the more Spiritualist 
religious terms in which she understands her own existence. 
Like the later preface in which Stoddard would describe the otherworldly composition of 
The Morgesons, Cassandra’s memory of Mary Morgeson’s “winter room” takes on a ghostly 
quality, with past, present, and future collapsing into one as Cassandra describes how “the hands 
of [the house’s] builders have crumbled to dust” (8). Describing the middle-class Victorian 
comforts of the room—its chintz chair-covers, serge curtains, “chocolate-colored” carpet, and 
cheerful Franklin stove, Cassandra describes a warm domestic scene in which the comingling of 
different literary-religious forms—the devotional manual, the Spiritualist memoir, the sectarian 
journal—facilitates female community and authorial agency (8-9). When Aunt Mercy declares 
the adventuresome Cassandra “possessed” she identifies Cassandra as the focal point for these 
secular circulations of belief. As reader and auditor Cassandra is possessed by the spirits of 
Franklin and Parry, by “Brother Boanerges,” and by the memory of those whose “hands have 
crumbled to dust”; as Mary’s daughter and Mercy’s niece she is possessed by their theological 
concerns even when she does not share them; and as narrator of the scene she is possessed by 
Stoddard’s authorial voice. Rather than indicating a narrative of religious decay from the 
doctrinal concerns of Mary and Mercy’s generation to the Spiritualist interests of Cassandra’s, 
the scene offers a depiction of female religious identification not bound by narratives of 
progress, decline, or even chronological time: Protestant devotionalism, Spiritualist explorations, 
sentimental fiction, and sectarian debate coexist within the loose temporal framework of 
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Cassandra’s memory and The Morgesons’s opening pages, offering a depiction of female 
community and agency enabled by a trans-temporal secular milieu. 
 
Agency Unhinged: Spiritualist Practice and the Circulation of Agency in The Morgesons 
Cassandra’s “possession” is an ongoing motif of The Morgesons, a moniker applied to 
her when she performs actions deemed willful or unladylike—in other words, when she asserts 
unclassifiable or ostensibly inappropriate forms of agency. To be possessed by another, or to 
appropriate someone else’s voice, is to transgress boundaries of individual identity—to deny 
apparent separations between unique minds and souls, and even between this world and the next. 
In The Morgesons, episodes of trance-speaking, clairvoyance, spirit-traveling, and other 
Spiritualist practice both indicate and simultaneously construct unique sympathetic connections 
between characters, while the fluid and unpredictable nature of Spiritualist agency enables new 
configurations of interpersonal power as well.  
Such fluid agencies, John Modern notes, were a hallmark of nineteenth-century 
secularism. Modern describes the nineteenth-century secular situation in the language of 
“haunting”: “Antebellum life… has everything to do with [a] street-walking God who is at once 
unsettling and determinative. It is a God who haunts the human subject yet erases that moment of 
haunting as it is happening. It is a God who incorporates… fleeting moments into the project of 
defining the sentience of human nature as disenchanted, thereby perpetuating its own 
enchantments and stability” (Secularism xxiii-xxiv). For Modern and other recent historians of 
American religion, the flowering of Spiritualist practice in the mid-nineteenth century is both 
effect and sign of this haunted modernity “in which one’s actions are acted upon by others from 
a distance—people, to be sure, but also and perhaps more importantly, concepts, representations, 
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and words” (Modern, Secularism xxix). Under such spiritually destabilized conditions, the 
rationalized notion of agency as something unitary, proprietary, and voluntary—something 
owned and wielded by individuals acting consciously and independently—is neither accurate nor 
helpful. In a society in which ontological boundaries may shift at any moment, agency will seem 
to inhere in objects and organizations as much as in individuals: 
To focus on the disciplinary air of the secular age is necessarily to focus on 
something that may seem anathema to either antebellum Americans or 
contemporary historians who imagine selves as having certain inherent traits. 
These selves have the capacity to access, immediately, their own thoughts, and 
they are set apart from organized forces and systemic structures, a removal that 
guarantees both the political and epistemological premises of the agentive self. 
But agency is not an either/or prospect. It is circuitous. (Modern, Secularism 6) 
 
It is the circuitous functioning of secular agency—the unpredictable circulation of motive forces 
between sympathetic persons—that enables Cassandra and Veronica Morgeson to upend 
expected romantic and domestic narratives and to “come into possession” of themselves.  
In The Morgesons the invocation of Spiritualist practices and the circuitous agencies they 
enable provides the possibility for defying standard romantic and sentimental plots at the level of 
both story and form. Spiritualist practice enables kinds of sympathetic connection among 
Cassandra, Veronica, and their friends that need not conform to the narratives of romantic love, 
sibling rivalry, sudden conversion, and economic dominance that their New England neighbors 
would impose upon them. Cassandra and her future brother-in-law Ben Somers, for instance, 
refuse to fall into the romantic rituals prescribed by their school companions at Rosville. At their 
first meeting Ben describes, accurately and without ever having seen her, Cassandra’s sister 
Veronica: “‘[I] fancy that the person to whom the name belongs has a narrow face, with eyes 
near together, and a quantity of light hair, which falls straight; that she has long hands; is fond of 
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Gothic architecture, and has a will of her own’” (96).159 Their non sequitur conversation and 
immediate rapport (Ben: “‘Are your family from Troy?’” Cassandra: “‘Do you dislike my 
name?’”) suggest an ongoing acquaintance, though they have never met, and when Cassandra’s 
eyes wander Ben asks “‘Are you looking for your sister?’” as though Cassandra and Veronica 
could communicate across the distance between Surrey and Rosville, as Ben and Veronica 
apparently can (96). Ben’s inexplicable clairvoyance—his ability to describe a woman he has 
never met, and whom he will someday marry—and the immediate psychic connection between 
Veronica, Cassandra, and Ben signal both the novel’s resistance to predictable romantic 
narratives (why talk to a beautiful woman about her distant and less attractive sister?) and a 
model of shared agency that can cross boundaries of time and space. Rather than imagining 
herself as the recipient (or victim) of Ben’s romantic attentions and placing herself in a position 
of dependence upon him, Cassandra and Ben form a friendship of equals in which the dominant 
role shifts with circumstance and need.  
Ben and Cassandra’s emotional interdependence is premised on their Spiritualist forms of 
communication and enables them to maintain their platonic friendship in the face of social 
conventions that would cast them in standard romantic roles. Ben, twice described by other 
characters as “visionary” (179, 256), predicts the bad end to which Cassandra’s romance with 
Charles Morgeson will lead,160 but rather than imposing his will on Cassandra he expresses his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Compare this description to the narrator’s depiction of the teenaged Veronica on page 136 of the 
novel. 
 
160
 Ben twice predicts Charles Morgeson’s death. Shortly after meeting Cassandra Ben recites 
Aeschylus’s Agamemnon for her benefit. When Cassandra asks her friend Helen Perkins who 
Agamemnon was, Helen replies, “‘He gave Cassandra her last ride,’” an explanation that foreshadows the 
carriage accident that will kill Charles Morgeson and wound Cassandra. Later Ben hums “I drink the cup 
of a costly death” just as Charles is confessing his love for Cassandra, then spills a glass of wine over 
Charles’s injured wrist, which will figure in the carriage accident. (The line is from Tennyson’s 
“Eleanore,” itself a paraphrase of Sappho’s “Poem of Jealousy.”) 
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opinions only telepathically:  
We looked at each other without speaking, but divined each other’s thoughts. 
“You are as true and noble, as I think you are lovely. I must have it so. You shall 
not thwart me.” “Faithful and good Ben,—do you pass a sufficiently strict 
examination upon yourself? Are you not disposed to carry through your own ideas 
without considering me?” Whatever our internal comments were, we smiled upon 
each other with the sincerity of friendship…. (204) 
 
Cassandra’s access to Ben’s thoughts gives her the authority to resist his moralizing attempts to 
control her behavior; when Ben spouts generic platitudes about her relationship with Charles, 
Cassandra replies with “‘Chut; drop the commonplaces, for once, Ben’” (129). At the same time 
the two friends’ Spiritualist intimacy gives Cassandra the authority to advise Ben about his 
tendency toward alcoholism. 
The Spiritualistic connections between Ben and Cassandra also enable them to defy the 
romantic expectations others would impose upon them. Cassandra’s friendship with Ben 
circumvents the well-worn romantic plot—two wealthy and attractive young people related 
distantly by blood or marriage fall in love and unite their fortunes—and their unconventional 
friendship is literalized in their ability to communicate outside the bounds of spoken 
conversation. The uniqueness of their relationship is brought into sharp relief by the reactions of 
those around them, who interpret their behavior according to the expected terms of nineteenth-
century sexual politics. Observing the strong but unspoken connections between them, Ben’s 
friends assume the end of a predictable romance that never took place: “‘[i]t is all over with 
them’” (204). Ben’s mother, too, offers a conventional explanation for Cassandra and Ben’s 
closeness: Cassandra is after Ben for his money. But Cassandra and Ben refuse to conform to 
these categorizations—the jilted man, the golddigging woman—which assume fixed power 
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relations between men and women: women control sex, men control money.161 
The Spiritualist abilities demonstrated by characters in The Morgesons, including the 
clairvoyant connections between them, offer explorations of shared agency and demonstrate how 
unpredictable agentive formulations can disrupt expected interpersonal narratives—not only 
those involving romance and marriage but those that depend on patriarchal family dynamics. 
Having found it difficult to communicate with her mother in this life, Cassandra can recall her 
mother’s spirit from beyond the grave: “[w]hen my thoughts turned from her, it seemed as if she 
were newly lost in the vast and wandering Universe of the Dead, whence I had brought her” 
(235). Such inversions are disruptive precisely because they undermine the patriarchal traditions 
of inheritance and (economic) possession that structure Cassandra’s and Veronica’s lives: as 
daughters the girls are worth less than sons. When their younger brother Arthur is born, they are 
quickly made aware of their relative value, as one servant, Hepsey, declares that “‘Locke 
Morgeson should have a son… to leave his money to,’” while another, Temperance, points out 
the orthodox underpinnings of the tradition: “‘Girls are thought nothing of in this ’ligious [i.e., 
religious] section; they may go to the poor house, as long as the sons have plenty.’” Mrs. 
Morgeson herself confirms the primacy of sons when she tells Cassandra, “‘I am glad it is not a 
woman’” (29). After Mrs. Morgeson’s death, Cassandra reverses the terms of this experience, 
performing a Spiritualist inversion of childbirth by bringing her mother back into a world in 
which, like a newborn babe, she finds herself “scared and troubled by the pressure of mortal life 
around her” (240). Though she mourns her mother, Cassandra inherits her parents’ home and 
comes to feel “an absolute self-possession, and a sense of occupation I had long been a stranger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Charles Morgeson’s spirit, too, is subject to Cassy’s mediumistic gifts: after his death she conducts 
spectral conversations with him in which she interrogates his motives, and her own, in ways that the 
imperious Charles would never have allowed in life. In these conversations with the dead, Cassy throws 
off Charles’s power over her and is finally able to admit her feelings for Desmond Somers (137-38). 
	   199 
to” (255). “Possession” here, as elsewhere in the novel, takes on a double meaning: Cassandra 
comes into possession of her home and herself by way of her gift of Spiritualist possession, as 
the fluid agencies enabled by Spiritualist mediumship invert the power assumptions inherent in a 
mother-child relationship founded on patriarchal structures of inheritance and female worth.  
Under nineteenth-century gender conventions, to possess one’s home as a woman is both 
to fulfill and to defy domestic expectations; Cassandra’s inheritance could be legitimately 
categorized as either progressive or conservative, since it confines her to domestic space even as 
it makes her master and mistress of that space. But plotting Cassandra’s “possession” along a 
political spectrum would reduce the complexities of her Spiritualist self-negotiation. Histories of 
the nineteenth-century Spiritualist movement often display such an instrumental understanding 
of religious agency as they attempt to pin down Spiritualism’s effects by categorizing the content 
of spirit communications as either positive or negative, either progressive or conservative.162 In 
the case of literary criticism such content-focused interpretation leads to misreadings of the 
Morgeson sisters’ spiritual agency. Christopher Felker, for instance, one of the few critics to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 One of the earliest scholarly works to address the nineteenth-century Spiritualist phenomenon as an 
important historical movement, Ann Braude’s Radical Spirits, describes how the inverted assumptions 
that undergirded Spiritualist practice—that the weak and sensitive could most easily access the powers of 
the spirit world—enabled female trance mediums to make radical political and social assertions, including 
feminist and antislavery declarations, before mixed audiences of men and women. Robert S. Cox has 
challenged this reading of the Spiritualist movement as inherently progressive, noting that the “spirits 
spoke in voices that spanned nearly the entire political spectrum of midcentury America, occupying 
positions, for example, that ran from immediate abolition to gradualism to pro-slavery, from 
egalitarianism to antiegalitarianism, capitalism to socialism” (19). Cox has thus criticized Braude’s and 
other works of religious and social history that treat Spiritualist experience “instrumentally” as a scheme 
for advancing radical reformist causes. (Cox notes that many of these works are based on the findings of 
anthropologist I.M. Lewis, who studied cross-cultural instances of spirit communication while 
problematically removing them from their local and temporal contexts. Lewis concluded that “possession 
has the capacity to challenge and, at least on a local and personal scale, to subvert the normal relations of 
social power, particularly with respect to gender” (Cox 17).) While I agree with Cox on the dangers of 
viewing religion instrumentally, it is possible to study the effects of Spiritualist phenomena without 
assuming that Spiritualism’s adherents produced those effects instrumentally or even intentionally. In 
order to do so, however, we must make a distinction between the radical inhabitations of agency that 
Spiritualist practice enabled and the political content of the language uttered by the medium while under 
the influence of trance. 
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address the Spiritualist motif of The Morgesons, classifies the characters’ Spiritualist gifts as 
“antinomian” and “evil.”163 Prompted by the same narrative of declension that guides Buell’s 
reading of the novel, Felker codes characters’ Spiritualist gifts as indicators of their corrupt 
natures; Felker thus reads a friendly conversation between Cassandra, Ben, and Helen Perkins 
about Helen’s tattoo as a sign of Cassandra’s “secret evil” and Ben’s supposedly “Svengali-like 
power” over her (Felker 216). Judging the conversation in terms of its Spiritualist form rather 
than its content, however—by the effects produced by the psychic connections between Ben, 
Cassandra, and Helen rather than by the purported apostasy of Spiritualist belief—results in a 
different reading: one in which three strangers quickly overcome the constraints imposed by 
New England propriety and achieve a swift and lasting intimacy. The conversation also provides 
Cassandra with a new way to understand herself and her attraction to Charles Morgeson: during 
the conversation Cassandra is “possessed” to speak of her home in Surrey, Helen is “moved” to 
reveal a secret tattoo of her lover’s initials, and Ben, divining Cassandra’s feelings for Charles 
Morgeson, hints that “we shall all be tattooed,” foretelling the carriage accident that will kill 
Charles and leave Cassandra “tattooed” with scars (103, 163).164 Eschewing attempts to classify 
Spiritualist practice or Spiritualist gifts as inherently good or evil makes it possible to recognize 
the unusual and empowering nature of the platonic cross-gender friendship that secular 
spiritualities enable in the novel.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Christopher Felker’s chapter on Stoddard is in his Reinventing Cotton Mather in the American 
Renaissance. In keeping with its declensionist reading of nineteenth-century religious history—difficult 
to avoid, perhaps, in a book on the Magnalia Christi Americana—Felker’s chapter lumps witchcraft and 
Spiritualism together under the general category of “antinomian,” then interprets these elements as 
evidence of New England’s putative slide into religious apostasy rather than as expressions of religious 
vitality and personal agency. 
 
164 Jennifer Putzi recognizes Cassandra’s scars as a sign of her agency, though Putzi reads this agency as 
primarily sexual: “The scars, obtained in the midst of the awakening of her sexual desires, reveal this part 
of her that her society teaches her must remain silent” (168). 
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The problem with readings like Felker’s, then, is that they elevate the content of 
Spiritualist doctrine above the formal effects of Spiritualist practice: they privilege what 
Spiritualists said over what Spiritualism, as a social force, could do. Spiritualism did not progress 
from “a children’s ghost story, [to] an after-dinner entertainment, [to] a popular national 
phenomenon and a powerful new religion” by virtue of its content alone (McGarry 2). Rather, 
Spiritualism became a transformative religious discourse not only by changing what could be 
said but by altering the dynamics of who was allowed to speak and how—by blurring the 
boundaries between the spiritual and the material and between individual minds.165 Spiritualist 
belief and practice posited the agency that flowed through Spiritualist circles as an unpredictable 
and fluid force wielded collectively and adroitly by those with the least access to sources of 
temporal power, whether extrinsic (wealth and education) or intrinsic (maleness and whiteness). 
In the process, it gave those traditionally positioned as meaning’s repositories—particularly 
women—unprecedented access to channels of communication through which meaning might 
travel and be changed in the process.166  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 “[H]uman agency,” notes the anthropologist Webb Keane, “is not always something people want 
entirely to celebrate or claim for themselves; they may prefer to find agency in other worlds” (“Religious 
Language” 65-66). But to express the quest for agency in terms of “preference” is to oversimplify the 
model of agency at work in Spiritualist practice, as though religious agency were a tool one picked up and 
put down at will. Spiritualism, in fact, baffled attempts to assign preference and intention, consistently 
raising the question of where agency might reside and whether and to what extent individual preference 
and choice were involved in spiritual practice at all. 
 
166 Spiritualism’s power to upend established cultural narratives of power and agency necessarily elicited 
vehement reproofs from religious and cultural authorities. The potential dangers of circulating agency can 
be inferred from the vehemence with which Spiritualism’s claims were repudiated, most often through 
attempts to determine the “true” source of the power that lay behind acts of Spiritualist agency. Scientists, 
clergymen, and other cultural representatives performed investigations or logical exercises whose 
purpose, irrespective of their methodologies, was to deny the fluidity of Spiritualist agency and locate a 
stable source for Spiritualist power, whether that source was the machinations of a fraudulent medium, 
the overactive imagination of an impressionable teenager, or the connivings of the devil himself. The 
most famous of these was the so-called “Cambridge Investigations,” in which Harvard professors 
Benjamin Peirce, Louis Agassiz, and Eben Horsford were invited to view a demonstration of and pass 
judgment on the Spiritualist gifts displayed by the Fox sisters and other well known mediums. Emma 
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It was precisely the unpredictable nature of Spiritualist agency and its consequent 
potential for social disruption that made Spiritualism such a controversial movement. Responses 
to Spiritualist practice thus often sought to pin down the nature and source of Spiritualist agency 
in an effort to undercut its disruptive potential; it is the logical and rationalizing tendencies of 
such attempts that The Morgesons counters with its narrative ambiguities. A representative essay 
in the August 1854 issue of Putnam’s Monthly, “Spiritual Materialism,” illustrates the 
problematics of agency that informed nineteenth-century debates over Spiritualist practice and 
the argumentative lengths to which its detractors would go to pin down the source of the power 
at work in Spiritualist activity. 167 According to “Spiritual Materialism,” the dangers of 
Spiritualist belief and practice lay not in the movement’s physical phenomena, but in its 
practitioners’ refusal to locate power and agency in stable and predictable places. Seeking to 
deny the possibility of collective forms of agency, the essay insists that for one person to have 
agency, another’s agency “must have been destroyed” (160).168 “Spiritual Materialism,” then, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hardinge Britten gave an account of this event in her Modern American Spiritualism, admitting that “the 
result of these meetings, whether we take the acknowledgments of the Spiritualists, or the pro tem. report 
of the professors themselves, was a decided failure” (Modern 186). 
 
167
 Like most pieces in Putnam’s, “Spiritual Materialism” was printed without attribution, but according 
to Poole’s Index of Periodicals it was written by “A.T. Tracy.” (I can find no biographical information on 
Tracy, though he appears to have published one other article in Putnam’s, “Mining Vanities,” in 1855.) 
Both Elizabeth Stoddard and her husband Richard published pieces in Putnam’s, Richard in 1853, 1855, 
and 1870, and Elizabeth in 1868 and 1869. Their friends Horace Greeley and Bayard Taylor were also 
frequent contributors. The issue in which “Spiritual Materialism” appeared also contained Taylor’s 
“Ethiopian Nights’ Entertainments,” so it is likely that both Richard and Elizabeth read it. 
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“Spiritual Materialism” draws a fixed line of demarcation between the spiritual world and the material, 
insisting that the twain will never meet, “that it is impossible that a spirit should manifest itself 
physically” (159). Faced, however, with the fact that thousands of Americans claimed to have seen 
spinning tables and heard mysterious knockings and ghostly music apparently brought about by spiritual 
means, the essay goes on to explain that, if such things are possible, they must be achieved by the 
suppression of participants’ wills to those of their spiritual accomplices:  
There remains, so far as we can see, but the one way in which physical phenomena can be the 
action of spirits. If the spirits can obtain the complete control of a human agent; if the persons in a 
‘circle,’ beneath whose fingers a table takes to its legs and perambulates, are really and truly 
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attempts to debunk Spiritualist claims to authority by applying to Spiritualist practice an 
Enlightenment liberal model of “sovereign agency” according to which agency is held and 
wielded individually and in competition with other sovereign subjects. The model of agency at 
work in Spiritualist practice and in The Morgesons offers an embodied and discursive critique of 
this western liberal model of agency, one in which “[u]ntethering the speech act from the 
sovereign subject… more fully acknowledges the way in which the subject is constituted in 
language, how what it creates is also what it derives from elsewhere” (Judith Butler 16).169   
It is precisely the power of unhinged agency—the possibility of an agentive self that 
might travel between and among multiple persons connected by sympathetic means—that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
acting without any volition of their own, under the immediate possession of spirits, then, and not 
otherwise, may these manifestations be in a certain sense spiritual…. (160) 
According to the article, agency must be located either in the doings of spirits, or in those of the séance’s 
participants: there can be no cooperation between the spiritual and the material realms.   
The author of “Spiritual Materialism” is not alone in distinguishing the unusual physical phenomena of 
the séance from the Spiritualists’ claims to communicate directly with the dead. The French Protestant 
cleric and diplomat Count Agénor Étienne de Gasparin wrote a two-volume treatise in which he debunked 
claims of spirit communication but left table-turning intact: “[t]he physical phenomenon, long suspected 
by thinking minds, which has been discovered but not sufficiently demonstrated by Animal Magnetism, 
finds its irrefutable proof in the Turning Tables” (xviii). Gasparin described a series of experiments in 
which he and a group of companions caused a table to turn spontaneously without ever touching it; they 
spread flour on the table to record the fingerprints of any who might surreptitiously try to alter the 
outcome of the investigation. Accepting table-turning while scoffing at spirit communication has the 
benefit of removing the dangerous power of the medium’s (often female) body from consideration, since 
table-turning could be performed by any group of people without a medium present. 
 
169 The second and third parts of “Spiritual Materialism” go on to enumerate the other distinctions that 
Spiritualist authors and practitioners refused to respect: the difference between material and spiritual 
bodies, between faith and experience, between the revelations of nature and those of the Bible, and, 
perhaps most offensively, between separate Christian sects: 
These creatures say that the soul of man has been shockingly trammeled and hemmed in by the 
stern religious teachings of the past—that it must now be granted the ‘freedom of unbiased 
thought,’ in order that it may ‘throw off all bonds of sect or denomination,’… Their wrath burns 
hot against all ‘sect and denomination.’ Under this head they enumerate the Church of Rome, the 
Church of England, Presbyterians, Dutch Reformers; all other sects and denominations of 
Christians are, of course, included in this category. (165-66)  
The most disruptive aspect of Spiritualist belief and practice, then, was its refusal to acknowledge 
carefully defended social and doctrinal boundaries: not only do Spiritualists refuse to acknowledge the 
authority of established denominational hierarchies, but they refuse even to discriminate between 
Protestants, Anglicans, and Catholics. 
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characters in The Morgesons access and wield. But rather than locating these agencies in a 
particular spatial or temporal location—the séance or the public demonstration—The Morgesons 
situates them in the relations between people, where they cannot be merely debunked or 
dismissed. Veronica Morgeson, like her sister Cassandra, is possessed of Spiritualist talents, but 
her particular gift most resembles the Spiritualist practice of trance-speaking: the power to 
channel the words and feelings of others as though she herself were speaking or experiencing 
them. This is simultaneously the most explicit and the most paradoxical way in which Spiritualist 
mediumship can undermine individual and hierarchical models of agency: Veronica can actually 
inhabit and ventriloquize those who should have authority over her. Veronica’s first words in the 
novel are in the third person, as though something or someone were speaking through her: as a 
clumsy child she overturns a milk pan on her head and begs her mother to “‘Help Verry, she is 
sorry,’” perhaps divining the very words that are in her mother’s mind (16). Later, when she is 
ill, the third-person recurs: “‘It is the winter that kills little Verry’” (153); this time it may be 
Cassandra or the family servant Temperance, watching by her bedside, whose voice she has 
borrowed. Veronica’s clairvoyance also allows her to divine and express hidden emotions that 
defy ordinary speech. Shortly after Charles Morgeson dies Veronica expresses her sympathy for 
the heartbroken Cassandra (who has confessed her affair to no one) through the kind of strange 
and ghostly melodies associated with the Spiritualist séance: she “went to the piano, and played 
music so full of wild lamentation, that I again fathomed my desires, and my despair…. She 
stopped, and touched her eyelids, as if she were weeping, but there were no tears in her eyes. 
They were in mine” (147). On the night before her wedding Veronica dreams, not of her own 
future husband, but of Cassy’s: in the dream she sees Desmond Somers carving Cassandra’s 
name into a tree. When dream-Desmond pricks dream-Veronica with a dagger, Veronica awakes 
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to find a red mark on her arm; years later, when she meets Desmond for the first time, she 
identifies him as “‘the man I saw in my dream’” (258).170 In each of these cases, Veronica, 
though sick and frightened, is able to assume the thoughts and feelings of those around her in 
order either to enlist their sympathy or to enter more deeply into their emotional lives. This 
ability gives her a claim to recognition in a household in which, as the younger, less attractive, 
and less engaging sister—“mother… did not love her as she loved me,” the narrating Cassandra 
observes (16)—she has little to command attention. 
Where Cassandra’s Spiritualist gifts help her defy romantic conventions and disrupt 
patriarchal family narratives, Veronica’s sympathetic clairvoyance embeds her more deeply 
within the family while simultaneously allowing her to repudiate the pieties of class that 
structure Surrey society and to form meaningful relationships across social divides. When 
Grandfather Warren dies Veronica refuses to attend his funeral, correctly intuiting that 
“‘grand’ther Warren nearly crushed’” Mary and Mercy “‘when [they] were girls of our age’” 
(70). Instead, she sends her custom-sewn mourning bonnet to a local widow’s daughter, who 
turns up at church wearing the expensive object in the “Poor Seats” (62)171—an act that 
highlights the arbitrariness of class distinctions artificially naturalized in the details of church 
seating and mourning rituals.172 While the wealthy Morgesons condescendingly allow the local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Keane notes how such religious practices blur the boundaries of the individual subject: “In many cases 
where the authorship, performance, and responsibility for speech is distributed among different actors, it 
might be most accurate to describe the result as the creation of a supra-individual speaking subject. The 
reverse is also possible, the combining of distinct roles in a single bodily individual” (“Language and 
Religion” 442). 
 
171
 Until the mid-nineteenth century many Protestant churches charged pew rental fees that supported the 
activities of the church. Wealthy families thus got the best seats in the house, in front near the pulpit, 
while those who could not afford the fees sat at the back or in the balcony, in the “poor seats.” 
 
172 Veronica’s unnerving ability to distinguish sincerity from hypocrisy—another characteristic of the 
Spiritualist medium, who could detect the presence of “unbelievers” at the séance table—also makes her 
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poor to warm themselves at the kitchen fire, only Veronica befriends them (26), and on a trip to 
Boston she uses her shopping allowance to buy presents for the “cadaverous” children of a 
missionary on his way to India (71). Veronica’s willingness and ability to empathize with others 
across boundaries of class is both sign and effect of her Spiritualist gifts—she channels others’ 
thoughts and feelings—and it widens the circle of emotional connection within which she lives. 
Rather than restricting herself to friends from finishing school, as Cassandra does, Veronica is 
able to seek out relationships with women like the seamstress Lois Randall, whose working-class 
origins should place her beneath the Morgesons’ notice. Veronica’s Spiritualist agency, then, 
finds its expression in sympathetic relationships in which agency is shared even between persons 
of different social classes.173 
Veronica’s unique and socially unsettling ability to empathize with those outside of her 
class is exemplified in her relationship with the household servant Fanny, whose ambiguous 
class status is a constant source of unrest in the Morgeson household. The Morgeson family has 
“adopted” Fanny as a putative kindness to the girl’s now-dead mother, installing her as kitchen 
help despite the fact that she was not expected to go into service. Veronica and Fanny share an 
unspoken sympathetic connection that expresses itself in mutual understanding that nevertheless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an object of fear for the clergymen who would seek to involve her in their plots. When “Mr. Thrasher’s 
Revival” sweeps through Surrey the ambitious minister visits the Morgesons in hopes of persuading them 
to his cause, but in Veronica’s presence “the man [tears] away the mask of the minister,” revealing his 
fear of her superior piety (and perhaps also his unrequited attraction to her) (155). Veronica’s strong 
Spiritualist gifts also help her defy conventional rituals when she does not find them meaningful, as when 
she refuses to attend Grand’ther Warren’s funeral or to greet well-meaning visitors after her mother’s 
death: “Veronica alone would see no one. Her room was the only one not invaded” (215). 
 
173
 Christopher Hager notes that “The Morgesons imagines writing (not just women’s writing) as an 
adversary of Massachusetts’s industrialization and its changing social hierarchy— a local precursor of the 
larger social transformation that the Civil War would shortly usher in” (706). Oddly, however, he 
identifies Cassandra as the writer in the family and dismisses Veronica as “starving for meaning,” despite 
the fact that Veronica writes more avidly than Cassandra does (Veronica and Lois have a writing club in 
which they exchange and comment upon one another’s essays) and seems better prepared than Cassandra 
for the changes in New England’s class system that will accompany industrialization. 
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does not conform to the patterns (or platitudes) of simple friendship: Veronica sees through 
Fanny’s attempts to spite Cassandra, uncovering her true motivations (“‘I admire her; you do 
too’”), while Fanny predicts Veronica’s approaching illnesses (“‘you are going to be sick; I feel 
so in my bones’”) (151). When Mrs. Morgeson complains that she has “‘never seen a spark of 
gratitude’” from Fanny, Veronica replies that she “‘never thought of gratitude, it is true; but why 
must people be grateful?’” (135). The statement “I never thought of gratitude” could represent 
Fanny’s own thoughts about her situation; here Veronica channels Fanny’s anger and recognizes 
it as a legitimate response to events outside of her control. Mary Morgeson, lacking Veronica’s 
sympathy or her clairvoyance, attributes Fanny’s anger to Fanny’s putatively bad character—  
“‘her disposition is hateful. She is angry with those who are better off than herself’” (135), she 
claims—while ignoring the economic and class privilege that make it possible for the wealthy 
Morgeson family to appropriate an orphaned child and make use of her as household staff.174 
While Veronica’s clairvoyant gifts and unusual spirituality make possible forms of 
agency that would otherwise be foreclosed by the hierarchies of gender and class that structure 
Surrey society, critical analyses of Veronica’s character generally follow the same pattern as 
those histories of Spiritualism that elevate content over form: they pass judgment on the positive 
or negative effects of Veronica’s actions while overlooking the innovations of agency that make 
it possible for Veronica to act at all. Noting the multivalent nature of Veronica’s seemingly 
altruistic behavior—she is occasionally “petted” for her kindness to the local poor, and her 
friendships with Lois and Fanny are tinged with patronage—critics on the whole have labeled 
Veronica’s peculiar behaviors as cynical grabs for attention and Veronica herself as “self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 The Morgeson family performs this act of appropriation again in the novel when the captain of one of 
Locke Morgeson’s ships sends him “a box of shells… and a small Portuguese boy, named Manuel” as 
gifts (241). Manuel, like Fanny, is installed as a servant and feels an immediate affinity with Veronica, 
likening her at one point to the Virgin Mary. 
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destructive,” “thwarted,” or “oblivious” (Putzi 172; Zagarell, “Repossession” 48; Çelikkol 48).175 
But the rush to classify the effects of Veronica’s spirituality as “good” or “bad” obscures the 
accession of agency that her Spiritualist gifts enable: Veronica’s ability to divine and channel the 
thoughts, words, and feelings of others gives her access to forms of agency that would otherwise 
be denied her. The same mysterious spiritual power that offers Veronica sympathetic access to 
others’ minds also gives her the moral authority to resist pressures to conform to social or 
familial expectations. 
 
The Cultural Work of Spiritualist Fiction  
As this reading of The Morgesons shows, Spiritualist fiction offered a medium through 
which to interrogate the disruptive forms of agency enabled by and modeled in Spiritualist 
practice. It did not always affirm them, however: much of the nineteenth-century fiction that 
depicted Spiritualist belief and practice performed the same cultural work that “Spiritual 
Materialism” aspired to enact, seeking to assign agency in stable and predictable ways and, in so 
doing, to bolster sexual, domestic, and economic hierarchies with their top-down models of 
power.176 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Çelikkol claims that Veronica, of all the Morgeson family, is the one most willfully blind to market 
forces: “After all, it is market relations that provide the middle-class Veronica with a piano and carpets 
and curtains” (48). But Veronica is arguably far more aware of market forces than is the supposedly more 
self-aware Cassandra, who, upon returning from her extended visit with the wealthy Charles and Alice 
Morgeson, redecorates her room with elegant and expensive furnishings and engages in an extended 
power struggle with Fanny, smashing dishes for the sole purpose of making Fanny clean them up while 
threatening to run to Locke with tales of Fanny’s insubordination. Veronica, at least, acknowledges the 
presence of the poor in Surrey and in fact is the only member of the Morgeson household to take an active 
interest in the lives of those less fortunate than herself, or to conceive that servants might have inner lives 
as complex as her own. Cassandra, for instance, expresses horror when she discovers that the family’s 
servants are stockholders in Locke Morgeson’s shipping business, since such a connection undermines 
the settled power relations she has taken for granted. 
 
176
 Elizabeth Stoddard and her husband Richard Henry Stoddard belonged to a circle of New York literati, 
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The Stoddards’ close friend Bayard Taylor, for instance—to whom The Morgesons is 
dedicated—published several Spiritualist tales in the Atlantic Monthly at the same time that 
Elizabeth Stoddard was composing her novel. Unlike The Morgesons, Taylor’s tales depict 
Spiritualist ritual as a banal sham and Spiritualist agency as entirely of this earth, a cynical and 
unnatural attempt by women to usurp men’s religious and romantic power. In Taylor’s stories, 
Spiritualism disrupts patriarchal marital relations by empowering women to make sexual 
advances toward men. In “Confessions of a Medium” (1860) a lascivious Swedenborgian and his 
drunken female medium use the dubious doctrine of “natural affinities” to justify their 
extramarital affair; the narrator, a hapless young bachelor, is saved from their sordid influence by 
the good offices of his quiet and chaste fiancée, who rejects all non-orthodox forms of belief and 
practice. In “The Experiences of the A.C.” (1862) another idealistic bachelor joins a utopian 
community, where he is horrified by the bold romantic advances of an unattractive older woman. 
His own preference is for a homespun young woman who conforms to traditional romantic roles 
by waiting for the narrator to declare his feelings and then insisting on a long and proper 
engagement. In “The Haunted Shanty” (1861), a more gothic and ghostly tale than either of 
these, a spurned woman spirit-travels to the remote homestead of her ex-lover, haunting his 
marriage bed and eventually causing the death of his child; her depredations end only with her 
own death. In each of these stories Spiritualist ritual and practice are discursively linked with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
including Horace Greeley, Bayard Taylor, Kate Field, and George Ripley, whose novels and stories 
frequently thematized Spiritualist phenomena. Greeley did not subscribe to Spiritualism himself but wrote 
an open-minded essay about it in the inaugural issue of Putnam’s Monthly, and he “defended [the 
Spiritualists’] integrity in the [New York] Tribune while his wife tried to get in touch with her dead son, 
‘Pickie’” (Kerr 6). Greeley sponsored the Fox sisters’ 1850 relocation to New York City, paid for the 
eldest Fox sister, Leah, to reside in Barnum’s New York Hotel (Cox 7), and reflected on Spiritualist 
phenomena in his 1868 autobiography, Recollections of a Busy Life. George Ripley and William Cullen 
Bryant attended séances, Kate Field experimented with planchette, and Bayard Taylor used Spiritualism 
and utopian movements as frequent subjects for his fiction. See Kerr for a discussion of these and other 
pieces on Spiritualism in the periodical press, and see James Matlack’s 1968 biography of Stoddard for a 
discussion of the literary circle that surrounded Richard and Elizabeth. 
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forms of female agency—particularly romantic and sexual agency—that are dangerously 
unstable and operate outside of male control. Taylor’s tales defuse this threat at the level of 
narrative by disposing of the unruly women through death, sexual rejection, or exile. 
According to Howard Kerr, whose Mediums, and Spirit-Rappers, and Roaring Radicals  
(1972) remains one of the most thorough studies of Spiritualist fiction available, “the 
spiritualistic movement exercised a distinct and fairly unified influence on the American literary 
imagination” (4) by providing a target for humorous or satirical attacks or a storehouse of vague 
occult symbols—what Buell called “bohemian charm” (364). But Kerr’s definition of 
“nineteenth-century writers” was largely limited to male authors for whom Spiritualism’s 
affiliation with feminism, women’s rights, and female agency in general made it a dangerous and 
frightening phenomenon. Accordingly, Kerr described these authors’ “unified” approach to the 
Spiritualist movement, and particularly its accordance of power to female mediums, as consisting 
of satirical disdain, dubious warning, or frowning disapproval.177 Expanding the category of 
Spiritualist fiction to include Stoddard and other female authors offers a different picture of the 
cultural work performed by Spiritualist fiction: one in which occult practices and symbols offer 
imaginative opportunities for exploring female agency rather than suppressing it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Kerr’s treatment of nineteenth-century Spiritualist fiction, while providing detailed accounts of female 
Spiritualist mediums including the Fox sisters, Cora Hatch, and Emma Hardinge Britten, overlooks 
Spiritualist fiction by women except for an occasional reference to Harriet Beecher Stowe and Elizabeth 
Stuart Phelps. Recent treatments of Spiritualist fiction have begun to remedy Kerr’s oversight. Bridget 
Bennett’s Transatlantic Spiritualism and Nineteenth-Century American Literature, for instance, treats 
Spiritualist practice and Spiritualist fiction as responses to the ongoing history of violence in the 
circumatlantic world. John Kucich’s Ghostly Communion: Cross-Cultural Spiritualism in Nineteenth-
Century American Literature undertakes a similar project, but looks inward—at the treatment of Native 
Americans and slaves on U.S. soil—rather than outward to Europe and Africa. And Mitzi Schrag’s 2006 
dissertation Rei(g)ning Mediums: Spiritualism and Social Controls in Nineteenth-Century American 
Literature examines fiction by male authors that, like Bayard Taylor’s Spiritualist tales, sought to 
narratively tamp down the dangerous possibilities for female agency raised by Spiritualist practice. But 
while there have been a number of treatments of English women’s Spiritualist fiction among scholars of 
British literature, I have yet to encounter a full-length study of women’s Spiritualist fiction in the 
nineteenth-century United States. 
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Compare Taylor’s treatment of Spiritualism and sexuality, for instance, to that depicted in 
Stoddard’s 1871 short story “A Dead-lock and Its Key”178 which, like Taylor’s Spiritualist tales, 
uses the symbology of Spiritualist ritual to comment on female agency and hierarchical marriage. 
Unlike Taylor’s tales, “A Dead-lock and Its Key” employs the phenomena of the Spiritualist 
séance—flickering candles, strange atmospheric phenomena, disembodied voices, trances and 
fainting, and spirits that speak from locked cabinets—as emblems for women’s silenced or 
suppressed voices rather than as a set of rituals contrived to undermine traditional structures of 
male authority. And unlike Taylor’s tales, which raise the possibility of female religious and 
romantic agency only to lay such possibilities to rest by the end of the story, “Dead-lock” refuses 
to resolve the questions it calls forth, employing the same ethic of indeterminacy that marks The 
Morgesons. 
“A Dead-lock and Its Key” introduces a Spiritualist element not found in The 
Morgesons—the “spirit-cabinet”—and uses this symbolically rich edifice to interrogate women’s 
agency within and outside of marriage. “Dead-lock” tells the story of a young Londoner named 
Mary Lester who is accidentally locked in a large antique cabinet on the eve of her wedding. 
When the story’s narrator, Saleen, arrives at the Lester home to attend the rehearsal dinner she 
finds carpenters and locksmiths struggling to free Mary before she silently suffocates. As Ellen 
Weinauer has noted in a perceptive reading of “A Dead-lock and its Key,” the terrifying and 
impenetrable cabinet in which Mary is locked—the pride of her father’s household, which he has 
forbidden anyone to meddle with and to which he alone holds the key, but which even he fails to 
open—comes to symbolize patriarchy and the indissoluble bond of marriage into which Mary is 
about to enter. But the cabinet also calls forth a popular Spiritualist image: the spirit-cabinet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 “A Dead-lock and its Key” appeared without attribution in Harper’s Weekly on November 4, 1871. It 
has been reprinted in Opferman and Roth’s edition of Stoddard’s stories. 
	   212 
invented and demonstrated by mediums Ira and William Davenport, who during their shows 
were tied fast and shut up in a large cabinet from which ghostly music and spectral hands then 
issued forth.179 Like the supposedly impenetrable spirit-cabinet, the Lester family’s armoire 
offers “no weak point, no crevice, no possibility of breaking into the huge thing without fear of 
harm to that which it held locked and fast, within a few inches of our light and air and living life, 
done to death by a bit of clever machinery, the work of a dead hand” (135). As Mary’s family 
struggles to release her from the cabinet, Stoddard’s scene takes on the characteristics of séance: 
there are three “telling blows” as the room grows darker and a storm begins, “strange and 
incongruous on this fine evening” (137). Candles are brought; Mr. Lester falls on the floor as if 
dead. Mrs. Lester begs him to “‘speak to me,’” but he can only beat his hand on the floor, and his 
knockings are repeated in the blows of the hammers and in the rappings that release the hidden 
spring that finally opens the cabinet. The “clever machinery” that has “done [Mary] to death” is 
symbolically aligned with the marriage laws that will soon render her “civilly dead,”180 even as 
the “dead hand” that imprisons her recalls the spirit-hands that would emerge through the 
apertures in the Davenports’ cabinet while the Davenports themselves were purportedly tied up 
inside.  
Stoddard’s tale of domestic imprisonment, then—Mary’s actual entrapment in her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 P.T. Barnum described the spirit-cabinet as “about six feet high, six feet long, and two and a half feet 
deep, the front consisting of three doors, opening outward.... The bolts are on the inside of the doors” 
(52). In “A Dead-lock and its Key” Stoddard describes the cabinet that endangers Mary as having three 
doors side by side, with an inner door hidden behind the central door:  
The centre one, about four feet wide, and certainly six inches thick, shut in another, which again 
inclosed, with a space of about eight inches of waste room, a set of six drawers, of different sizes, 
and a sort of cupboard above them.... The two side doors opened with curious keys, which stood 
in the locks, chained to the armoire. (132) 
 
180
 Weinauer’s work on marriage law and the domestic symbolism of “A Dead-lock and its Key” was 
presented at the 2011 American Literature Association Conference in Boston, Massachusetts. I am 
grateful to her for providing me with a copy of the paper, and for allowing me to cite her unpublished 
work here. 
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father’s cabinet and her potential entrapment in her impending marriage—invokes the language 
and symbolism of Spiritualism, not to affirm romantic narratives that reinforce hierarchical 
marriage, but to suggest how marriage might rob women of opportunities for agency by silencing 
and suffocating them. “Dead-lock” employs the props and practices of Spiritualism, particularly 
the spirit-cabinet and the séance, to suggest the legal and personal predicament that marriage 
posed for women, as it threatened to subsume their voices and their bodies under those of their 
fathers and husbands. Unlike Taylor’s tales, however, Stoddard makes no attempt to resolve such 
problems at the level of narrative. “Dead-lock” ends, not with Mary’s marriage or her release 
from the cabinet, but with narrative indeterminacy: as the cabinet is finally forced open there are 
“ten awful seconds” of silence, “then a cry and a heavy fall,” but it is never revealed who cried 
out, who fell, and, most importantly, whether Mary has survived her imprisonment. The final 
lines of the story extend the mystery further as they reveal that the entire incident was a dream 
and that the narrator Saleen, upon waking, is late for the rehearsal dinner. This “resolution” 
suggests nothing so much as circularity, since it opens the possibility that Saleen’s dream was a 
premonition and that she may yet arrive at Mary’s house to find her friend locked in the cabinet; 
formally the story provides, not narrative resolution, but an infinite and open-ended loop. Unlike 
Taylor’s Spiritualist tales, which raise the threat of female religious agency only to narratively 
defuse it through the death or marriage of the would-be medium, “A Dead-lock and its Key” 
ends inconclusively, with neither marriage nor death, leaving open the interpretive possibilities 
raised by the conflation of Spiritualism, fiction, and gender. In The Morgesons, Ben Somers 
avers that “‘If we do not lay our ghosts, our closets will be overcrowded’” (253). The closets of 
Stoddard’s Spiritualist tales are crowded with possible endings, resolutions refused, and lessons 
unlearned. 
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Conclusion: Misdiagnosing The Morgesons  
The hallmark of Stoddard’s literary engagement with Spiritualism, then, is mystery and 
indeterminacy—a refusal to collapse distinctions, provide concrete answers, or assign agency in 
expected ways. In The Morgesons it is Veronica’s illnesses, standing on the line between two 
possible interpretive regimes, that are the embodied expression of these fluid and unpredictable 
forms of agency. Veronica’s advanced spirituality—the impression, shared among her family 
and friends, that she has a particularly strong relationship with the divine—is signaled by her 
physical frailty and frequent bouts of debilitating illness. Spiritualist practices, rather than 
denying the body, placed it at the center of religious experience, positing the body rather than a 
particular building or book as a holy space through which spirits and their attendant agencies 
might circulate.181 Whether in public trance lectures before a crowded hall of people, small 
séances in suburban parlors, or private hours between an individual and her planchette, 
“mediumship and the physical body became inseparable” (Cox 20). The Morgesons endows its 
characters with the supernatural abilities that underlay Spiritualist practice precisely because of 
the way Spiritualism foregrounded the medium’s bodily experience as central to the experience 
of the divine. Steeped in New England orthodox traditions that define the body in general and the 
female body in particular as “the temporary prison of the soul” (Gutierrez 141) and the source of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Those among the educated and cosmopolitan, like the Stoddards and their friends, often found it 
difficult to embrace Spiritualist practice, not (or not only) because it defied doctrinal tradition but because 
its manifestations were so frustratingly this-worldly: performances that purported to include 
communications from the spirit world seemed ridiculously grounded in this one. “The overwhelming 
majority of antebellum spirit communications,” Robert Cox declares, were “so excruciatingly banal that 
Lydia Maria Child lampooned them as ‘more disappointing than the golden key which unlocked nothing; 
for they are the merest mass of old rags, saw-dust, and clam-shells’” (3). What bothered these critics was 
precisely the materiality of Spiritualist practice: its refusal to restrict itself to ethereal forms. The 
Spiritualist insistence on the centrality of the medium’s body—often poor, sick, female, black, or all of 
the above—only heightened this impression. 
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temptation, Cassandra and Veronica seek out other ways of understanding their bodies as the site 
of both material experience and spiritual transcendence. 
Cassandra sits up with her sister during one of these terrifying episodes, in which 
Veronica  
could not speak, but shook her head at me to go away. Her will seemed to be 
concentrated against losing consciousness; it slipped from her occasionally, and 
she made a rotary motion with her arms, which I attempted to stop; but her 
features contracted so terribly, I let her alone. “Mustn’t touch her,” said 
Temperance…. Her breath scarcely stirred her breast. I thought more than once 
that she did not breathe at all. Its delicate, virgin beauty touched me with a holy 
pity. We sat by her bed a long time…. Suddenly she turned her head, and closed 
her eyes…. In a few minutes, she asked, “What time is it?” “It must be about 
eleven,” Temperance replied; but it was almost four. (153)182   
  
This sickroom scene is shot through with religious language and imagery: the “virgin beauty” of 
Veronica’s body suggests the incorruptibility of the Virgin Mary (an association that recurs 
throughout The Morgesons),183 while the misrecognition of time suggests a scene of worship 
removed from the temporalities of everyday life. Temperance, the Morgeson family servant, has 
participated in the ritual many times and knows its patterns: “‘Mustn’t touch her’”; instead, it is 
Cassandra who is “touched” with holy pity. The impersonal pronoun “its” that Cassandra 
employs in this description—does it refer to Veronica’s breath? Her illness? Veronica herself?—
reiterates the mysteriousness of these attacks and Veronica’s otherworldliness. The narrating 
Cassandra, like the reader, stands outside of the scene, puzzling through its possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Veronica’s malady is not the wasting-but-beautiful consumption of Alice Humphreys or Little Eva, but 
neither is it the mean-spirited malingering of Marie St. Clare. Indeed, Veronica’s illnesses seem almost a 
parody of the death-scenes that mark sentimental fiction: rather than gathering her family and servants 
around her she tries to lock them out of her room, and though she does cut off her hair, the act is more 
compulsive than comforting—she bestows no locks on her family and continues cutting for so long that 
by the time she has recovered she is nearly bald. 
 
183 On the day of Veronica’s wedding Manuel, seeing her with her bouquet, exclaims “‘Santa Maria!’” 
(248). When Veronica and Desmond meet for the first time, Desmond tells her “‘you are like the Virgin I 
made an offering to, only not quite so bedizened’” (258). These are only a few of the points at which 
Veronica, in addition to her Spiritualist gifts, is also linked with Catholicism.  
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interpretations: is Veronica imprisoned in this unruly body, or acting through it? Is she 
physically ill or spiritually inspired? Is Veronica the agent or object of these attacks—a “she” or 
an “it”? Does Veronica, Cassandra, or Stoddard herself even know? 
The multiple valences of the scene reflect the hermeneutic indeterminacy of nineteenth-
century Spiritualist practice: the same symptoms welcomed by Spiritualist mediums and their 
followers as signs of divine anointment were diagnosed by medical professionals as debilitation 
and as evidence of women’s inherent delusion and disorderliness (or, in the case of male 
mediums, of the unnatural feminization of men). Compare the description of Veronica’s 
inexplicable illness to the features of the Spiritualist trance outlined by Molly McGarry: 
There were two main variations…: falling into a fainting trance, sometimes called 
catalepsy, and uncontrolled thrashing, jerking, or trembling…. The sufferer 
alternately sobbed and laughed violently, complained of palpitations of the heart, 
clawed her throat as if strangling, and at times abruptly lost the power of hearing 
or speech. A deathlike trance might follow, lasting hours, even days. (126-127) 
 
The uncontrollable “rotary motion” of Veronica’s arms, her prolonged breathless 
unconsciousness, and her voiceless protests against Cassandra’s nursing mark her seizure-like 
attacks of illness as similar to Spiritualist trances. But rather than come down on one side of the 
question or the other—the only diagnosis the novel will make is that Veronica is “delicate”—The 
Morgesons leaves the mystery of Veronica’s illness unsolved. 
Twentieth- and twenty-first-century critics, on the other hand, have rushed to diagnose 
Veronica’s illnesses as psychosomatic delusion, “the hysterical reaction of a young woman who 
does not want to grow up and face her anger at her severely restricted life” (Matter-Seibel 31).184 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Christopher Hager and Sabine Matter-Seibel both offer the anorexia diagnosis, and Julia Stern remarks 
on the “automaternal dimensions” of Veronica’s adolescent habit of “subsist[ing] on a regressive diet of 
milk and buttered toast” (“I Am Cruel” 108). (Indeed, Stern makes quick work of the Morgesons’ various 
psychological afflictions: Locke Morgeson has “compulsive shopping and speculating disorders,” Alice 
Morgeson is “occupied monomaniacally by child-rearing,” Charles Morgeson “expresses an exclusionary 
passion for hothouse gardening and horse-breaking,” and the various Pickersgill-Somerses are “notorious 
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Rather than consider the possibility that Veronica’s religiously inflected illnesses might point to 
the centrality of the body to her Spiritualistic construction of the self, critics have sought to 
explain away her “self-destructive” behavior (Putzi 172), most often by diagnosing it as anorexia 
nervosa.185 Such diagnoses accord with Jenny Franchot’s observation that literary critics 
employing Marxist, psychoanalytic, or poststructuralist theoretical principles have tended to 
approach religion as though it were disease: “About those who ‘had it’ in the past, scholars often 
write either ‘around’ the belief (as if belief stays bottled up within a denominational container 
and never tinctures a person’s greater reality) or isolate it as a deviant element to be extracted for 
diagnostic analysis” (837). The critical discourses Franchot invokes are all subject to the larger 
(a)historical narrative of secularization, in which the scientific processes of rationalization and 
disenchantment promise emancipation from superstition and, by extension, a solution to all the 
spiritual mysteries a text might hold. 
Such readings have obscured how Veronica’s spirituality—signaled, in part, by her 
frequent illnesses—enables her to experience her body, not as an opaque signifier of identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for alcoholic self-immolation” or “control their kindred by means of inappropriate sexuality and 
economic tyranny” (“I Am Cruel” 108).) Jennifer Putzi compares Veronica’s illnesses unfavorably to 
Cassandra’s scars: while the scars are “crucial to [Cassandra’s] sense of self and her redefinition of 
womanhood as the result of experience,” Veronica’s delicate constitution symbolizes “blissful ignorance 
or self-destructive illness” (172). Ayse Çelikkol accuses Veronica of symbolic complicity with the forces 
of market capitalism, reading Veronica’s illnesses as identifying her with an ethos of the sublime that 
paradoxically reinforces market relations by refusing to participate in them. Whatever their diagnosis, 
though, the critics are agreed that Veronica’s illnesses are marks of her selfishness or symbols of her 
failed character: she is “thwarted” and “reclusive” (Zagarell, “Repossession” 48), “a twisted specimen of 
the angel-child” (Matter-Seibel 31). In The Morgesons, Cassandra’s father gives her some advice: “‘Let 
me tell you something; don’t get sick. If you are, hide it as much as possible. Men do not like sick 
women’” (107). Neither, apparently, do critics.  
 
185 Veronica’s cryptic assertion that she “‘need[s] all the illnesses that come’” (73) has led critics 
including Stacy Alaimo and Ayse Çelikkol to claim that her illnesses are self-inflicted—that they are 
cultivated grabs for attention and props to her own self-importance, or at the very least signs of her 
conformity to separate spheres ideology. But the fact that Veronica finds a way to make meaning out of 
her recurring illnesses—that she puts these long periods of pain and paralysis to some sort of spiritual 
use—does not necessarily mean that she brings them on herself. 
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(male or female, beautiful or ugly, rich or poor, sick or well) or the source of temptation to men, 
but as a fluid medium for accessing the possibilities of the mysterious and the divine. Like her 
Spiritualist gifts and her acts of cross-class charity, Veronica’s illnesses are multivalent: while it 
is possible to read them as selfish grabs for attention and attempts to make herself the center of 
family life, they also provide opportunities for those around her to act on their best impulses, as 
when Fanny claims that Veronica’s illnesses give Fanny the chance to “be somebody” (154). 
They also help Veronica herself to make sense of her existence. Cassandra-as-narrator notes that, 
We did not perceive the process, but Verry was educated by sickness; her mind 
fed and grew on pain, and at last mastered it. The darkness in her nature broke; by 
slow degrees she gained health, though never much strength. Upon each recovery 
a change was visible; a spiritual dawn had risen in her soul: moral activity 
blending with her ideality made her life beautiful, even in the humblest sense. 
(65) 
 
It is the creativity of Veronica’s life—the way that spirituality enables her to imagine ways of 
being in the world that are not defined by patriarchy and privation—that critics who ignore her 
spiritual aspirations, or diagnose them as delusion or selfishness, simply cannot see. 
The rush to diagnose Veronica (as well as Cassandra) is a symptom of a secularized 
critical tradition in which “the real problem is that women, persons of color, and other members 
of historically oppressed groups are not generally allowed to be both subject and object at once” 
(Fleissner, “Feminism” 55). Like Spiritualism’s detractors, including the early psychologists that 
McGarry discusses, modern-day critics seem anxious to assign agency and hold it fast, so that 
“[t]he moment [fictional figures] display characteristics not conforming to absolute rationality 
and dignity, they seem inexorably reduced to pure objects, sheer victims of determining forces 
beyond their individual control” (Fleissner, “Feminism” 55). Such assumptions make it 
impossible to understand religious phenomena, including Spiritualist mediumship, that offer a 
“psychic double play of… subjectivities that blu[r] the boundaries between active, speaking 
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subject and passive object” (McGarry 126).  
At the same time, the diagnostic move recapitulates the “monopoli[zation] of all 
knowledge” that nineteenth-century Spiritualists complained of: the mania among lawyers, 
physicians, clergy, scientists, and educators to pass judgment upon and dismiss the embodied 
experiences of Spiritualist mediums and their fellow seekers (Britten, Nineteenth Century 192). 
One outgrowth of this monopolization of knowledge was a phenomenon that William James 
called “medical materialism”—the rage to reduce all strong spiritual feeling to a product or 
symptom of disease:  
Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to 
Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It 
snuffs out Saint Theresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary 
degenerate. George Fox’s discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for 
spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle’s organ-
tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-
tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of 
diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of 
various glands which physiology will yet discover. 
And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such 
personages is successfully undermined. (Varieties 14-15)186 
 
As a cultural discourse emphasizing first-hand knowledge of the universe gained through 
collective, shared seeking, Spiritualism offered a vociferous challenge to “the incipient 
professionalism of science [and] medicine,” whose practitioners claimed the authority to assign 
meaning to existence by appealing to scientific principles “which to most people [were] as 
invisible as ghosts” (Cottom 772, 774). As such, it offered opportunities for personal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Charles Dickens, too, had his suspicions of “medical materialism,” though he did not call it by that 
term. In A Christmas Carol (1843) Ebenezer Scrooge says to the ghost of Jacob Marley, come to beg him 
to repent of his sins:  
“‘You may be an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of an 
underdone potato. There’s more of gravy than of grave about you, whatever you are!… You see 
this toothpick?... I have but to swallow this, and be for the rest of my days persecuted by a legion 
of goblins, all of my own creation.’” (“Marley’s Ghost”) 
Both James and Dickens found the materialist explanation of spiritual phenomena so unsatisfying as to 
provoke ridicule. 
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collective self-definition that were not defined by the binaries of professional discourse. 
Susan Gubar notes how the assumption that women and other disempowered persons 
must be either rational or irrational, either agents or victims, either subjects or objects, and that 
these attributes manifest themselves through physical signs diagnosable by experts, impoverish 
critical understandings of literature by women by whittling down the number of acceptable ways 
that women may negotiate their existences in the world. Tellingly, she offers her own diagnosis 
for this tendency, one that mirrors the interpretation that contemporary critics have most often 
applied to Veronica: “critical anorexia.” Narrowing our readings of nineteenth-century religious 
women in ways that diagnose their embodied religiosity as mental or physical illness reinscribes 
the same limiting cultural discourses that, even in the 1860s, already sought to narrow the ways 
in which women’s minds, bodies, and voices might legitimately be defined.187  
By invoking the embedded indeterminacies of Spiritualist practice and refusing to resolve 
them at the level of narrative, The Morgesons challenges totalizing discourses that would seek to 
reduce human experience and human agency to singular and mutually exclusive explanations. 
Like Spiritualist leaders, Veronica and Cassandra complain about the monopolization of 
knowledge—the foreclosing of mystery that diagnosis entails. When Locke Morgeson quizzes 
Veronica about her impending marriage to Ben with the question, “‘Do you know each other?’” 
Veronica replies, “‘We do not know each other at all. What is the use of making that futile 
attempt?’” (169). Cassandra, facing the prospect of life as the mediator of Ben and Veronica’s 
marriage, muses that her sister and soon-to-be brother-in-law “would have annihilated my 
personality, if possible, for the sake of comprehending me” (163). Complete and total 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187
 In an essay provocatively titled “What Ails Feminist Criticism?” Gubar answers the titular question in 
this way: “I could call the problem a bad case of critical anorexia, for… identity politics made the word 
women slim down to stand only for a very particularized kind of woman, whereas poststructuralists 
obliged the term to disappear altogether” (901). 
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knowledge—the kind provided by the professional discourses of doctors, clergy, and modern 
literary critics—is framed within the novel as an annihilation that must prove fruitless precisely 
because of its thoroughness. When Ben Somers probes Cassandra’s feelings for his brother 
Desmond he dismembers a book in his agitation: “taking up a book, which he leaned his head 
over, and whose covers he bent back till they cracked,” Ben performs the action that later critics 
would perform on the book of Veronica and Cassandra. “‘You would read me that way,’” 
Cassandra avers, and she could be speaking to twenty-first-century critics as much as to Ben 
(232). Like Cassandra’s mythical namesake, who foresaw the future but was unable to change it, 
Elizabeth Stoddard predicted the dissection to which her text would be subjected—a future in 
which critics, like surgeons, would probe her novel for signs of spiritual disease. 
  
	   222 
 
 
CODA: Religious Agency and the Secularized Academy 
 
In the years following the Civil War the forms of Protestant religious-secular agency 
modeled in antebellum fiction moved beyond the imaginative space of fiction and received more 
concrete embodiment in the rise of new religious movements and in the growth of social and 
political causes grounded in the reform impulses of the antebellum era. Religiously driven 
organizations like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union offered women a form of 
collective intervention in social affairs that was grounded in particular Protestant visions of 
agency similar to those modeled earlier in the century in fiction by Catharine Maria Sedgwick, 
Susan Warner, and Augusta Jane Evans. The growth of denominations like the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, founded in the early nineteenth century and providing a locus for 
black religious leadership throughout the postbellum period, gave African-American Protestants 
a venue for independent theological thought and coordinated social action that was not beholden 
to the white Protestant hierarchies William Wells Brown had complained of in his letters to The 
Liberator. And the unhinging of religious authority and the new forms of secular agency 
performed in Stoddard’s The Morgesons became part of postbellum life as new religious groups 
including the Christian Science, Theosophy, Holiness, and New Thought movements arose with 
women either at their heads or in important positions of leadership. 
The social effects brought about by the collective political achievements of female and 
African-American Protestants after the Civil War seem, in retrospect, to be of varied social 
utility. The historian Edward Blum credits white Protestant women with consolidating white 
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identity and solidifying Jim Crow segregation in the years following the Civil War; the greatest 
success of the Temperance movement, the nationwide prohibition of alcohol, lasted only 
fourteen years. But divorcing the concept of agency from specific political outcomes—resisting 
the impulse to classify agency itself as good or bad by reading its effects according to 
anachronistic historical evaluations—reveals that the forms of religious agency dusplayed by 
women and African Americans after the Civil War included an expanded field of social and 
political action not previously available. 
So successful were the new forms of religious agency modeled in fiction and taken up by 
social activists that already in the 1860s and 1870s white, male religious leaders were on the 
defensive, attempting to reclaim religious influence for themselves. In an 1866 essay on “Pulpit 
Talents” the liberal theologian Horace Bushnell advocated sermons that exemplified “a 
mediating combination of scholarship, stylistic talent, effective vocalizing, human feeling, and 
vigor,” the very characteristics found in novels by Sedgwick, Warner, Evans, Brown, and 
Stoddard (Reynolds 491). In 1877 Henry Ward Beecher, contemplating the growing influence of 
women within the church, insisted that “manhood is the best sermon” and that men needed to 
assert their positions in their religious communities (quoted in Reynolds 493-494). Such 
reactionary calls for white male religious involvement culminated in the turn-of the-century 
phenomena of “muscular Christianity” and the Men and Religion Forward Movement, a 
nationwide revival that sought to draw white men back into Protestant churches by aligning 
Protestant values with the “masculine” world of business and competition rather than the 
“feminine” world of domesticity, nurture, and social reform (Bederman 432). 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, then, the role of Protestant religious adherence in 
providing a source of communal identity and collective agency for the disenfranchised was so 
commonly acknowledged that it became necessary to “reclaim” Protestant agency for white men. 
How, then, did it become so difficult for twentieth- and twenty-first-century literary critics, so 
concerned with the question of agency, to recognize religion as a legitimate field for individual 
and collective action? How did religion, in the modern literary-critical narratives discussed 
throughout this project, become something “done to” the disenfranchised rather than something 
chosen and experienced by them? 
This question brings us back to the secularization thesis that I discussed in my 
introduction and, intermittently, throughout this dissertation—not the putative secularization of 
American culture as a whole, but the secularization of academic discourse in particular. It is the 
secularization of critical discourse that has made it difficult for literary historians and critics to 
recognize religion as a legitimate source of agency for the disenfranchised. As Vincent Pecora 
has argued, the forms of criticism valued by twentieth- and twenty-first-century critics—most 
famously Edward Said’s model of “secular criticism”—base their claims to objectivity on an 
implicit or explicit characterization of all religious belief as irrational, primitive, and dogmatic. 
In this way secularized criticism is “forged in opposition to religion and, in that way, 
irremediably marked by it” (Seth 305). The modern research university has thus become one of 
the primary producers of secularized twentieth-century discourse: since  
the story of secularization narrates a triumph of empiricism over superstition, 
reason over faith, and the emancipation of all spheres—science, knowledge, the 
market, the state—from the oppressive and authoritarian ‘yoke of religion’… 
secular institutions—such as the emerging research university—become the place 
for a public discourse based on scientific evidence, objective reason, and 
disciplined methodology. (Kaufmann 607) 
 
As religion becomes a secularized criticism’s putative “other,” and as that secularized criticism 
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legitimates itself by claiming to deconstruct and strip away unexamined beliefs and oppressive 
dogmas, it becomes all but impossible to recognize how religion itself might provide a source of 
agency for its adherents. 
The most extended critique of the secularized academy has come from historian George 
M. Marsden, who claims in The Soul of the American University (1994) that the progress 
narrative of the rationalized university, set forth in the 1960s by historians including Frederick 
Rudolph and Lawrence R. Veysey, should properly be read as a narrative of declension. Marsden 
claims that the twentieth-century university’s commitment to rationalized scientific inquiry has 
robbed the institution of its “soul,” such that the university no longer produces moral leaders but 
instead churns out “value-free scientific inquiry” (265). Marsden’s text sparked an extended 
debate on the role of the research university in the modern world—a debate that I will not 
recapitulate here—but what both Marsden and his interlocutors overlook is the way that 
academic discourse, both pre- and post-secularization, has always been positioned to exclude 
those modes of discourse most accessible to the disenfranchised. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, 
and early-nineteenth centuries, when theological discourse took place in venues from which 
women and people of color were excluded—namely the pulpit and sectarian journals—the 
university was in the business of educating clergy and publishing such journals. Over the course 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as women, African Americans, and other 
disenfranchised persons gained access to the discourse of doctrine and to (mostly non-ordained) 
forms of religious leadership, the university gradually transformed itself from an institution 
concerned with theology and religious leadership to an institution in which religion was merely 
one subject among many, to be relegated to Religious Studies departments or divinity schools. 
Transformational narratives like those of Marsden, Rudolph, and Veysey—whether they 
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posit a model of progress or decline—thus obscure the overarching consistency of the American 
academy: it privileges and produces whatever form of discourse—religious or secularized—is 
least accessible to women and people of color.188 This consistency-through-transition is most 
obvious at the turn of the twentieth century when, just as the Men and Religion Forward 
movement was struggling to reclaim Christianity for men, American academics were working to 
reposition religion as a subject of rationalized scientific inquiry rather than a vital language that 
offered opportunities for collective agency to the disenfranchised. 
William James’s turn-of-the-century work on belief and religious experience encapsulates 
this set of changes, exemplifying the transformation of religious language from an effective 
source of agency to a corpus suitable for professional dissection by psychologists and 
practitioners of other incipient academic disciplines. James’s 1897 essay “The Will to Believe” 
and his 1902 book The Varieties of Religious Experience (based on his Gifford Lectures at the 
University of Edinburgh) define legitimate religious experience in terms that dismiss collective 
and communal forms of religiosity while celebrating individualistic and originary acts of 
religious creation, particularly those performed and codified by men. While not directly 
denigrating the religious experiences of women and persons of color, James’s classification of 
“true” and “false” religion privileges those experiences that conform to an individualistic, liberal 
model of religious belief and practice. And because, as this dissertation has shown, the religious 
agency demonstrated by disenfranchised persons is often at its most potent when it defies or 
avoids the atomizing tendencies of liberal individualism, defining valid religious experience as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 The fact that the student population of most universities is now majority-female and far more racially 
diverse than in past centuries does not undermine this consistency. The recent “crisis” in higher 
education, in which states have systematically defunded public higher education and the majority of 
university courses are now taught by contingent faculty, has coincided with the rise in enrollment of 
women and people of color. Once women and people of color gain access to a discourse, that discourse is 
no longer considered worthy of public debate; once women and people of color gain ascendancy in a 
public institution, that institution is no longer considered worthy of public funding.  
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essentially internal and individual, as James does, delegitimizes the very forms of communal 
religious agency most likely to empower the disenfranchised. 
“The Will to Believe” and the Varieties, like the larger secularization narrative in which 
they form an important node, are both descriptive and normative, excluding certain kinds of 
religious experience by setting narrow boundaries for what should be regarded by psychologists 
(James’s primary professional audience) as “true religion.” In James’s formulation, “true 
religion” is practiced individually rather than communally, because communal religious 
experience is necessarily rote and dull. True religion is originary and “pattern-setting”; religious 
experience that is not original can only be vacantly imitative. True religion is practiced by 
leaders—recognizable by virtue of their spiritual enthusiasms—rather than by those who follow 
them. True religion is primarily an internal, psychological experience rather than an external, 
social one, and can be recognized by its tendency to produce abnormal psychological 
phenomena. Despite such abnormalities, however, true religion can best be recognized by 
reading rational explications of doctrine rather than by examining the myths and stories of a 
particular religious culture. Taken together, these conditions for true religiosity work to exclude 
those who would experience religion communally, ritually, submissively, interdependently, or 
nonrationally—namely, in all of the ways that women and African American characters 
experience religion in the texts this dissertation has engaged. 
James begins the Varieties by delineating how his auditors, students of the new field of 
psychology, can recognize true religious tendencies in their fellow men: 
I speak not now of your ordinary religious believer, who follows the conventional 
observances of his country, whether it be Buddhist, Christian, or Mohammedan. 
His religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, 
determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit. It would profit us 
little to study this second-hand religious life. We must make search rather for the 
original experiences which were the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested 
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feeling and imitated conduct. (10) 
 
James positions religious persons as existing in only two possible types: the “conventional” 
adherent who has inherited his religion “second-hand” from his community, and the “genius” 
whose religious experience marks him as “abnormal”—separate from the community and then, 
later, grudgingly acknowledged as its leader (10). The “ordinary” believer, who may think that 
he is consciously participating in meaningful, sacred rituals with important cultural significance, 
is really only an automaton, reproducing a religion “made for him by others,” “retained by 
habit,” and suitable only for “imitation” (a word James repeats twice). This privileging of leaders 
and originators over followers and communities of believers positions true religion as an 
experience that can only be authentic when not shared with others; it is the originator’s very 
“eccentricity”—his removal from common experience—that marks his religion as “true.” This 
formulation not only privileges religious traditions that value individual self-awareness and 
striving but classes any form of communal religious experience as inauthentic and beneath 
notice. It thus renders invisible forms of religious adherence and agency that are not obviously 
originary and creative.  
James’s descriptions of the “ordinary” believer imply inactivity rather than action: “made 
for him,” “communicated to him, “determined” by others, and “retained” passively, by habit. 
Religious observances that follow “conventional” forms (the connotation is derogatory) are 
hardly worth calling “religion” at all, since they are passively received rather than actively 
engaged in. Communal religious experience thus cannot provide a source of agency; only the 
solitary believer, acting alone, has agentive power. Though James’s pronouns class all religious 
adherents—leaders and followers—as male, in practice his classifications are implicitly 
gendered. Since the ordained leaders of most religious movements were largely male even at the 
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end of the nineteenth century, and since female religious adherents often find comfort and 
companionship in communities of faith, James’s elevation of religious leaders above religious 
followers implicitly denigrates the religious experiences of women. 
Once religious leaders have been distinguished from followers, the next distinction to be 
made is between those with “normal” religious tendencies and those with “abnormal” ones. The 
true religious innovator will demonstrate “exalted emotional sensibility” but also a disturbing 
tendency toward “abnormal psychical visitations” including “fixed ideas,” “trances,” and 
“visions”: 
These experiences we can only find in individuals for whom religion exists not as 
a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather.... Even more perhaps than other kinds of 
genius, religious leaders have been subject to abnormal psychical visitations…. 
They have known no measure, been liable to obsession and fixed ideas; and 
frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented 
all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily classed as pathological. (Varieties 
10) 
 
Religious persons, in James’s formulation, can be one of two things: dull or unstable. The former 
are not worth dwelling upon; the latter can best be approached as psychological specimens. 
Paradoxically, however, the historical evidences of these abnormal religious tendencies must be 
judged according to standards of reasonableness and self-consciousness determined by academic 
professionals like James and his students: 
I must confine myself to those more developed subjective phenomena recorded in 
literature produced by articulate and fully self-conscious men, in works of piety 
and autobiography…. It follows from this that the documents that will most 
concern us will be those of the men who were most accomplished in the religious 
life and best able to give an intelligible account of their ideas and motives. 
(Varieties 8) 
 
True religion, despite its classification as an abnormal psychological state, can be recognized by 
its tendency to produce works of piety and autobiography—never fiction or myth—that are self-
evidently both rational and professional. The only religious adherents worth studying are those 
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who have reached the top of their field—the CEO’s, as it were—and can describe their religious 
experience “articulately” and “self-consciously.” Forms of religion that cannot be expressed 
rationally and systematically, or that can be best expressed in narrative forms like fiction and 
myth, are imperfect or unevolved. James, then, aligns true religion with the implicitly white, 
male, and Protestant conditions of the American public sphere: “true religion,” though it might 
originate in abnormal psychological forms like trances or visions, will eventually prove itself 
rational, textual, and fully compatible with burgeoning social scientific discourses that privilege 
description and classification over creative narration. Any religion or religious adherent that 
cannot be understood within these terms is false, imitative, rote, and unworthy of notice. 
The implicitly gendered and raced terms of James’s classificatory scheme are made even 
clearer in his 1897 essay “The Will to Believe” in which, in addition to thinking through a theory 
of religious belief, he addresses the increasing division of Western experience into public and 
private realms. Decrying a modern tendency to elevate the putatively public discourse of science 
over ostensibly private religious feelings, James makes the case for a robust public religious 
presence by aligning religion with a competitive, scientific masculinity and distancing it from 
any association with communal experience or personal sentiment. As in the Varieties, the 
gendered terms of this dichotomy are fairly clear. James argues for the continuing relevance of 
religion to a properly constituted public sphere by arguing that it be reclassified as science rather 
than sentiment: 
When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and 
sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men 
lie buried in its mere foundations;… then how besotted and contemptible 
seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-
wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream! 
Can we wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science 
should feel like spewing such subjectivism out of their mouths? (“Will” 7) 
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The physical sciences, and scientists themselves, are “manly,” “rugged,” and “august,” while 
religious belief is “sentimental”—a term synonymous, by the end of the nineteenth century, with 
the weak and feminine. The purpose of bringing religion into the public sphere, then, is to 
“masculinize” it, to rid it of its feminine sentimentality and put it on an equal footing with the 
sciences. James imagines a battle royal in which “religious hypotheses” are pitted against one 
another in a public sphere defined according to the terms of empirical science and competitive 
capitalism: “the freest competition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest 
application to life by their several champions, are the most favorable conditions under which the 
survival of the fittest can proceed” (“Will” xii). The faiths that emerge from this Darwinian 
challenge will be those which most resemble (or force themselves to resemble) science: “Those 
faiths will best stand the test which adopt also [the scientist’s] hypotheses, and make them 
integral elements of their own” (xii). In this new twentieth-century public sphere, defined by 
rationalism and the triumph of scientific thinking, religious agency will consist not in communal 
acts of meaning making but in a mano a mano competition to conform to scientific methods of 
interpretation. Women and persons of color, still largely excluded from the sciences and from the 
halls of higher education, will have little to contribute to this competitive discourse. 
James, then, wishes religion to remain a matter of public debate, not because religion will 
transform the public sphere, but because the public sphere will transform religion, first by 
eliminating “lesser” forms (those that do not conform to a “widening knowledge of the world” 
[“Will” xi]) and finally by absorbing it within the discourses of science. The actions of religious 
people and communities, in James’s formulation, should be properly subsumed within and 
subordinated to the expectations of a rationalized public sphere. While James’s language is 
generally gendered rather than raced, Laurie Maffly-Kipp has recently described how James’s 
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Harvard student W.E.B. DuBois performed a similar act of division in creating histories of 
African-American social life: turn-of-the-century black intellectuals presented black history, 
“especially its religious elements, as a romantic but vestigial remnant of a dying way of life,” a 
primarily emotional experience characterized by “the frenzy of the Southern preacher, the 
croonings of the spirituals, and the ecstatic ravings of the congregation.” DuBois, Cater 
Woodson, and other black intellectuals thus positioned the communal religious experiences of 
African Americans as aspects of a superseded past no longer applicable to a black community 
that would soon join the ranks of “academic and elite audiences” (Maffly-Kipp 4). If African 
Americans were to enter into an increasingly rationalized public sphere they would have to do so 
as secularized individuals rather than religious communities. 
The consolidation of the secularized university that took place at the turn to the twentieth 
century thus relied implicitly on intellectual models that either denied the generative power of 
religious agency or relegated it to the distant past. The public sphere was reimagined, not as the 
proper place for doctrinal debate, but as a secularized space in which religious discourse and 
agency must either conform to scientific standards or disappear altogether. The assumption that 
the public sphere is a fully secularized space and that the forms of agency most appropriate to 
and effective within it must therefore also be secularized became so pervasive over the course of 
the twentieth century that when religious agency did appear in the public sphere it was quickly 
removed from official histories. Ann Braude’s study of the National Organization for Women, 
for example, notes the critical role played in the group’s founding in the 1960s by Catholic nuns, 
Methodist lay leaders, and other religious feminists, who established “an Ecumenical Task Force 
on Women and Religion that organized worship services as well as supporting women’s rights in 
religious contexts” (“Religious Feminist” 559-560). Braude goes on to demonstrate how feminist 
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historiographies that appeared during the 1980s and 1990s erased these religious origins, 
“portraying religion exclusively as an enemy of feminism” (“Religious Feminist” 556) and 
emphasizing the success of the “secular feminist” movement. Feminism, then, had to be stripped 
of its religious roots in order to claim its proper place in a secularized public sphere.  
Such revisionism, as this dissertation has shown, has obscured critical understandings, 
not only of the twentieth-century social movements that Braude studies, but of nineteenth-
century history and literature. To remedy the continued misreading of the power of religious 
agency in the nineteenth-century public sphere, critics must seek out secular models of criticism 
rather than secularized ones: models of nineteenth-century culture (and twenty-first-century 
culture as well) that account for the complex interplay of religious and non-religious discourses 
instead of assuming that the latter take precedence over the former in any given text or context. 
An attention to the interleaving of the religious and the secular—and to the shifting values 
embedded in these terms at different cultural and historical moments—can reveal the many ways 
that religion functions to enable agency in both the public and private spheres, and lead to better 
understanding of the role of religion in past eras and our own.  
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